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Introduction
Towards a relational society
Introduction text
“The real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new landscapes but in 
having new eyes” (Marcel Proust)
Premise
After many years of theoretical work and empirical research on social rela-
tions, and on the paradigm of relational sociology, I think the time has 
come to outline the vision of society to which these reflections and field 
research lead.
As far as I can see, from the 1980s, from year to year, the relational per-
spective on society has proven to be increasingly topical. The reasons for this 
growing relevance are many. I could mention the processes of globalisation, 
the advent of new technologies (information and communication technol-
ogies [ICT], artificial intelligence [AI], robotics), the dematerialisation of 
society, the diffusion of scientific theories based on the principles of relativ-
ity, indeterminacy, the progress in quantum physics, genomics, and many 
other sciences, not to mention the Covid-19 pandemic which showed the 
importance of social relations in spreading the virus as well as in avoiding 
it. Overall, all these factors have accelerated the process of creating a new 
“relational environment.” The various economic crises of the first decades 
of the 21st century and then the Covid-19 pandemic of 2020 did the rest, 
making the social relationship the protagonist of social and cultural change, 
for better or for worse.
This book is an attempt to show how the reality of social relations is 
profoundly changing modern society and will lead it to be another society, 
no longer modern as we have known it in the past. Of course, the book is not 
against modernity, which has brought so many benefits to humanity. Nor 
is it a question of taking sides for a conservative or progressive position. 
It is simply a matter of understanding that we are going beyond moder-
nity. It is the exit from one world to go to another world. This exit is as 
problematic as any creation of a new societal formation.
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What is modernity?
Modern society has been defined in a thousand ways. Sociology has been 
particularly rich in contributions. Obviously, it is impossible to mention 
even a few of the main texts. I limit myself in recalling some representations 
with respect to which I intend to highlight the novelty of the idea of a rela-
tional society. I think about the Capitalist Society (Karl Marx 1848), The 
Acquisitive Society (Richard Tawney 1923), The Achieving Society (David 
McClelland 1961), The Active Society – “one that is master of itself” (Amitai 
Etzioni 1968), the Information Society (James Beniger 1986), and, more 
recently, Risk Society (Ulrich Beck 1992), Reflexive modernisation (Ulrich 
Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash 1994), The Rise of the Network 
Society (Manuel Castells 1996), and up to the Knowledge Society that many 
have talked about.
I mentioned these authors only to point out that the various definitions 
of society have marked an evolution of modernity characterised by a cre-
scendo of dematerialisation of the concept of modern society.
All the connotations of what has been and still is modern society are obvi-
ously linked together. They have tried to capture the various phases and 
changes of the modernisation processes up to the so-called late modern, post-
modern, hyper-modern, and so on. It is not the task of this book to directly 
address these complex issues, which are rather kept in the background.
The purpose of this book is to argue that modern society encounters a 
social and cultural morphogenesis that leads to “beyond modernity.” We 
are entering an aftermodern, or trans-modern society that I call “relational 
society.” I propose to speak of a society that abandons modernity and tran-
scends it, while maintaining certain aspects of it.
This new society radically alters the guiding ideas of Western modernity, 
in particular the idea that society, albeit with ups and downs, is marked 
by a linear or multilinear progress, that time is quantitative, that science 
and technology are the basic factors of development, and that culture can 
entirely replace nature. All these ideas encounter a profound crisis. It must 
be recognised that the changes are moving in uncertain directions and that 
the configuration of society opens up to the world of the “otherwise pos-
sible.” It is, therefore, also possible for society to regress to a permanently 
worse configuration than in the past. Among the phenomena that contrast 
modernity, we must mention the fact that time becomes qualitative and cir-
cular, that science and technology prove to be the causes of perverse effects, 
that nature rebels against the domination of culture.
The discontinuity is not just about one or more dichotomous differences 
between the past and the new that emerges, because it is the same dichot-
omous thought used by modernity that is put into question. New ground 
of social phenomena feeds a new thinking about the possible relationships 
between opposing entities, such as conservation/change, past/future, quan-
titative/qualitative, and nature/culture. What relationships?
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Having to choose, for simplicity reasons, a dichotomy that represents the 
most significant nucleus of modernity, as it marks its apogee and its decline, 
I assume that modernity, as a cultural and structural configuration, is 
defined by the opposition between two symbolic codes, which I call lib and 
lab. They are still at work, as evidenced by the race to the Covid-19 vaccine 
which saw the free market advocates opposed to those who rightly wanted 
the vaccine to be considered a common public good.
At the beginning, and for a long time, the two codes took on the ideolog-
ical meaning of liberalism (lib) and socialism (lab), freedom vs equality. The 
third pole of the French Revolution, fraternité, never had a significant role. 
Subsequently, the two codes were reformulated in various ways and became 
increasingly abstract. Lib has become the point of reference for individual-
istic approaches. Lab has become the point of reference for system or holis-
tic approaches.
The relevant fact, from my point of view, is that lib and lab have been and 
still are used as binary codes (0/1) which exclude the “Third.” The Third 
can be interpreted in many ways, but what matters to me is that it is not a 
combination of lib and lab (as in the “Third Way” of Giddens). The Third is 
what transcends both the lib and the lab. It is another symbolic code. In this 
text, I will try to explain what it is.
From Georg Simmel to attempts to 
portray the future of society
The modern world is characterised by the confrontation between pro-
gressives and conservatives, left and right, and lab and lib. This world is 
over. Neither is the winner, although liberalism seems to prevail at times. 
Why can we no longer describe society with modern categories? Simply 
because, in the meantime, society has gone somewhere else. Where has it 
gone?
Who anticipated the new world, beyond the very important contributions 
of other classic authors such as Marx, Durkheim, Pareto, Weber, was Georg 
Simmel. An author who experienced the drama of the “tragedy of modern 
culture.” Simmel argues that the tragedy of culture comes about when the 
objective culture comes to dominate the subjective culture of the individ-
ual. In other words, the tragedy of culture occur when the individual’s will 
and self-development become submissive to the product of its own crea-
tivity, without the hope of being able to “reverse” the situation (as Marx 
prophesied).
As Papilloud (2018: 212) reminds us, to respond to the dissolution of val-
ues and social life, Simmel develops all his ideas on the rock of the concept 
of relation. The relation summarises the interpenetration of three processes: 
Wechselwirkung (reciprocity effect), Vergesellschaftung (socialisation), and 
Tausch (exchange). Simmel places different importance on each of these 
concepts throughout the development of his works. In his late writings, he 
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extends the meaning of Wechselwirkung to a cosmological principle of life 
energy. Papilloud (2018: 212–213, italics mine) writes,
Each of these three concepts describes the same shift in modernity 
from substance to function, that is, from a social differentiation rest-
ing on socially defined positions to a social differentiation that itself 
defines social positions. For Simmel, this cultural turn in modern 
society leads to an abstract society in the sense that social forms play 
an increasingly important role for the definition of these social posi-
tions, and finally, for the determination of the possibilities that will 
make society concrete. To put it in a less abstract way, modern society 
is one in which social actors, groups, and institutions grow by concen-
trating ever more content in forms capable of occurring in every pos-
sible relation. In this regard, money as well as love are good examples 
of such modern social forms which tend to be life principles, high-
lighting the indifference of these social forms towards their contents, 
and ultimately the exchanges that they mediate, as well as towards 
the actors, groups, and institutions using them to build society. For 
Simmel, the indifference of such generalized forms potentially fosters 
strong social inequalities not only because they tend to be monop-
olized by the actors but also – and maybe above all – because they 
reduce the concrete work on relations to an abstract game with social 
forms. The tragedy of modern culture and modern society eventually 
finds its sociological expression in this ambivalent situation, where 
modern society is possible as a concentration of its most contradictory 
tendencies – which means, at the level of Simmel’s relational sociol-
ogy, that modern society is based on relations which, at the same time, 
it tends to substitute against social forms.
I intend to resume Simmel’s work from where he left it as an exploratory 
and unfinished project. For him, modernity envelops itself in itself without 
being able to get out of it. As Beck will then say, modernisation becomes “a 
systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and intro-
duced by modernisation itself” (Beck 1992: 21).
Simmel fragments have been developed in various directions. Luhmann 
(1998), for example, developed the theme of modernity in terms of shift-
ing from substance to function. The theme of the abstractness of social 
forms was taken up by network analysis. Relationists, such as Powell and 
Dépelteau (2013), have constructed a concept of relational sociology under-
stood as an abstract game with social forms.
For me, the key to getting out of modern tragedy would be a new vision 
of relationality. Simmel saw such a possibility through the concept of 
Wechselwirkung, but the point is that this concept can only be elaborated 
with a theory of emergence in morphogenetic processes and with a stratified 
ontology that he did not possess.
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My proposal
My proposal starts from the need to develop the Simmelian discourse on 
the relationship as that reality which constitutes the only solid element in 
critical conditions of uncertainty, darkness, disorientation, and sense of 
helplessness. It is a perspective that opposes an abstract, purely relativistic, 
and procedural sociology.
I start from the assumption that society is not made up of people who 
exchange something with each other (as in the Aristotelian tradition), but 
that it consists essentially of social relations acted out by people who belong 
to a relational social context in which they are embedded. Society is not a 
space that contains relationships, but it is relationship itself (society does 
not “have relationships” but “is relationship”).
What I mean by social relationship is said in all the chapters of the book, 
in particular in Chapters 3 and 4. Along the whole text, the reader should 
keep in mind the polysemic and ambivalent semantics of the concept of social 
relation, which has a double meaning as a process and as an outcome of that 
process. It may be helpful to consider the analogy with the concept of “asso-
ciation” which denotes both the process of becoming fellows/members (i.e. 
joining) and the outcome of this process, that is the association as an organ-
ised entity with its structure. In the same way, when we say that two agents/
actors “are in relation” or “have a relation,” we can mean the process of recip-
rocal action (interaction and transaction) taking place between them or the 
product of this process, that is the emergent effect, which is the social relation 
as a new reality existing between them with its own structure. The latter is a 
social structure to the extent that it operates as a stable connection between 
the positions of those who are in relation. Therefore, from the ontological 
point of view, the social relation can be viewed both as an element essential to 
the process of emergence and as an emergent (structural entity) in itself.
What I care to anticipate and underline here is my critique of sociologi-
cal relationism based on a radical pragmatism grafted on that postmodern 
culture that enhances relativism, processuality, and indeterminacy, a per-
spective to which Simmel himself tried to react with his Lebensphilosophie.
All relational sociologists agree that we are facing a “relational turn,” 
whose common denominator is the rejection of both methodological indi-
vidualism and holism. But they give very different interpretations, generally 
of two types, sometimes combined with each other (Luhmann’s theory is 
an example). These two types are objectifying relational sociologies (e.g. 
structuralists and systems theorists) and subjectivising relational sociol-
ogies (e.g. action theorists and those who claim that knowledge is totally 
observer-dependent). Neither of them satisfies me, because they don’t have a 
properly relational concept of social relationship as I conceive it.
These two ways of looking at social relations are in continuity with the 
foundational symbolic code of modernity, which I call lib/lab, where lib 
stands for subjectivity (free agency) and lab stands for constraint or bond 
6 Introduction
(social structure). The two polarities are continuously transformed and 
recombined while keeping one point still: the exclusion of the Third. The 
Third is precisely the relationship.
In the past decades, there has been a wide debate on the agency vs struc-
ture issue, which has tried to connect the two polarities. But, in the end, 
most scholars placed themselves either on the side of the agency and the 
transactions it triggers (e.g. Emirbayer 1997 and his followers, who devalue 
the structure) or on the side of the structure (e.g. Luhmann 1995 and his 
followers, who consider the agency as an environment outside the system).
The search for a micro/macro link has not paid off, simply because these 
ways of thinking do not see the relationship between agency and structure, 
and, for this reason, they do not include the meso level in which the Third 
is located.
I consider the morphogenesis/morphostasis scheme elaborated by Archer 
(1995) as a fundamental methodological tool to highlight what connects 
micro and macro, that is relationships at the meso level, where the linearity 
of time leaves room for its circularity, and quantitative time becomes qual-
itative. I must add that, differently from Archer (2003), I think that the link 
of conjunction between agency and structure is not personal reflexivity, but 
relational reflexivity, which entails the fact that the relationship has its own 
reflexivity (the relational feedback mechanisms).
In this text, I will try to explain why and how the relational turn leads to 
a deep discontinuity with the qualifying key concepts of modern society. By 
way of example, I list some of them.
1 The Marxian concept of capital, precisely as a social relation (Shaikh 
1990), has been radically changed: on the one hand, at least in advanced 
countries, it is more and more limited and regulated against the 
exploitation it entails, reoriented for social purposes and re-embedded 
through corporate social responsibility, the civil economy, and so on; 
on the other hand, it is redefined as social capital, which consists of 
relationships of trust, cooperation, and reciprocity.
2 Durkheim’s concept of division of social labour, from functional and 
organic, becomes relational, that is it becomes networking; the func-
tional differentiation that, according to Luhmann (1995) characterises 
modernity through binary processes that enhance functional special-
isation, gives way to forms of relational differentiation, which follow 
non-functionalist or suprafunctional logics.
3 The Weberian concept of bureaucratisation of society is radically mod-
ified by what I call the Digital Matrix surveillance system (algocracy), 
which destructs hierarchies and favours a more horizontal, reticular 
society.
4 The condition of incredulity towards metanarratives, which accord-
ing to Lyotard (1984) characterises postmodernity, erodes the met-
anarratives of the past, while new metanarratives are born, such as 
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those of the post-human and trans-human, the new ecological cultures 
oriented to a reappropriation of nature, and those of new religious 
movements.
Clearly, modern society does not disappear in an instant, it continues to 
exist. What I want to underline is the fact that, through these transforma-
tions, a “relational society” is born that generates unprecedented social 
forms that escape the old oppositions, such as conservation vs progress, 
freedom vs control, agency vs structure. On the one hand, the new forms 
seem to require a liquid and fluid society, but on the other hand, they seek a 
new connective social fabric.
From an ontological and epistemological point of view, the turning point 
lies in taking note that human persons are neither the architects of social 
relations, nor actors who passively perceive them. Interhuman relationships 
need to be redistinguished from other types of relationships. System reflex-
ivity is by no means sufficient. Personal and relational reflexivity are needed.
My thesis is that only a realist and critical relational sociology accounts 
for the fact that human beings are both internal and external to social rela-
tions, and therefore to society, while constructivist-type relational sociolo-
gies consider human agents/actors it either internal or, vice versa, external 
to society. The relational society of which I speak can be envisioned only 
if humans are seen as operators of the boundaries between the inside and 
outside of society and are capable of transcending what exists in a given 
situation. Human subjects are positioned on the border between the inside 
and the outside of the structures that condition them, and by acting on the 
borders, they can change them.
To see the borders properly, one needs to get out of the binary code 
inclusion/exclusion, according to which one is on one side or the other, totally 
included or totally excluded, without any mediation. I argue that there is 
another way of seeing things. There is what I call “relational inclusion,” which 
allows human beings to look at society from the outside, even though they are 
included in it, and vice versa. This can be seen only with the “relational gaze.”
If relationality (not communication, or culture, or structure, or agency 
per se) is the constitutive fact of society, then agents (individual and col-
lective) are certainly embedded in a certain context, but potentially also 
capable of transcending their social relations and positions. The ability to 
transcend given society derives not so much from scientific discoveries and 
technological artefacts but from the ability of human beings to change the 
boundaries between their interior (internal conversation) and their exterior 
(the relational context), because they can only live in the relationship with 
others, so that existing social forms can be transcended only by transform-
ing these relationships, with and through them.
The Covid-19 pandemic forced us to “measure” relationships, their prop-
erties and qualities. The next pandemics will do the same. All epidemics 
have the task of showing us that the social relationship is not only a vehicle, 
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a channel through which the virus passes, but it is also the remedy if han-
dled properly. In a sense, we can say that the relationship brings the virus, 
but it is also the means to avoid it. Relationships decide the quality of our 
life and our destiny. They do it for better or for worse. We need to measure 
the distance and strength of the relationship, its qualities and causal prop-
erties. Getting sick during an epidemic like Covid-19 has strong analogies 
with being prey to other kinds of pathogens, such as fake news carried by 
ICTs or harmful consumption offered by the market. Social relationships 
must be measured in terms of penetration capacity. Knowing how to involve 
and detach ourselves from others becomes fundamental.
The underlying imperative of this book is the need to empower our “culture 
of relationships.” Relationships are ambivalent and enigmatic because they 
can generate good or evil, and therefore require competent observation and 
evaluation. They are a reality different from our feelings or ideas. Normally, 
we do not see them, because they are immaterial and invisible like air. 
Precisely for this reason, they have the power to manage us if we do not know 
how to map and handle them. However, relationships are never what we want 
them to be. They are never just the projections of our interests. They affect 
our lives even if we are not aware of it. Hence, there is a challenge.
Contents of the book
The target of this book is to show the power of social relations in generating 
a new society beyond modernity. To understand this epochal change, the 
book proposes to equip us with a new ontological and epistemological par-
adigm that I call “relational thinking.”
Part 1 is intended to explain the exit from modernity.
The thesis of Chapter 1 is that the transition from modern to aftermodern 
society is driven by the need to overcome the dilemma freedom/control dis-
tinction to go towards a post-lib and post-lab society. We must seek a soci-
ological approach which may allow us to see the new, historically unique 
aspects of social formations that are taking place before us more clearly.
Chapter 2 deals with the recurrent societal crises connected to the pro-
cesses of globalisation. We are still short of a deep sociological interpretation 
of these crises differing from interpretations centred upon economic, moral, 
and political factors. My argument is that, in order to avoid permanent soci-
etal crises, we have to break away from the self-referential logic of the lib/
lab configuration of society. Such a new set-up shall be capable of allowing 
for the emergence of new social subjects that can generate and adopt certain 
ethical standards of conduct and change the economic-political systems. 
This transformation should be structural. Luhmann would say that this is 
not possible, because – in his view – society operates with autopoietic mech-
anisms insensitive to social subjectivities. I propose to meet the challenge 
of Luhmannian sociology by showing why and how the emergence of a new 
society is as possible as it is necessary.
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Chapter 3 tackles this challenge by suggesting that the solution lies in 
having a “relational gaze” on social reality. Today, many sociologists invite 
us to see social “objects” (societies, institutions, social movements, social 
classes, etc.) in a processual way, that is as being made of always fluid, 
dynamic relations. In my view, they offer a reductive and misleading vision 
of social reality, because they rely upon a flat social ontology rather than 
a stratified social ontology, so that social relations are reduced to eternal 
flows underestimating the weight of structures. On the contrary, in my view, 
a truly relational sociology should attribute a relative autonomy to struc-
tures, even if they are produced by processes. The relational gaze distin-
guishes between different orders of reality, the processual-interactional and 
the structural one, so to be able to see how ethically oriented interactions 
can generate new economic and political structures. It can show how the 
economic, the political, and the ethical are intertwined with each other. The 
topic is expanded upon in subsequent chapters.
Part 2 is intended to clarify how a new society is generated through mor-
phogenetic processes, in which the moral dimension of social life plays a 
fundamental role.
The aim of Chapter 4 is to understand how the morphogenesis of society 
comes about through social relations, which are the connectors that medi-
ate between agency and social structure. The generative mechanism that 
feeds social morphogenesis resides in the ways in which social networks 
alter the social molecule of the structures already in place. From viewpoint 
of relational sociology, social morphogenesis is a form of surplus of society 
with respect to itself. This surplus is produced through the relationality that 
agents/actors create in their interactions, so as to alter the initial structures. 
The morphogenetic surplus is not so much the product of structural effects 
as of “emergent relational effects.” Society increases (or decreases) its poten-
tial for surplus depending on processes of valorisation (or devalorisation) of 
social relations. Empirical references are given in order to show how the lib/
lab societal arrangement is overcome by an aftermodern society that can be 
called “relational.”
Chapter 5 explores the germs from which a relational morality could 
arise. In modern social sciences, moral norms are generally explained as a 
product of individual actions or as a manifestation of adaptation to soci-
ocultural institutions. In recent decades, theories that combine these two 
paradigms in various mixes have multiplied in so-called institutionalised 
individualism, a distinctive trait of Western morality. In my views, these 
modalities for explaining morality reflect the structural and cultural dual-
isms of modern Western society (based on the individual/State, private/
public, and micro/macro axis) and their compromises, which today face a 
profound crisis. The basic thesis is that moral norms are meeting processes 
of change characterised by the need for new relational behaviours between 
humans and between them and nature. The emergence of a trans-modern 
social morality takes place in those social spheres in which social relations 
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are considered a reality endowed with sui generis qualities and causal prop-
erties, so that relational normativity becomes the fundamental moral crite-
rion of new social practices.
Chapter 6 focuses on morality of social networks. Premodern traditional 
ethics has imputed the morality of action to the “acting subject” on the 
basis of a principle of linear causality. With the advent of modern social 
sciences, the social, economic, and cultural conditioning weighing on the 
human subject have been evidenced. The result has been to attribute moral 
responsibility to a “conditioned subject” who, in turn, attributes the respon-
sibility to the existing societal structures, including so-called unjust laws. 
In this way, responsibility has become anonymous, and its weight has been 
transferred to the welfare state. A sort of vicious circle was generated, which 
now can only be broken by new relational subjects, both individual and col-
lective, who take responsibility for social networks that produce relational 
evils at a distance. Ethics is required to make itself relational, in the sense 
that the attribution of responsibility for acting for good or bad cannot be 
limited either to a single act or to structures, but must invoke the reflexivity 
of relational subjects and the reflectivity of social processes that take place 
in networks of relations. The ethics of intention is no longer sufficient. It 
must be integrated with an ethics of responsibility that is not restricted to 
the direct consequences of individual acts but takes into account the indi-
rect consequences of relational networks.
Part 3 tries to identify who are the bearers of a societal change that can 
avoid the relational evils to which the lib/lab configuration leads.
In continuity with the previous part, Chapter 7 wonders, in which ways 
and why do hyper-modernised societies change the concept and practices 
of the “good life?” What are the prospects for the next future? Human hap-
piness is being redefined as the possibility of enjoying opportunities that 
present themselves in contingent situations. It becomes a matter of ana-
lysing who offers these opportunities, how they are used, and what effects 
they produce. I argue that there are three main sources offering opportuni-
ties: the lib/lab systems, a global communication matrix of an impersonal 
nature, and new collective subjects of civil society organised in social net-
works. The opportunities afforded by these three sources are selected on the 
basis of a multiplicity of logics (individualistic, systemic, or relational). I 
claim that these different moralities of the good life are generated according 
to different ways of addressing the relation between “the social” and “the 
human,” and, more generally, according to the diverse ways of considering 
social relations as the decisive reality fostering human fulfilment. In the end, 
my thesis is that, in a society conceived as a field of opportunities, the dis-
criminating factor of “living well” becomes the relational or non-relational 
nature of the good that is sought and realised by the acting subjects. This 
guiding idea is what supports relational social work in dealing with welfare 
and well-being issues. The good life is a matter of the modalities with which 
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agents and social networks produce relational goods or, vice versa, engen-
der relational evils.
Chapter 8 tries to clarify in what sense and in what way relational subjects 
are emerging. After the publication of The Relational Subject (Donati and 
Archer 2015), the issue of how to connect personal reflexivity (i.e. inner con-
versation) and social reflexivity (i.e. how social relations affect the identity 
of the subject reflexively) has remained opened. In this chapter, I propose 
an answer to this problem from the point of view of relational sociology. 
The argument is that (i) it is possible and necessary to distinguish between 
two kinds of reflexivity (inner and relational) and their different contribu-
tions; and at the same time, (ii) we need to clarify their complex connections 
in the process of structural and cultural morphogenesis of the identity of 
the agent/actor. A conceptual framework, capable of empirical verification, 
is proposed that can explain the relational constitution of agents/actors 
beyond the limits and fallacies of both individualist and radically relation-
ist approaches.
Part 4 deals with the challenges to the relational society that come from the 
hybridisation of social identities and relations with new digital technologies.
Chapter 9 examines the phenomenon of hybridisation of social relations. 
The enhancement of human beings through digital technologies compels 
us to evaluate whether, how, and when these technologies feed the flourish-
ing or, vice versa, the alienation of humanity. Social identities, relations, 
and organisations are forced to take shape in the environment of a Digital 
Matrix that is a symbolic code which tends to replace all the ontological, 
ideal, and moral symbolic matrices that have structured societies in the 
past. In a certain sense, the Digital Matrix I am talking about is a functional 
substitute for that metaphysical conception that Leibniz, in his Dialogus 
(1677), outlines by saying that “the world is formed thanks to the thought 
and calculation of God” (cum Deus calculat et cogitationem exercet fit mun-
dus). In this new vision, God’s place is taken by the symbolic code of the 
Digital Matrix. The great calculator is no longer the divine person, and cer-
tainly, not the human person, but an anonymous system that circulates and 
pervades the world.
As a form of TechGnosis, the peculiarity of the Digital Matrix is that of 
making the boundaries between human and non-human labile and crossa-
ble in every way in order to foster hybrids. Hybrids, however, are not ran-
dom or purely contingent entities. They stem from complex interactional 
networks, in which social relations are mediated by the Digital Matrix. The 
processes of hybridisation of social identities and relations are selective and 
stratified according to the ways in which the human/non-human distinc-
tion is thought of and practised. Three scenarios of hybridisation are out-
lined along with three kinds of societal morphogenesis: adaptive, turbulent, 
and relationally steered. The chapter examines these alternatives and their 
possible consequences. The Covid-19 pandemic of 2020 had the effect of 
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accelerating the digitisation of all societies. The relational society will there-
fore be increasingly virtual.
Finally, in Chapter 10, I argue that the great challenge is to think whether 
what we call “society” could retain its basic human characters or whether it 
is inevitable that it will become post- or trans-human. The thesis is that the 
recognition of the human character of social life depends on whether the 
human is essentially distinguished by its own species-specific relationality. It 
is a question of rethinking human identity by passing from unrelated think-
ing, which reifies or subjectivises identity, to relational thinking, for which 
the essence of human identity lies in the fact of being a sui generis relational 
subject. It is the relationship with the Other (not the face of the Other as such) 
that tells me what I actually am. The human character of society is either 
relational or it is not. The human feeds on a relational rationality, far beyond 
instrumental and value rationality, otherwise it does not surpass itself but, 
on the contrary, it regresses or degrades in the non-human.
What we call “relation” belongs to all the orders of reality, it is a way 
of existence of all existing entities (existence takes priority over essence). 
Everywhere, but particularly in the case of human beings, it presents itself as 
an enigma. In the end, what I call “relational society” may not be the social 
configuration that people dream of. However, if we increase our awareness 
of what it is, we can perhaps limit the tragic conflicts, wars, and exploita-
tion of human beings that bloody the world, or even simply we can avoid 
indifference towards our fellow human beings and the creation. It can be an 
antidote to a society dominated by technocracy and algocracy. Technology 
is capable of destroying humanity. But, as long as there are human beings 
who cultivate their humanity, technology will not be able to dominate the 
world, because it will have to go through the Caudine forks of meaningful 
social relations.
Part I
The emergence of 
aftermodernity

1 Beyond the modern dilemma 
freedom (lib) vs control (lab)
What after?
Modernity as a lib/lab dilemma
Modernity contains a fundamental dilemma. It was born based on a spe-
cific antithesis between freedom and social order (the latter in the sense 
of control), as polarities irreducible to one another within which social 
life unfolds. Freedom is generally thought of as the possibility of action 
unbound by conditioning. On the contrary, order (control) is intended as a 
bind that conditions action from the outside. Conditioning and binds are 
first conceived as naturalistic, then as normative, and finally mechanical.
The point I want to underline is that, to moderns (both liberal and 
non-liberal), freedom lies outside control (i.e. extrinsic to its forms). Social 
control as such cannot make one free, cannot be a component of freedom, 
but only expand or diminish the chance for freedom, which is built on other 
foundations. Freedom lies in the subject (individual, collective, or histori-
cal), while social control lies in external constrictions (in the form of rules, 
structural, normative, or functional).
The previous statement may be mitigated by saying that both liberty and 
control are conceived within a shared framework characterised by rational-
ity, contractuality, and conventionalism. However, dualism remains.
Some have observed that Western social thought, compared to other cul-
tures, places freedom (“liberation” of the subject, beginning with the indi-
vidual) as a priority and as a limitation of control. Of course, only in the 
West do we find radically libertarian theories, unknown to other societies. 
But it would be stretching to maintain that modern social thought interprets 
society only as a process of liberation or, vice versa, only as a process of 
control, although these unilateral temptations are anything but absent.
We can instead state that modern social theories still differ today on 
the side of the distinction (freedom vs control) from which they choose to 
observe society: some see society from the side of freedom and as a func-
tion of freedom (I will call these lib theories), while others see it from the 
side of control and as a function of social control (I will call these lab the-
ories). Either it is lib or lab, the third is excluded. The fundamental binary 
distinction is that of freedom/equality. Some might object that these are 
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not antithetical terms, since “equality of the conditions of freedom” also 
exists. But one might respond to this objection that the conceptual category 
“equality of the conditions of freedom” is paradoxical, and therefore does 
not eliminate the binary nature of the lib/lab distinction. Indeed, sociolog-
ical analysis reveals that the processes that encourage liberty are against 
social equality, and vice versa social controls are introduced to reduce the 
inequality deriving from the existence of certain freedoms.
As modernity develops, the “lib/lab complex” increases, in which the two 
poles – lib and lab – combine and are gradually placed in increasing synergy. 
Distinctions are no longer seen as objective differences but as social con-
structions. Modern social thought legitimates a configuration of society in 
which lib and lab feed one another, however opposite they appear. Through 
this process, classical liberal thought finds its end. This is the framework 
that should be highlighted.
Observing social reality from a lib/lab standpoint has certain conse-
quences: (i) it leads to theoretical paradoxes and (ii) it contradicts many 
aspects of empirical reality. Modern and contemporary social theories raise 
these two sets of problems. In an attempt to address these problems, mod-
ern social thought transforms its very nature: from an explanatory and/or 
interpretive narration of social reality, seen as a phenomenon that emerges 
spontaneously, it becomes a means for the paradoxical construction of 
social reality itself.
Those who have sought a non-paradoxical composition between freedom 
and control within the paradigms of modernity, specifically Talcott Parsons, 
have failed. No matter how hard they try, social theories which refer to the 
classics (up to and including Parsons) do not see how freedom and con-
trol can be reconciled, in the sense of mutual support or at least significant 
interdependence with one another. Freedom and control are assumed as 
two tracks – infinitely parallel – along which social theory runs, but nothing 
is said about how they are intrinsically connected. Social thought therefore 
finds itself with the continuous need to return to the discussion on the mean-
ing of the categories of freedom and control per se. In doing so, it generates 
theories that are by necessity anti-modern, neo-modern, or postmodern.
This highlights the fact that modernity has made a bet. It has configured 
the relationship between freedom and control as a typical synergic antithesis 
(i.e. an antithesis producing a synergic effect) between the two terms of the 
distinction. But today this bet seems about to be lost. Indeed, in today’s 
Western society, we can note that the contingencies for both freedom and 
control are increasing, that both sides tend to pursue their own paths inde-
pendently, that their meaningful bonds no longer hold – at least those that 
were considered meaningful until recently. This very fact marks the end 
of classical liberalism (Gray 1993). This highlights the fact that, today, the 
union between lib and lab has become an “unhappy marriage.”
The relationship between liberty and control cycles endlessly and ends 
in a void, or it remains limited by forms of self-understanding (the lib/lab 
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complex) that prevent society from developing new meaningful and more 
stable relations. As a matter of fact, if the lib/lab logic is radically extended 
to all forms of social life, it generates catastrophes. If instead it is restricted 
to inhibit further possibilities for synergy, it runs the risk of leading to 
degenerative processes, for example a regression to pre-modern forms of 
social life or a leap into postmodern destructuration. Modern management 
of the freedom/control coupling becomes increasingly problematic.
At the beginning of the 21st century, many governments attempted to 
reintroduce a neoliberal reading of society understood as a system that can 
simultaneously increase freedom and social control, making both more 
rational, contractual, and conventional. But this is an illusory dream. 
The synergy no longer acts as a guiding criterion for all of society. The 
freedom/control distinction is reduced to a mere conceptual pair, analytical 
in nature, that no longer grasps the meaning nor the functions it held in 
modernity. One wonders, then, whether modern social theories that reason 
in terms of lib/lab might contain some actual ideological biases based on a 
type of society which now appears obsolete.
Theories that remain within the lib/lab framework see subjects and rules, 
but not the generation of society. Generating society becomes – peculiarly, 
for the first time in human history – building a network of communicative 
relationship networks.
The thesis of this chapter is that the passage from modern to aftermodern 
society is specifically distinguished by the need to move towards a relational 
approach to the freedom/control distinction, which is post-lib and post-lab, 
post-individualistic, post-holistic. Such an approach may allow us to see the 
new, historically unique aspects of social formations that are taking place 
before us more clearly.
Lib and lab meet and combine
In modern social thought, despite the debates between lib and lab thinkers – 
or, if we prefer, methodological individualism and holism – society is seen 
through the common framework of a historical process that conceives itself 
as individual and/or collective liberation from the ascriptive ties of the com-
munity (Gemeinschaft) to move towards progress in which Reason, be it 
individual or collective, micro or macro, of action or social systems, leaves 
its contract mark on society.
Within this scenario, freedom is intended as freedom “from” (thus as an 
opening of contingencies of existence, and not merely dependencies), rather 
than as freedom “for” something or someone. And within this framework, 
social control is intended as external coercive regulations rather than an 
intentional and purposeful choice according to a moral conscience inherent 
in the subjects and their relationships.
Some might object that this is simply the positivistic, functionalistic 
side of social thought, so to speak. I feel the same way. But the point is 
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that within modernity, no great Western social theory appears immune 
from creeping positivism, which even pervades those theories intended 
to be non-functionalistic or even anti-functionalist (Marxian theories for 
example).
Why is positivistic functionalism considered to be limiting and simplistic, 
but then permeates every theory and ends up winning in the end?
I believe the reason lies in the fact that lib and lab theories are not truly 
opposites, but largely complementary: they “dance together,” so to speak. 
This very dance is what feeds positivistic functionalism. Freedom and reg-
ulation, whether aimed at the individual or collective, work together in a 
certain way (to be defined later) to build that symbolic and institutional 
complex (lib/lab) that contains the collective consciousness of what mod-
ernisation means and what are deemed to be “good systems governance” 
under normal condition. Different is the case in which there is a need to face 
serious economic crises, pandemics, and catastrophes, as we will see later.
The categorical imperative says: we must expand all freedoms under the 
sole condition that they do not create a constriction for anyone; and good 
governance is considered an expansion of all possible freedoms as long as 
they are “compatible” with one another and with the concurrent principles 
(especially equality) that act as external binds.
From a methodological standpoint, this means that individualism and 
holism “shake hands,” support, and complement one another. Society is con-
ceived as a game between freedom and control along the individual-government 
axis, through continuous renegotiation between the market and the state.
Even empirical research sees through the same lenses. To give an exam-
ple, anyone wishing to prove that school choices are individual rather than 
induced by the societal system can do so. However, in the end, one must 
take note, on the basis of empirical research, that the growth of individual 
freedoms in choosing school careers does not alter the stratification struc-
tures of the whole society (Boudon 1981). Individualism and holism meet 
and shake hands.
This is the lib/lab paradigm inherent in modernity. It proposes a synergy 
between freedom and social control that constitutes the “propulsive engine” 
for the entire historical-social formation. The engine works like this: social 
control is used to free individuals, and freedom is used to make control 
more rational and functional to progress, under the assumption that one 
can be freed from the binding nature of social relationships without putting 
social order in deep danger.
Even after the economic crises, global warming, pandemics, or other 
catastrophes, Western social theory thinks of society in these terms: as the 
battle between the forces of freedom, representing the propulsive (innova-
tive) thrust, generally free of any need for a priori ethical justification, and 
the forces of social control, representing a brake (self-preservation safety) 
and generally requiring justification, which must become increasingly 
technical-functional. The burden of proof is on control. The brake refers 
to the public sphere and must be used only when others’ private freedom 
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is violated, not before and not for any other reason. The fuel for the his-
tory machine is the liberty/control distinction used as a synergic antithe-
sis between the private and public. Synergy means the use of the public to 
privatise the private (legislation must increase private freedoms) and, vice 
versa, the use of the private to publicise the public (the more freedoms grow, 
the more public control must be increased to guarantee them). The develop-
ment of one is based on the development of the other, even if “at a distance,” 
because controls are entrusted to the system, while freedoms float in the 
environment of the social system.
The engine of the modernity machine, thus configured, is fuelled 
by a potentially infinite energy – or at least that is how it is represented. 
Progressively removing constrictions to freedom, making it potentially 
unlimited, means creating an inexhaustible source of resources. If one then 
manages, in a complementary fashion, to invent a form of social control 
that does not block this process of liberation, but instead uses control to 
expand freedoms, for instance using new technologies, then social control 
itself is no longer an insurmountable obstacle, but rather a mere identifica-
tion of temporary limits and functionally necessary mechanisms (including 
automation) to ensure that freedoms run smoothly.
Those forms of society that interrupt this process are viewed as devia-
tions, pure accidents, temporary halts, or stopovers. This is how we inter-
pret, on the one hand, political dictatorships (whether they be communist, 
fascist, Nazi, or other types) that eliminate civil freedoms and, on the 
other hand, those forms of capitalism considered rampant or haphazard 
(casino capitalism), which do not guarantee equal freedoms for all. In the 
eyes of the lib/lab paradigm, dictatorships and unregulated capitalism are 
“unintentional effects,” which must be once again subjected to the (same) 
freedom/control directive distinction. Modernity is convinced that the 
lib/lab machine is expandable in terms of progressive upgrades. It refuses 
the idea that this logic may generate situations that are more problematic 
than before.
The dance where lib and lab shake hands is still the prevailing arrangement 
in many countries. In the meantime, however, its limits have become appar-
ent. We are gradually realising that it prevents the observer from seeing 
beyond the horizon where other possibilities have their place. Indeed, many 
possibilities are not at all thematised or discussed, and many of those that 
are considered probable in the end prove more virtual than real. In brief, 
today one realises that the lib/lab approach does not see the morphogenesis 
of the dialectic between freedom and control that escape modern logic.
The modern freedom vs control dialectic leads to 
paradoxes and is challenged by empirical reality
The lib/lab configuration begins to be placed under serious discussion when 
it encounters systematic malfunctions, thus when one realises that it can no 
longer function structurally.
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There are many crisis paradigms. Most of these take note that the modern 
paradigm of development encounters structural limitations in its external 
and internal environments (to cite just one author, see Hirsch 1995). Within 
the system, the synergy between giving more freedoms, on the one hand, 
and organising social controls capable of ensuring these freedoms, on the 
other hand, produces more problems than solutions. As for the relationship 
with the physical environment, one realises that we cannot exploit nature 
(physical resources) indefinitely. On the whole, the increase of pathological 
repercussions becomes evident.
Yet, not everyone sees that critical results are the product of specific rela-
tionship processes between freedom and social control that generate vicious 
or perverse circles. What I would like to emphasise here is that the lib/lab 
complex in itself leads to situations that are unsolvable paradoxes and that 
contrast mightily with the needs and experiences of daily life. Let us exam-
ine these two aspects.
1 In the first place, to describe society specifically as a synergic antithesis 
between freedom and control leads to unsolvable paradoxes because: 
(i) freedom enters into contradiction with itself and (ii) social control 
loses its legitimacy. Let me examine these separately.
a The exaltation of freedom as the absence of normative restrictions 
internal to the agency and its subject spreads social anomie and ulti-
mately causes the self-destruction of the same freedom. In the sym-
bolic code that modernity generates, it is written that freedom as 
interdependency is a purely temporary limitation, because freedom 
as such consists of the possibility of abandoning interdependency. 
The growing monetisation of social transactions, in which money 
is transferred as long as the possibility of avoiding any constraints 
in future transactions is increased, is the prototype of this evolution. 
The value-pattern of society becomes the convertibility of anything 
into anything else.
As long as this process remains restricted to limited groups of people 
(the modern élites), only the highest social classes experience a lifestyle in 
which freedom is an end unto itself. Only they, for the moment, enter the 
paradoxes. When the process becomes a mass phenomenon, one realises 
that all of society takes on the same characteristics. We are at the “drift 
of liberalism,” thus within a social arrangement in which freedoms cancel 
each other out. The very idea of civil comes under discussion (Seligman 
1992). To generate a civil life, one must create new social institutions 
which – far from encouraging a “lightening of ethics” – manage to inter-
twine freedoms and controls through morally significant relationships 
between them. When the old relationships fall, one must seek new rules 
for the creation of social institutions that connect freedom and control in 
a different way.
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Since it is imperative to be modern, and since we are modern to the extent 
to which we do not seek rules which can constitute freedom from within, but 
only mechanisms to reduce the undesired effects of freedom, social norms 
come to feed vicious circles within the system of freedom. To put it bluntly: 
many private behaviours are permitted, but their public effects are punished 
or blamed, as happens when a country permits a certain use of drugs in the 
private sphere but punishes those who sell it and blames those who become 
drug-addicted.
b Something similar takes place for control. A concept of social control 
as external and coercive towards the agency and its subject causes a 
substantial delegitimisation of the social order, because the controls 
do not have the necessary consent of the people. Therefore, the mech-
anisms (institutions and rules) that should guarantee the social order 
lose their effectiveness.
The more social rules are separated from the subjects’ motivations and inte-
rior aims, the more they are perceived as purely artificial and arbitrary, and 
therefore free of any human sense; they become a pure technical necessity, 
which spreads an adiaphoric ethics.
There are abundant indicators of these results. We might briefly recall: the 
collapse of the institutional welfare state; the fact that the law has changed 
from guarantor of social order to a source of social disorder. In all of these 
instances, social control is first delegitimised in terms of aims and values, 
and then reduced to a technical point and thus subject to procedural rules 
that chase their own tail (Dahl 1979). For example, the welfare state was cre-
ated to achieve greater social justice, but was then reduced to a functional 
fact of redistributing resources, thus making the ethos of welfare more and 
more evanescent.
The control machine begins to waver. This phenomenon may be described 
as the emergence of an order based on increasing entropy. Some, using 
other languages, speak of the death of public goods, while others declare 
the death of privacy. But few see that these demises are produced by that 
very modernity that exalts the lib/lab synergy. The outcome is due to the 
prevalence of negative freedoms (devoid of moral norms, i.e. intended as 
freedoms “from” something or someone) over positive freedoms (those that 
are oriented towards – they are “for” – something or someone). The latter 
see the Alter not merely as a limit, but as a condition and resource for Ego’s 
agency and its responsibility (responsibility understood not only as a due 
response, but as taking care of the Other). In this case, Ego is free to act 
insofar as he/she can promote Alter’s freedom as a condition and resource 
of his/her own action. Contrary to the unrelated character of the concept 
of negative freedoms, the positive concept emphasises the relational nexus 
existing between Ego and Alter, which becomes the focus of sociological 
interest.
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2 In the second place, the lib/lab code contradicts empirical evidence and 
subjective experiences of daily life. Modern social thought describes the 
relationship between freedom and control as a synergic antithesis that 
can find new mutual adjustments for better solutions of social problems. 
But that is not how things really are.
In common-sense experience, the growth of freedom is always problem-
atic, as is the growth of social controls. To conceive of society as a “society 
of individuals” (Elias 1978) with increasing individualisation, that is as a 
society capable of “individualizing individuals” (Beck 1992) by loosening 
social constraints, appears to be highly misleading for at least two reasons: 
firstly, because it underestimates the fact that the individual is prey to new 
powerful collective forces linked to fashion, social media, and consumer 
market and, secondly, because it does not mention that, as many authors 
have shown – such as Foucault and Donzelot – the institutionalisation of 
individualism may transform the “technology of self” into the destruction 
of the self.
It is beyond a doubt that new freedoms appear on the one side and new 
controls on the other. Nevertheless, this growth is not parallel. Most of the 
time it is asymmetrical in space and time. It remains highly problematic in 
the rules that guide social processes. The idea that social control may be 
configured in such a way as to ensure greater individual freedoms without 
significant relations between freedom and control leads to mystifying forms 
of system control, which bring about the schizophrenia typical of daily life 
in our times.
The experience of contemporary men and women is that they live between 
two entirely discrepant levels of reality. On the one hand, they are theoret-
ically free to do anything they like, on the condition that it remains pri-
vate. The culture of globalisation reinforces this feeling in them, which is 
that they may “privately” enter the realm of virtual reality, so to speak. 
On the other hand, when they deal with actual deeds, men and women 
find that the opportunities to satisfy their needs are socially limited and 
structured. Many specific freedoms and identities are denied. The ideol-
ogy of egalitarian control ensures that men and women can have the same 
freedoms and opportunities, but in practice, the opposite occurs. Social 
freedoms and opportunities are gendered, that is differentiated by gender, 
and the egalitarian viewpoint does not allow us to see the new inequalities 
that are generated. And yet the globalising machine of modernity provides a 
representation that denies this fact. It can admit the existence of inequality 
only as a temporary situation, pending the continuation of the antithesis 
of synergistic lib/lab in an attempt to generate forms of control that ensure 
greater freedom, which does not happen.
The conclusion is that, in the globalisation processes, the ideology of free-
dom masks widespread non-freedoms, and the ideology of equality masks 
new inequalities.
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Attempts to reconcile freedom and control 
conducted within modernity
Parsonian theory represents the finish line and point of greatest inertial 
equilibrium in modern sociological thought between freedom of action and 
the need for social order, between private and public, or, to use the words 
of Jeffrey Alexander (1983), between substantial and formal voluntarism. 
Parsons is the last of the classics to theorise the lib/lab framework as the 
optimal solution that allows that contact between reason and religious rev-
elation which, according to many (Seligman 1992), is the origin of the mod-
ern spirit and its idea of freedom (civil society). To him, this configuration 
is a structural form that conditions freedoms in order to ensure the achieve-
ment of common goals in a liberal democracy. In other words, for Parsons, 
the lib/lab ensures the maximum possible fit between system integration and 
social integration,1 if not the first-best Pareto optimality.
In Parsons (2007), the societal community may combine freedom and con-
trol only because it still retains something that transcends both. It incarnates 
the spirit of a freedom that is born “from within” social actors, since it rests 
on a cultural system with religious roots. After Parsons, sociology is no longer 
able to justify this arrangement, which appears to be grounded in an unduly 
normative vision of society. Because of how his theory (read: the original 
AGIL diagram) is formulated, it absorbs and rationalises the transcendent 
element, the vital source (of values) of the social system. Within the very logic 
of Parsons’ (non-relational) AGIL, the subject of freedom disappears against 
the determinations and structural limitations of social action. Indeed, in 
Parsons (1967), it is already evident that civil society cannot stop the secular-
isation of transcendent (i.e. religious) concepts and values.
With Parsons and immediately thereafter ends the dream of the starry 
heaven above that is reflected within us. The Kantian spirit of modern social 
thought dissolves. It is no longer so easy to reconcile freedom and control. 
The lib/lab synergy can no longer be considered a normally functioning pro-
cess. Normality becomes the very fact that the mutual conciliation of free-
dom and control no longer works. Society becomes a “deviant majority.”
Parsons thought that freedom consisted of individuals internalising the 
value-patterns and control mechanisms of the Weberian Protestant ethic, 
and Freudian schemes in socialisation terms. Both one and the other have 
been lost. Thus, it is revealed that this kind of thinking was modern only 
in part; it actually reflected a few pre-modern convictions. In its specific 
constitution, modernity thinks that freedom cannot be founded on value 
normative control. This is the exact point where Parsons fails and must be 
abandoned.
 1 For the distinction between social integration and system integration, I refer to Lockwood 
(1992).
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It becomes clear why and how Parsons never found a way out of the 
dilemma that lies at the heart of all modern sociological theory, and that 
can be expressed by the guiding question: how is it possible to limit the 
(modern) social system’s demand to control all areas of human life, begin-
ning with the pretence that something (nature? religion?) comes before the 
system and that, through it, legitimises its institutions?
Parsons (1977) theory still assumes that (i) freedom and control work 
within a certain symbolical framework of values and (ii) they increase each 
other by respecting the famous cybernetic hierarchy of control (latency → 
integration → goal attainment → adaptation). But both of these conditions 
have collapsed today. Thus, the guiding question becomes: how can the 
modern social system develop, or even survive, if it globalises contingencies 
and cancels the control hierarchy? Parsons’ theory becomes useless.
Sociology in recent decades is a declaration of the failure of Parsons’ the-
ory as the apex of modern theorisation on the freedom/control dilemma.
Three alternatives arise after Parsons:
a run the risk of being anti-modern bringing freedom back under the 
aegis of social control;
b support the path of a neo-modernity by reintroducing the synergic 
antithesis between freedom and control in search of new forms of com-
patibility achieved by adjusting re-selected mixes and contingencies;
c or, one may enter the postmodern, further destructuring the two terms 
and their relationships.
It is not difficult to place the various currents of post-Parsonian social and 
philosophical thought within these three ways of responding to the crisis of 
modernity. In terms of the morphogenetic theory, they may be classified as 
follows.
The first category includes the neo-communitarians, who commit errors 
of downward conflation, as they assume that freedoms can be regulated 
top-down by building new communities more or less impervious to gen-
eral entropy; “communities are necessarily, indeed, by definition, coercive 
as well as moral, threatening their members with the stick of sanctions if 
they stray, offering them the carrot of certainty and stability if they don’t” 
(Beckert 2006: 81).
The second includes the neoliberals, who commit errors of upward con-
flation, as they assume that the lib/lab synergy can still work bottom-up, 
expanding freedoms only to reassert the basic values and institutions of 
constitutional liberal democracy (see, for instance, Alexander 1994 and 
Habermas’ 1998 constitutional patriotism).
The third are the neo-relationists, who commit errors of central confla-
tion between freedom and control in that they define them through each 
other, “horizontally.” They conflate agency and structure. Giddens’ (1992) 
thesis on “pure couple relationship” is an example, as this relationship is 
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structured by a rule which consists in the fact that the partners live together 
only as long as they derive individual satisfaction from it. Another example 
is Beck and Beck-Gernsheim’s argument (1994) according to which the fam-
ily institution becomes a social form made up of subjective preferences that 
work as social norms to themselves.
Indeed, the debate on the future of modernity is a mixture of these three 
“pure” types of response.
Amidst this debate, radical postmoderns emerge. They break with any 
humanistic tradition. As Luhmann put it bluntly and brutally (1995: 354), 
“man is no longer the yardstick of society.” He argues that modernity cannot 
regenerate itself through any reference to human nature. Luhmann places 
freedom outside the system, in the so-called system environment, where the 
human subject may fluctuate as desired. Control is delegated to the autopoi-
etic system. With the Luhmannian structural neo-functionalism, social the-
ory reaches a decisive turning point, in the direction of a radically contingent 
relationism as to what concerns both freedom and control. Sociology proves 
itself ready to be placed in that crucible of postmodern thought that cuts all 
human ties between human freedom and social control. In this light, from 
my point of view, Luhmann appears simultaneously as the gravedigger of 
modernity and the lark of radical postmodernity, intended as a society that, 
after him, cannot distinguish the human-social from the non-human social 
(as in Latour’s actor-network theory). This becomes the core problem of the 
postmodern world.
Limitations and obsolescence of the lib/lab paradigm
In late modernity, the freedom vs control dialectic meets structural and cul-
tural limitations beyond which it may not go. What are these limits? We may 
summarise them briefly by stating that the late-capitalistic arrangement:
a identifies control with mere technical needs, or functional mechanisms, 
which should be managed by impersonal systems (regulated through 
negotiations between the state and the market),
b identifies freedoms using the yardstick of market freedom, thus general-
ising freedoms as processes of commodification,
c makes all associative spheres of social solidarity (i.e. non-profit-oriented 
actors, otherwise called prosocial private spheres, and civil economy) 
residual, allowed only to survive in the most marginal spaces of society,
d weakens the civil culture of the lifeworld, that is debilitates the civic 
commitment of people and their informal networks, through privatised 
and standardised forms of consumption and behaviour.
The lib/lab arrangement now stands on a process of ethical and cultural 
relativism. Ethics is not able to develop an adequate symbolic code for an 
internal differentiation capable of limiting the partiality of lib/lab ethics (i.e. 
26 
institutionalised individualism) in the face not only of the great environ-
mental, genetic, and technological challenges, but also to remedy the frag-
mentation of society and the loss of social integration.
This is the background against which advanced society, in the first few 
decades of the 21st century, no longer represents itself as the best of all pos-
sible worlds, but only as one of the many possible variations of one world 
that is infinitely “otherwise possible.”
Indeed, many old problems remain unsolved, and others arise that the lib/
lab arrangement cannot confront. These problems have to do with:
• the crisis of the welfare state induced by the growth of freedoms guar-
anteed regardless of the negative consequences of private behaviours,
• the overflowing markets beyond national confines and other control 
apparatuses,
• the unregulated influence of the scientific and technological progress on 
bioethical and environmental issues,
• the increasing risk of amoral behaviour by subjects, against the increas-
ingly mechanical nature of control systems which have by now long 
stopped relying on the purposeful, intentional motivations of subjects 
in behaviour areas such as drug taking and selling, environmental pol-
lution, the diffusion of hazardous lifestyles, the perverse effects of the 
ICTs on people and their communicative relationships,
• the end of the Mandeville paradigm according to which private vices 
favour public virtues.
The end of modernity is revealed by its inability to achieve its promises. 
One realises that the lib/lab complex (freedom/equality) has made solidar-
ity residual and continues to corrode the primary and secondary forms of 
social integration in lifeworlds. The lib/lab complex systemically empties the 
fabric of sociality. Society discovers that it is a powerful machine that turns 
life into merchandise. The freedom/control combination has taken on the 
abstract form of general intellect (of Marxian memory) that appears and 
materialises every day more in the globalisation processes implemented by 
the new communication and information technologies, the so-called infos-
phere (Floridi 2015) or, to say it with Teubner (2006a), by an anonymous 
Matrix of communication.
Within the winning model of Western modernisation, beyond the thresh-
old where solidarity is radically eroded, the existence of sociability, as a sui 
generis reality, may no longer be assigned to freedom nor control, nor to a 
combination thereof, simply because the modern definitions of freedom and 
control implode.
The only alternative that remains is to conceive of sociological theory 
as the construction (and management) of paradoxes. Sociological paranoia 
becomes a keyword.
The dialectic between freedom and control becomes something else 
in relation to the dream of early modern civil society. The reconciliation 
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between freedom and control appears increasingly desperate, because these 
two realities are kept separate under the representation of a society in which 
freedom floats in the environment of the social system governed by impera-
tives of control, without freedom and control being able to communicate. To 
go beyond, society needs a fundamental change in the guiding distinctions 
upon which social institutions are built. Sociology must choose whether to 
continue to reason within the old framework, or to consider an alternative.
A relational approach to freedom vs control dilemmas 
in an aftermodern society: possible scenarios
So far, I have argued that this symbolic code (lib/lab) can no longer act as 
the guiding code for the entire societal system. It becomes a mechanism 
for highly limited choices in specialised social sectors (particularly in the 
regulation of the trade-offs between the state and the market). I would now 
like to draw the theoretical implications of this way of interpreting society 
beyond modernity.
The overall premise lies in assuming that the freedom vs control relation-
ship becomes an antithesis only in particular instances. The antithesis – 
especially when synergic – is only one of the possible reductions of the 
relational dilemmas between the two poles. It lends itself to describing the 
relationship between state and market, but not relations within and between 
the other spheres of life. Generally speaking, a complex, multifaceted rela-
tionship arises between freedom and control.
When this reality takes on a new appearance, we enter the aftermodern 
world, where alternative relating processes emerge because the relationship 
between freedom and control may now be seen and enacted with many 
more degrees of contingency on both sides. This contingency is selectively 
reduced in different ways, according to the communication contexts, since 
these are relationally contested contexts. That this type of society presents 
new problems, and even immense risks, is intrinsic in its relational nature.
 2 As I will explain later, stating that freedom and control are social relations in themselves 
means that AGIL must be understood as a complex of relations (Donati 2011a: 147–154), 
which in turn means that freedom must have its own internal controls, while control must 
have its own internal freedoms. Or, otherwise stated, freedom and control cannot be dis-
connected entirely but should be redefined as relations between the components of AGIL.
From a theoretical standpoint, a fact then emerges: that freedom and con-
trol are not simply two dimensions inherent in every social relation, but are 
social relations themselves, which must be conjugated differently in different 
social environments.2 We must define freedom and control as social rela-
tions, and do it without making their interaction with other relations 
and dimensions of social action – such as, for example, with solidarity – 
antithetic or even perverse.
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Freedom not only stands outside control, but also inside it; freedom is a 
form of control and its source of justification. Control not only offers greater 
or lesser opportunities for freedom, but constitutes it, in the sense that it 
creates the various forms and degrees of freedom itself.
Freedom and control work together, and are not mutually exclusive 
alternatives. Instead, they are contexts and opportunities that develop one 
another. To see this, we must consider the freedom/control distinction as a 
complex relationship of social relations. But how is it possible to consider 
freedom and control as social relations?
1 As far as freedom is concerned, modernity has opened up freedom to 
the world of the possible by introducing new distinctions.
First example: by introducing the distinction between freedom “ from” 
(negative) and freedom “ for” (positive), it has on the one hand 
expanded negative freedoms as demands for non-interference 
and on the other opened new horizons of positive freedoms as 
needs to achieve significant goals.
Second example: by introducing the distinction between procedural 
freedom and substantial freedom, it has on the one hand 
increased the possibilities for routine social relations and on 
the other made creative relationships of significant human 
intention possible.
The lib/lab complex, however, still sees the first side of these relationships 
almost exclusively. It mainly sees negative and procedural freedoms, while 
it has great difficulty in seeing positive and substantial freedoms. We need 
to rethink the sense of liberty if we wish to avoid nihilism.
This explains why the lib/lab sociology has observed freedom essen-
tially in the form of the contingency inherent in “money” as a general-
ised symbolic means of interchange and communication, thereby making 
all social relations abstract and instrumental. But, in doing so, this vision 
has obscured the reverse processes, those through which new embodied, 
value-based, heavily intertwined and at the same time self-restricting social 
relationships have produced social forms outside those regulated by the 
lib/lab logic. Many sociological theories have not realised that the social 
relationship is an emerging effect of mutual action and have thus ignored the 
fact that vital associative worlds produce positive and substantial freedoms 
outside the state-market complex.
2 The same has happened for control. Modernity generated new distinc-
tions of social control; that is, it created control as a social relation that 
can be played out in many diverse ways.
First example: by introducing the distinction between system inte-
gration control and social integration control, it has on the 
one hand built new norms that operate without resorting to 
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actual human intentionality (checks through mere adminis-
trative procedures) and on the other opened up room for rules 
that instead require a rife intentional activation or adher-
ence (when they are left to the discretion of the agent/actor, 
as happens in informal networks and in some digital media 
networks).
Second example: by introducing the distinction between hetero-control 
and self-control, it has on the one hand been able to construct 
impersonal apparatuses of social security and regulation and 
on the other explored the worlds of internal psychological 
conscience-based regulation.
The lib/lab complex favours the first side of these relations. It easily resorts 
to coercive system control towards people (using state or public appara-
tus, as happens to regulate the poor), while it has difficulty in recognising 
social control activated by subjects in their voluntary networks. Take, for 
instance, those social networks that give rise to protest movements, advo-
cacy networks, or informal third sector initiatives, to name a few, which 
intentionally or unintentionally concur to exercise social control without 
being recognised in their contribution. This explains why most sociology 
has ended up seeing the social domain as that which negates the authenticity 
of the self, that is seeing society as a powerful machine that denies individ-
ual authenticity, rather than seeing primary and associative relationships as 
what makes it possible.
As I said, modernity tends to play out freedom and control as opposite 
dimensions, negatively correlated, but it still believes in the possibility of 
finding some sort of accommodation between them. It is assumed that if free-
dom is expanded along the refero axis (i.e. relation as an intentional-cultural 
reference), then control is reduced along the religo axis (i.e. relation as a 
structural bind), and vice versa. On the concept of refero I am referring to 
Weber’s idea of social relation (Weber 2013 [1922]), while for the concept 
of religo, the reference is to Durkheim (1951 [1897]) (for more details: see 
Donati 2011a: 87).
Figure 1.1 depicts these two ways of understanding the social relationship 
as Cartesian axes in which the abscissa represents the relationship as a bond 
(religo) and the ordinate represents the relationship as a symbolic reference 
(refero). Modernity is understood as a society in which relations tend to take 
on a hyperbolic form, either in the direction of symbolic reference (called 
“refero”) or in the direction of a constraint or bond (called “religo”), with-
out connecting the two orientations, which correspond, respectively, to the 
theories of action and systems theories.
If the intentionality and the symbolic value (refero) are exalted, the struc-
tural link (religo) should be reduced to the minimum until it can be can-
celled, as in the charismatic movements studied by Weber. If the structural 
link (religo) prevails, the intentional symbolic reference must be reduced to 
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the minimum and eventually emptied, as in the idea of organic (functional) 
solidarity by Durkheim in The division of social labour, or, nowadays, as in 
cases of catastrophes and pandemics, when the axis of control (use of con-
strictive rules) prevails.
In late modernity, the tension between the two poles explodes. 
Compromises are no longer within reach. Instead of a system that proves 
unstable, but still thinks it can control itself to advance modernisation (this 
was the illusion of the cybernetic hierarchy of the Parsonsian AGIL), post-
modern society assumes a hyperbolic configuration of itself, in which the 
antitheses find no accommodation or synthesis. The lib/lab antithesis (i.e. 
refero/religo) becomes a hyperbolic relationship in which the two terms of 
the relationship go on their own in an asymptotic direction (Figure 1.1).
Freedom and social control assume an asymptotic configuration, that is, 
they become “hyperbolic escapes” (Figure 1.1). The asymptotic development 
of control must expunge freedom in the system environment (thus outside 
institutions). The same occurs for the asymptotic development of freedom, 
which confines controls to its environment (thus only within system opera-
tions). In one direction, freedoms are placed outside the social sphere (thus 
outside social institutions), and in the other social control becomes only 
systemic (i.e. made of self-referencing and a normative automatism) and 
remains without justifying values. To understand this, take, for instance, 
the dilemma competition (marketisation as refero) vs social control for 
equality (welfare state provisions as religo).
The lib/lab complex thus ends up stretching all social spheres asymp-
totically towards “polar forms,” either dominated by control (along the 
religo axis of functional constraints) or by freedom (along the refero axis of 
intentional-symbolic references). Private spheres (e.g. families) are further 
privatised, and public spheres (e.g. welfare service apparatuses) accentuate 
their surveillance and control character.
Figure 1.1 The relational hyperbola of late modernity
Source: Author.
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It is always improbable to find a balance point on the hyperbola in which 
refero and religo are connected to each other in such a way as to generate a 
significant emergent. This difficulty leads to the constant reduction of the 
social world to the Problematizierung of the world itself. It is no longer just 
about describing society as an antithetical oscillation between statu nascenti 
movements and processes of institutionalisation without that social institu-
tions can correspond satisfactorily to the needs of the lifeworlds. The prob-
lem is that there is a dissolving of both social movements and institutions, at 
least in the sense intended by modernity.
I hypothesise that this formula of reading late modernity may be gen-
eralised using the relational interpretation of the AGIL multidimensional 
scheme to observe the transition to an aftermodern society as a rela-
tional society generated by modernity itself (Figure 1.2). The hyperbola of 
Figure 1.1 becomes specified when it is articulated within Figure 1.2.
The axis of the refero is interpreted as a relationship between latency (L) 
and purpose or goal (G). The axis of the religo is interpreted as a relationship 
between means (A) and integration rules (I). The AGIL scheme, interpreted 
relationally, schematically represents society as a social organisation made 
up of the market (A), the political system (G), civil society or community 
(I), families and informal networks (L) connected in various ways (Donati 
2011a: 152–154). The letters A, G, I, L are intended both as analytical com-
ponents of every social form and as concrete subsystems. Social forms exist 
in that they organise means (A) in relation to their goals (G), using norms 
and having values that justify the goals (L).
Now, the hyperbolic configuration of society that replaces any idea of 
an “organic” or modernising system implies that the four dimensions of 
social relations (goals, means, norms, values) tend to go their own way 
Figure 1.2 The hyperbolic relational nature of aftermodern society at its beginning
Source: Author.
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and to redefine relations with other dimensions based on mutant logics 
(Figure 1.2). The goals are no longer connected to the means, norms, and 
values; the means are no longer connected to goals, norms, and values; 
norms are no longer connected to goals, means, and values; values are no 
longer connected to goals, means, and normative standards. Each polarity 
tries to attract the others to itself without one dimension having an absolute 
and stable primacy over the others.
In the example of the dilemma competition (marketisation) vs social con-
trol for equality (welfare state provisions), their antithesis is transformed 
into many possible relational combinations of their respective elements 
(goal, value-pattern, norms, means) along the two axes of refero and religo. 
For instance, competition can assume the purpose of equality. Equality 
can adopt some market means. There are many different ways in which the 
value-patterns of competition and equality (as intentional purposes) can be 
combined with their respective means and norms, so to reconfigure the rela-
tionships between freedom and control otherwise.
If a group of people wants to create an organisation in which social sol-
idarity prevails over any other motivation, it must provide itself with situ-
ated aims, norms, and means suitable to achieve its aims, cannot use the 
same means and norms as an organisation that works for profit purposes. 
Certain social cooperatives, NGOs, community foundations do this. If one 
of the latter, on the other hand, uses the same means and/or rules of for-
profit activities, as certain social cooperatives or foundations at the service 
of multinational companies do, it will become something else.
Multiple social forms can arise. Then, we can see that the space of rela-
tions between freedom (refero) and control (religo) delineates the scenarios 
for new micro, meso, and macrosocial forms emerging in an aftermodern 
society.
These forms emerge from hyperbolic relations in which each dimension 
attracts the others to itself and redefines the relationships with them. This 
reveals the relational nature of refero and religo, that is, the fact that, being 
relations, they can take very different forms. In any case, their relationship, 
from a synergistic antithesis, becomes a complex of hyperbolic relationships 
in which one element seeks its own maximisation and reconfigures the other 
elements in relation to itself. In this hyperbolic configuration, the chances of 
having an indeterminate range of social relational forms increase.
Let us take the empirical example of couple relationships. In principle, 
if the couple relationship becomes “pure” (of pure intimacy, as though sus-
pended in a normative vacuum), that is maximising freedom, or, otherwise 
stated, when the love relationship is reduced to the axis of the refero (L-G), 
then the institution (the religo of the couple, i.e. the relationship A-I between 
means and norms) is brought to an asymptotic minimum, which means that 
the institution no longer controls the couple’s life. How will this configura-
tion evolve? To another institution? Various possibilities are open, which 
can be seen through morphogenetic processes (see Chapters 4 and 5).
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On the other hand, couples exist who have an opposite characteristic, that 
is, they maximise the axis of the religo (A-I) by privileging the issues of 
means and norms (see the diffusion of premarital contracts in the United 
States and elsewhere). What happens if, at a certain point, the axis of free-
dom comes into play, not to undermine or renegotiate the contract that is 
legally binding, but because one partner asks the other to ignore the con-
tractual rules or forget them to affirm feelings of love instead of legal norms? 
In this regard too, developments are a question of how social morphogene-
sis will evolve.
We could imagine the most different situations and the search for the most 
different social relationships. What is important is to understand that the 
relational society opens Pandora’s box and, in order to find new solutions, it 
needs to resort to another symbolic code than the modern and postmodern 
ones.
To describe society as a relational-hyperbolic tendency of social forms is 
clearly an alternative to the description based on the functional primacy of 
one of the four functional prerequisites adaptation, goal attainment, inte-
gration, or latency. The functional primacy of one of the four poles is no 
longer possible (as Parsons and Luhmann still believe) for the entire society.
Summary
In conclusion, the more society becomes aftermodern, the more each rela-
tionship (each sphere of social relations) tends to be based on its own guid-
ing distinction (its own principle of operation) in such a way that freedom 
and control are not seen in an antithetic contraposition, but combined in 
differentiated modes, by changing their own elements and their reciprocal 
relationships.
Perhaps, by adopting a relational paradigm, we can see how the norms of 
freedom and control lie neither simply in the individuals (as “abstract” sub-
jects) nor in systems (as normative structures) but in social relations when 
taken seriously for what they are: fully emergent effects from reciprocal 
actions between social subjects.
Herein lies the novelty of civil society, which beyond modernity no longer 
coincides only with the democratisation of the political system, but above 
all with the possible emergence of collective subjects that express new pro-
cesses of civilisation.
The political expression of this project can be called “societal citizen-
ship,” intended as distinct from nation-state citizenship. Societal citizenship 
is produced by forms of social governance instead of political government. It 
is built as a co-growth of freedom and control within social networks acted 
by relational subjects, through distance relationships between civil society 
and the state, rather than as an ascriptive emanation of the nation-state 
(implemented, as in modernity, through the principle of progressive inclu-
sion of the population in it).
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Social relationality is the new glue of society, not the state per se, or an 
abstract normative system, or functionalist adaptation systems. It may per-
haps be called “the political” (le politique) of social exchanges, as opposed 
to “the politics” of the political party system (la politique), according to the 
distinction made by Caillé (1993). But only if we see that the political stuff 
of society consists of its “relational glue,” and if we can observe it in an ade-
quate way, we can realize that “the political” has become simultaneously 
more global and more local, meaning that it has spread throughout all rela-
tional dimensions of society and at the same time has differentiated within 
each societal sphere, according to autonomous intersections (nexi) between 
freedom and control. In the 21st century, society will be able to manage “the 
political” only as a form of post-liberal as well as post-labour relationality 
unknown to the moderns.
The emergence of aftermodernity
2 Overcoming the market/
state binary code
How to explain the recurrent system crises?
It is an established fact that modernising societies are subject to recur-
rent system crises. I take the financial economy’s crisis that broke out in 
September 2008 as emblematic for the way in which many other system cri-
ses are faced. I am referring to the industrial revolution 4.0 driven by new 
robotic technologies and artificial intelligence (AI), the economic and social 
crisis due to the Covid-19 pandemic erupted in 2020, and others.
To get to the point, most theories converge on the idea that world society 
is bound to face a future bristling with risks, uncertainties, disorientation, 
and even chaos (in the technical sense of the word) without hope of solving 
system crises. Only caps and temporary remedies can be provided or let cri-
ses run their course. The dictum by Luhmann (1976) that “the future cannot 
begin,” means that societal systems must accept a condition of permanent 
crisis. Where the term crisis has the meaning of a critical event that stands 
for (or is expected to) leading to an unstable and dangerous situation affect-
ing the whole society, but also as a test period for further adjustments, or 
an emergency event, a turning point in a disease that sooner or later we will 
come out in ways that we cannot know in advance.
In this chapter, I am interested in analysing how modernised societal sys-
tems react to recurring crises. Their reaction consists of a game between 
the political system and the market. In the end, they must take note that 
the political power can enforce very few limitations to economic systems, 
and economic systems cannot expect politics to solve their problems. Their 
exchanges are very limited, only contingent, merely functional, and cannot 
meet normative imperatives beyond economic and political action. Ethics 
is turned into an exaggerated steering mania, which proves to be practically 
ineffective when challenged by real incidents (Luhmann 1997: 50).
The measures adopted cannot solve the crisis for a number of reasons.
First of all, all the remedies remain within the “economic-political sys-
tem,” what I call “lib/lab” configuration. My argument, then, is that if we 
want to avoid a permanent crisis, then remedies have to break away from 
the self-referential logic of economic-political systems.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003146698-2
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Secondly, the ethics that is called upon to correct the markets’ malfunc-
tioning and state’s failures has no credible sociological foundations, since 
neither the market nor the state are sources of ethical standards. If ethical 
corrections are to work, one needs to think of a different way of organising 
society. Such a new setup (i) has to be capable of allowing for the emergence 
of collective relational subjects (viz. “social environments” for the economic 
and political system) that can generate and adopt certain ethical standards 
of conduct and uphold them in economic-political systems and (ii) has to 
meet such a condition in a structural manner and not by way of an occa-
sional voluntary commitment. Luhmann (1995) would say that this is not 
possible, because – in his view – society’s multiple spheres cannot in any 
way influence one another, least of all exchange ethical services. I propose 
to meet the challenge of proving that this is as possible as it is necessary, if 
we want to avoid permanent crises.
My explanation
What are the mechanisms that make the lib/lab society unsustainable? Here 
I would like to analyse the problematic aspects of these systems and subse-
quently verify whether there can be a societal configuration that can over-
come their limitations. Let us first look at intrinsic faults of the lib/lab setup.
According to the lib/lab approach, the structure of society is basically an 
interweaving of economics and politics with respect to which “the rest” – as a 
private affair – is seen as marginal and irrelevant to the common good and 
citizenship. The lifeworlds are conceived as merely “private” spheres. But, 
from a sociological point of view, what lies outside the state-market pair is 
not insignificant for the achievement of the common good, for citizenship, 
and for the workings of both market and state. If the lifeworlds are con-
ceived as mere receptors of state and market decisions and activities, and 
therefore devoid of social subjectivity, the lib/lab system falls into a chronic 
crisis of social integration it cannot remedy.
To put it another way, for the lib/lab system, there is no alternative to the 
combination of liberalism and socialism. A champion of this approach, Ralph 
Dahrendorf (1994) has defined citizenship as a gift granted (octroyée) by an 
enlightened political élite that extends the social rights guaranteed by the 
state to increasingly large portions of the population to make available to 
them the provisions offered by the free market. Such a societal configuration 
refrains from tackling the social integration problems due to the erosion of 
social relations induced by capitalism and state-induced population passi-
vation. Even though one may agree that society’s system planning is not a 
workable regulatory response, still it is clear that lib/lab systems generate 
increasing social integration deficits – the so-called modernity pathologies 
(Habermas 1984) – for which they provide no remedies.
The world system (or globalisation) is the outcome of this worldwide societal 
lib/lab structure. What determines the crises is a kind of “economic logic,” an 
evolutionary model which is supposed to bring us to “progress,” that produces 
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unexpected effects, side effects, and negative externalities which erode the 
civil society on which the lib/lab system is based. What is this logic about?
Let me summarise it in Figure 2.1. The economic logic I am talking about 
consists in using political power to favour consumption, especially private 
ones (Box 1), which in turn will fuel productivity and profits (Box 2), in such 
a way as to be able to increase the tax levy (Box 3) that allows the welfare 
state to redistribute more financial support to the population necessary to 
increase consumption (Box 4). The rest is irrelevant. Banks and financial 
systems serve this logic.
Such a system logic, with all its internal mechanisms, cannot be extended 
over certain thresholds, because great social problems arise once certain 
economic growth levels are exceeded. In particular,
1 Consumerism generates a broad range of pathologies in the human con-
dition of many people: consumption needs are artificially induced, and 
media technologies are misused both by producers and by consumers.
2 The social inclusion model that is supported by this logic (founded on a 
simple extension of the typical 20th-century welfare state) makes ben-
eficiaries ever more passive and produces distorted effects: it creates 
various traps (the poverty trap, the crystal roof limiting women’s social 
mobility and distorting equal opportunities on the basis of gender, etc.) 
and above all immunises individuals from social relations.
Many will point out that there are no alternatives to the system logic I am 
talking about (Figure 2.1) because (i) if you curb consumption, you also stop 
economic growth; (ii) if you cut social expenditure (the welfare state), you 
create poverty.
Figure 2.1 The economic logic of a lib/lab society
Source: Author.
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What shall we do then? The proposals put forward are centred on intro-
ducing two kinds of correcting tools:
1 Putting “more ethics into the market,” as proposed by some, in the hope 
of making actors more responsible; two examples of this are business 
ethics at the production stage and a fairness ethics in the distribution 
of goods; such proposals are especially aimed at correcting the lib side 
of this setup.
2 Extending citizenship, as proposed by others, to make it more inclu-
sive to embrace the weakest social segments of the population, in order 
to reduce poverty and social problems; such proposals are especially 
aimed at correcting the lab side of this setup.
I note that such corrective measures do not modify the system logic of lib/
lab configurations. As generous as the above proposals may be, they do 
not stand many chances of succeeding because it is the lib/lab system itself 
which makes them ineffective. The system continues to work in such a way 
as to be functional to a moral order centred upon individual, instrumental, 
and utilitarian values and criteria. Though sensitive to the need for personal 
honesty and greater social justice (in the form of equal opportunities), these 
values and criteria fail to meet the need to create a civil society capable 
of generating a social morality that supports sufficient cohesion in the net-
works of relationships between people. Economy refuses to consider ethics 
as an autonomous variable of economic action (and function). In the long 
run, a system that gives absolute primacy to the means, tracing back to 
them the other components of social relations (the integration norms, the 
goal, and the pattern-value: see Figure 2.2), is self-defeating. If the societal 
configuration is to generate a social integration in the lifeworlds, which is 
sufficiently synergistic with the system integration (market/state), the lib/lab 
logic must be radically modified.
Should we adapt to a Darwinian evolution?
The lib/lab vision of the world system brings with it the idea that society 
develops according to progressive evolutionary tendencies. The processes 
do not tolerate any restrictive, external regulations of the lib/lab logic (as 
summarised in Figure 2.1). The only regulations this logic can endure are 
the functional ones, which is functional to its own reproduction.
A functionalist approach, anyway, can only determine the same problems 
again and again. Luhmannian neo-functionalism turns to be just “another 
way,” only outwardly non-ideological, of describing the commodification 
of the world and an evolutionary adaptation of the whole society to such 
commodification processes.
Basically, the functional version of the lib/lab model proposes us to 
live in a society that adapts to Darwinian evolutionary laws, lacking any 
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finalism and pushed by its competition and survival skills. Cooperative 
behaviours are possible, but nevertheless they remain marginal. This is the 
(Luhmannian) world system of globalisation.
There seem to be no alternatives to this state of affairs. Utopias have 
fallen. The word is given to the stock exchanges. George Soros (2000), the 
international magnate, has pointed out that financial markets’ workings fol-
low their own “reflexivity” (or reflexive rationality) marked by evolutionary 
mechanisms, which are self-referential and have uncertain outcomes. These 
mechanisms are rooted in the particular reflexivity of economic actors who 
discount the future. They shape reality (i.e. what actually happens in society, 
not only within markets) through investments that anticipate the future and 
pre-empt future reality in the shape desired by financial operators. Reality 
is transformed through the financial operators’ own “reflexive truth.”
This is another version of a society evolving under the primacy of the 
adaptive function guided by money as the engine of evolution. Money is the 
g.o.d. – the generator of diversity – of Darwinian evolution. The question 
that arises is whether it is realistic to think that society can evolve as a finan-
cial market with its so-called reflexive logic promoting an evolution without 
finalism. Clearly, society is not a stock exchange. There are other types of 
reflexivity that shape society. It is these “other” forms of reflexivity that can 
get us out of the lib/lab systems’ own chronic crisis.
Figure 2.2 The economic logic of a relational society
Source: Author.
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No alternatives to an evolution without finalism?
Can we think of alternatives to the functionalist and evolutionist model I 
have been discussing? I think that the world is in need of a post-functionalist, 
indeed an aftermodern development model, which goes beyond the function-
alist model hitherto considered the theoretical and empirical infrastructure 
of Western modernity (Davis 1959).
However, a word of caution is needed here. Functionalism cannot be 
overcome by a backward-looking humanistic view, unable to match the 
competitive skills of functionalism. It has to be a humanism proving capa-
ble of taking functionalism into account while overcoming its limitations.
Such a post-functionalist development configuration or logic ought to be 
able,
1 at a macro level: to reduce system determinisms by lib/lab institutions, 
in order to avoid commodification mechanisms,
2 at a meso level: to favour organisational networks capable of self- 
steering,
3 at a micro level: to change consumption habits and lifestyles through 
reflexive consumption and according to more sustainable values in the 
lifeworlds.
It seems to me that such changes are not possible within an economy whose 
ruling principle is the GDP growth imperative. They become possible, 
though, as soon as one takes on board the fact that GDP has been a use-
ful well-being parameter for developing countries with quite a low average 
income and with widespread poverty problems, but it becomes hardly signif-
icant for societies that have reached a certain well-being threshold. Starting 
with the latter countries, GDP has to be replaced by other parameters of 
measurement and evaluation of progress that refer to Gross Domestic Well-
Being (GDWB) (Stiglitz Report 2009).
A sustainable lifestyle does not mean a “poor” economy that reduces 
aspirations to a qualified well-being. It does not mean, for instance, a mere 
deindustrialisation or entrusting health and school services to imaginative 
“community” solutions, nor does it mean rejecting technology. It does not 
mean going back to a naively “naturalistic” way of life. These are utopias 
without any hope. A different economy is made possible by a different notion 
of well-being and of happiness with relational and not merely materialistic 
connotations (Diwan 2000). This is suggested by the “happiness paradox,” 
according to which the well-being – beyond a certain income threshold – 
does not grow with the increase in available money, but instead with signif-
icant human relationships.
The recurring crises need to be addressed with a model of sustainable 
development (see Figure 2.2). If we want to pursue a human ecology (i.e. pre-
serve the ecosystem), reflexive consumption and attention to the quality of 
life are required. The processes of production-distribution-consumption of 
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goods and services should assume a relational configuration by promoting a 
synergy between profit and non-profit sectors, which means a modification 
of the logics of both. The for-profit sector must become socially responsible, 
and the non-profit sector must become more efficient and effective with full 
autonomy with respect to the other sector. This latter target is certainly dif-
ficult to pursue. Take for instance the case of health service. International 
evidence indicates that non-profit organisations (NPOs) are likely to be 
more attentive to service quality but less cost-efficient. However, this is not 
always true. For example, researches on the care sector in Italy show that 
NPOs can be as efficient as other organisations. What is even more impor-
tant is the fact that the efficiency of these organisations is positively corre-
lated to the production of relational goods, highlighting the importance of 
intrinsic motivation compared to the profit motive (Destefanis and Maietta 
2015), as well as having greater value for a caring democracy (Zubero 2018).
The rule of the welfare state shall be gradually replaced by a societal 
governance, featuring a “market-state-third sector” triangle (plural and 
subsidiary welfare). Societal governance should operate reflexively both on 
consumption and on the differentiation of different markets (for profit, non-
profit, civil economy, etc.) aiming at producing relational goods.
These changes indicate the birth of another type of system configuration, 
based on a relational economy that evaluates progress in terms of GDWB 
rather than in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as illustrated in 
Figure 2.2. The figure outlines the economic logic of the relational soci-
ety through a circular sequence: human ecology can be pursued through 
the interdependence between profit economy and non-profit sectors, so that 
the societal system governed by a joint partnership between state, market, 
and third sector can promote the production of relational goods on which 
human ecology depends. Furthermore, it is indicated that the interdepend-
ence between the profit and non-profit sectors itself produces relational 
goods regardless of system regulations.
It is important to emphasise the role of the social spheres bearing a devel-
opment model that connects the economic to the social after modernity has 
separated them. I am referring to those economic realities which are partly 
non-profit and partly managed to producing profit for ethical purposes. 
The non-profit sector is made up of third-sector organisations, such as civic 
associations, voluntary organisations, NGOs, and civic foundations. The 
novelty is represented by the so-called civil economy companies, which aim 
to do business ethically through a cooperative and solidarity organisation 
both between producers and between producers and consumers. These 
are entrepreneurs and managers who intend to produce profit with social 
responsibility, in view of a sustainable economy, and allocate most of the 
profit for prosocial purposes.
Within the third sector, we find a vast world of social cooperatives, social 
enterprises, voluntary associations, ethical banks, various forms of micro-
credit, fair trade, NGOs, community foundations, and multiple forms of 
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enterprises which we call civil. Such bodies create their own financial mar-
kets, such as the the KIVA project in the United States, SASIX (South African 
Social Investment Exchange) in South Africa, Bolsa de Valores Sociales y 
Ambietais (BVS&A) in Brazil, the Asian Impact Investment Exchange (IIX) 
managed by the Social Stock Exchange Asia (SSXA) in Singapore, GEXSI 
(Global Exchange For Social Investment) in the United Kingdom, MYC4 in 
Denmark, and Social Stock Exchange Ltd. in the United Kingdom. Others 
have proposed to create a “social stock exchange,” aimed at managing 
“social and welfare business,” which would become an integral part of a 
horizontal subsidiary setup between the welfare state and an active welfare 
society. This might happen by setting up a sort of Alternative Investment 
Market, whose financial instruments would be shares (issued by low-profit 
enterprises and non-profit social enterprises) and debt bonds (equally issued 
by for profit and non-profit bodies).
Such new enterprises as low-profit limited-liability companies and com-
munity interest companies, as well as new ethical banks, can produce a 
different response to the system crises, not merely by adapting themselves 
but by giving moral standards priority in economic and social action and 
by being able to modify life, investments, work, and consumption styles. 
Compared with traditional capitalist enterprises, such enterprises have a 
number of peculiar features: they are bound to produce relational goods 
(and more generally intangibile goods), and they show greater flexibility and 
value lateral social mobility rather than upward or downward job mobility.
Not only is the influence of all these actors growing, but above all such 
spheres operate as an engine of a civil society that is alternative to the typi-
cal capitalist market underpinning the lib/lab setup.
As Manterys (2017: 86) writes,
Any change in the spirit of aftermodernity and building a relational 
civic society implies the emergence of new relational structures, which 
sustain the autonomy of individuals while adding capital to their rela-
tional, and not individual, aspect through “valorisation” of the new 
social forms, which are usually placed in the “third sector” (Donati 
2015a: 99–105). In other words, the emergence of a new social formation 
is at the same time an introduction of a “third actor” and implementa-
tion of relational imperatives mitigating the topdown oppression of the 
authority of the state and the instrumentalism of competing for pre-
cious resources, and through this allowing fuller civic participation and 
the liberty to form symmetrical and non-instrumental relations.
Rethinking civil society beyond modernity
The recurrent crises of the lib/lab configuration have highlighted the dif-
ference (a real splitting) between the old and the new civil society, that is 
the one that still reasons in terms of liberalism and socialism and the new 
The emergence of aftermodernity
Overcoming the market/state binary code 43
one that instead brings out a distinct third pole, distant from the other two, 
capable of redefining them. We may have reached a turning point between 
the old and the new civil society.
The new societal configuration (as outlined in Figure 2.3) does not com-
pletely erase modernity, but sees the modern lib/lab setup only as a particu-
lar case, that is as a way of operating (i.e. organising economy, politics, etc.) 
which is only applicable to ever more limited action areas. The new setup 
is not characterised by a logic of dominance of a pole (market or state) over 




the other or by commercial negotiation logics between subsystems, but by a 
network-like logic which is forced to make the different societal spheres more 
co-operative, or at least to follow a mutually non-destructive competition 
logic, within a global sustainability project.
To implement such a setup, one needs a relational configuration that moder-
nity was unable to tolerate, because it was overwhelmed by cultural move-
ments conceiving of modernity as a way to immunise people from sociality.
As outlined in Figure 2.3, on the one hand, the old civil society is still 
amongst us, tending to subject every good to the sequence by which money 
is invested in goods and services (GS) which in turn are used to make more 
money (M-GS-M). Actors, that is, invest money in a good they have no 
need for, but which is only instrumental to making more money. At first, 
they attribute to that good a monetary (functional) value and then trade 
it to make more money. It is important to understand that this mechanism 
presides over the whole lib/lab system. The state also uses it in its relation-
ships with the market. The state uses the market to get the money to pay for 
public welfare, which in turn is the source of votes, the political system’s 
own money. In this context, civil society is identified with the market.
On the other hand, a new civil society is emerging, which is identified with 
real economy. In real economy, in contrast with the previous case, the good 
is evaluated in itself and money (also in forms different from currency) is only 
used by actors as a tool to acquire the goods and services they need [according 
to the sequence GS-M-GS]. A good is translated into the money only in order 
to obtain another necessary good. Money is embedded into social relations, 
and its different forms depend on which social relationships are at stake.
Rethinking civil society means understanding whether, and how, it is pos-
sible and necessary to shift from the M-GS-M sequence to the GS-M-GS 
sequence. This shift modifies modernity’s own view. At the core of this view 
lies the relational nature of goods and services. Indeed, if it is correct to 
say that the distinctive feature of a modernising economy is to erase the 
relational nature of goods/services and economic processes, the building 
blocks of a new economy will be precisely the new needs for interpersonal 
and collective relationships. It is not by accident that we see gifts – and the 
enlarged circuits of exchanges based on reciprocity – coming back into so 
many social spheres and in many different forms: as redistribution, invest-
ment, free voluntary work, civic action, and also means of production. 
From a sociological point of view, gifts and reciprocity exchanges point to 
the pursuit of social bonds and to the need for social relations to be forged 
to cement the sense of community.
The key element of the distinction between modern and aftermodern soci-
ety is the fact that the latter is confronted with the need to produce a variety 
pool of options in goods/services production and consumption, in life styles, 
and in welfare measures which cannot be evaluated in terms of a merely func-
tional monetary equivalence. This pool must respond to existential needs of the 
life-worlds, must replenish primary natural resources, and above all must do 
this through the creation of common goods, by which I mean relational goods.
The emergence of aftermodernity
Overcoming the market/state binary code 45
This results in the rise of a new Zeitgeist. Whenever we say that future 
society will have to be inspired by the ethical criterion of sustainability, 
everyone has different things in mind, but the basic idea is the one for which 
instruments, such as finance and technology, must match human needs, and 
not vice versa, without compromising resources for future generations. It 
implies that the means must be used only as means, and not as autonomous 
ends or objectives, and be legitimised by values of relational well-being and 
with appropriate regulatory rules.
I summarise the distinction between modern and aftermodern setups as 
follows:
1 Main features of a “modern society”:
(A) The preferred symbolic medium of interchange is money intended 
as currency (which decides the value of all other factors, in particu-
lar production, labour, and technology).
(G) The goal of society is to increase the GDP, and the only constraint 
imposed on money is that it provides more money; money is an end 
in itself, because of the functional culture which makes all goods 
and services subjectable to monetary equivalence.
(I) Companies have no broader social responsibility than that strictly 
associated with their own employees and customers.
(L) The value motives of social action are individualistic, instrumental, 
and acquisitive.
2 An “aftermodern society”, on the other hand, is featured as follows:
(A) Money, as symbolic medium of communication and interchange, 
can take many different forms, monetary, and non-monetary; the 
medium of currency as the privileged symbolic medium of inter-
change leaves room to other forms of money understood as entitle-
ments to goods and services provided not only by the state, but also 
by the market, the third sector, and the community (Donati 2001: 
189–197); the distinction between monetary and non-monetary 
means is assessed based on their specific and differential contribu-
tion to the real economy, in which many goods and services do not 
allow for monetary equivalents.
(G) Society’s goal is to maximise GDWB, and for this purpose, money 
(in its various monetary and non-monetary forms) is subject to 
constraints that must support sustainable relational contexts; the 
different forms of money are incorporated into social relationships 
that decide on its value and the type of exchanges for which it can 
be useful.
(I) Enterprises take on an external responsibility to the community’s 
stakeholders; corporate social responsibility is extended outside 
the company; profits do not only or entirely go to shareholders, but 
must be shared with the stakeholders; social responsibility is also 
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broadened with regard to employees with forms of reconciliation 
between work and family, through relational contracts as well as 
corporate citizenship.
(L) Value motives are relational, that is oriented to pursue a relational 
well-being that is generated by relational goods and in turn regen-
erates them.
Therefore, aftermodern society is characterised by an observable multipli-
cation of forms of money, labour, and capital. The types of work multiply 
due to technological changes. Capital is considered not only from a finan-
cial point of view, but also as a political, social, and human capital. This 
entails a multiplication of contracts, in addition to the classic ones, towards 
forms of relational contracts necessary to pursue an economic objective 
embedded in a relational social context (Donati 2001: 181–188).
A relational society needs a “relational state”
Since the 1990s, I have launched the idea of the “relational state,” whose 
rationale is based upon a relational theory of society. The traditional wel-
fare state should be replaced by a new societal configuration character-
ised by the fact of being shared, associational, and relational within and 
between the different social spheres. A progressive society needs a truly 
responsive welfare state that builds the capabilities of all relying upon a 
relational work: services that value and build on relationships. This is the 
relational state.
A form of welfare that understands that a social issue stems from a fac-
tual configuration of the social relations between people and not only in 
their individual good or bad will, that loneliness makes people sick and 
eventually kills, that personal insecurity or poverty depends on the lack 
of a reliable social network, that people need a social network to find a job 
when most of jobs are never advertised, and that people need a community 
to address the problems of violence, depression, and anxiety.
To pursue a relational society means connecting high system integra-
tion (at the level of macro-institutions) with high social integration (at the 
micro level) going through forms of reticular associations at the meso level. 
If we criss-cross the two aforementioned forms of integration, dichotomis-
ing them for simplicity in high and low, we get four types of welfare state 
configurations.
• Type 1 (low system integration and low social integration): this is a soci-
ety where a fragmented market welfare (lib) prevails (e.g. the United 
States).
• Type 2 (low system integration and high social integration): these are 
societies characterised by a stratified and segmented residual welfare 
left to primary social networks (e.g. underdeveloped countries).
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• Type 3 (high system integration and low social integration): this is a 
societal configuration characterised by the traditional institutional wel-
fare state (lab) (e.g. countries governed by a form of socialism).
• Type 4 (high system integration and high social integration): in this 
case. the societal system is characterised by an institutional plural wel-
fare; the whole configuration is that of a relational state supported by a 
relational society (e.g. emerging policies and practices in evolving post-
lib/lab systems).
The relational society is one where the political institutions put in practice 
the principle of active subsidiarity, in its various forms – particularly in the 
circular form between the political system and civil society – and by that 
way they ensure high social integration in civil society. The Province of 
Trento in Northern Italy (Malfer 2019) provides such an example. Its polit-
ical system operates through an extended network of social cooperatives 
and a regular partnership between public and private organisations through 
intermediary bodies.
A relational welfare state is not just an idea. It is the political form of a 
relational society. Its basic principle is to provide better levels of basic wel-
fare through the building of rich social networks that can empower people 
through forms of cooperation among the four basic sectors in order to pro-
duce relational goods.
The relational state is a way to design services aiming at empowering peo-
ple and families in order to face many difficulties in day-to-day life. Families 
have the potential to change their own lives. The relational state empowers 
civil society by adopting a relational vision of all social issues and their 
possible solutions within a framework that promotes relational generative 
mechanisms (Donati 2015b). It provides the framework for those at the front 
line to create new relationships with people that support fair and sustaina-
ble social transformation.
A relational approach defines not the goals assigned to people, but the way 
through which people can achieve their inner motivated goals in relation to 
significant others. Relationships are the glue that keeps people together and 
the relational state can build public services that foster good relationships. 
For instance, a service can create opportunities for those seeking work, by 
providing someone to vouch for you, to support you, and be reflexive with 
you. It will promote the building of a social network around you within this 
framework, including the support for the small businesses that will drive 
job creation.
According to Cook and Muir (2012), there are four areas where scholars 
should set out their ideas more fully.
The first is how people working in public services can be supported to 
acquire the skills required by the relational state. Mulgan (2012: 10) argues 
that the skills and capabilities of people working in a relational state will 
be different to those in the “delivery state”: “the ability to empathise, 
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communicate, listen and mobilise coalitions of citizens and professionals 
to achieve social goals.” For example, he suggests that we make healthcare 
more like education, deliberately aiming to raise the skills of the public 
through, for instance, courses or e-tutorials to support people with diabetes 
and dementia. According to this perspective, we need to identify new roles 
that staff will play in 21st century public and private services (“catalysers,” 
“navigators,” “brokers,” “storytellers,” “resource-weavers,” “activators”) as 
part of a process of supporting citizens to be co-authors of their own lives. 
Social workers should be trained in learning new methodologies of rela-
tional work. Supporting professionals in acquiring these skills and building 
effective relationships is a key challenge, but one which professional bod-
ies, universities, and service providers are not yet well set up to meet. My 
relational perspective emphasises the need to share learning across welfare 
professionals and informal caregivers and to ensure that those engaged in 
relational services, such as health care assistants, social care workers, and 
classroom assistants, become keen on how to do a relational observation 
(O), a relational diagnosis (D), and a consequent relational guidance (G).
ODG systems are based on the sequence: relational observation (O) → 
relational diagnosis (D) → relational guide (G). The principles on which 
ODG systems operate are as follows: (i) it is a question of defining the social 
problem and its solution in terms of relationships (e.g. if the problem is 
unemployment, it is a question of defining it in terms of relationships and 
look for the solution in modifying the relationships that generate it); (ii) the 
relational guide consists in activating all those involved in the problem by 
building a social network between them, and then making them interact 
spontaneously, while a team coordinates the subjects so that the interac-
tions are oriented to cooperate in order to produce relational goods (for 
more details, see Chapter 5 in Donati 2011a).
The agency is made by all the parties, as in an orchestra or a sports team, 
where everyone follows a cooperative standard that is used to continually 
regenerate a non-hierarchical and non-individualistic social structure and 
consequently modifies the behaviour of the individual subjects, who are 
driven to generate relational goods.
Now let us see some details to explain the acronym ODG. (O) Relational 
observation aims to define the problem as due to a certain relational con-
text. Therefore, it favours the meso level (in which relational goods can be 
produced). (D) Relational diagnosis aims to define the satisfactory (or not 
satisfactory) conditions with respect to the effects produced by the relational 
context. (G) Relational guidance aims to modify the social context so that it 
can be mastered by the agents/actors in order to generate relational goods.
A second area where more development would be useful is on how the 
emphasis on relationships will intersect with an outcomes-focus. Social 
relations should not be conceived as “objects” of the same kind of concrete 
or material outcomes, but nevertheless we can speak of relational outcomes. 
Mulgan (2012: 25) writes, “Some of the goals of government have to be 
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concerned with outcomes – fewer families in crisis, for instance, or better 
survival rates in hospitals. But others should be relational….” This sentence 
seems to trace a functional distinction between goals as outcomes and goals 
as relations that is inappropriate, because the former have a relational con-
stitution like the latter. Outcomes are not the opposite of what is relational: 
in fact, we can talk of relational outcomes as a new configuration of rela-
tions leading to the resolution of a problem. Relational outcomes can be 
measured, although with different methodologies in respect to quantitative 
performances. The complex links between social relationships, outcomes, 
and culture can be investigated within a normative framework that can han-
dle unbound social morphogenesis (see Chapter 6).
A third area is concerned with the discussion about the practices of 
devolving funding down to the individual level through personal budg-
ets and pupil premiums and how they will intersect with the emphasis on 
relationships. The literature on social work has highlighted potential ten-
sions between individualised funding and a therapeutic social work based 
on valuing relationships. Personalisation does not (and should not) mean 
individualisation. To reduce the human person to an “individual” means to 
embrace an impoverished ontology, namely one that fails to accord sufficient 
weight to the primordial and existential realities of human interdependence, 
inter-being, and symbolic interaction. This is not to deny the importance of 
personal choice and control in life planning, but rather to argue that choices 
and control are best favoured within an ontological framework in which 
inter-being, sociability, and the socially reflexive nature of the self is at the 
fore. The relational state should operate through a relational reflexivity and 
refer to relational subjects.
In the end, relational state situates the relations between the public and 
private sectors, between the state and civil society, in the sphere of co- 
responsibility, partnership, and co-production (Mendoza and Vernis 2008). 
The relational state is a perspective based on the thesis that changes affect-
ing the economic and political structure in recent decades have transformed 
the roles and capacities of social agents, above all in public and government 
sectors. The globalisation of the economy can transform the traditional wel-
fare state model into a relational state model, above all in its role as public 
manager. The organisational model to which the relational state belongs 
is that of the social entrepreneur, capable of creating and managing com-
plex inter-organisational networks in which public, private, and civil soci-
ety organisations play their part. This new relational model of governance 
relies more on decentralised civil society initiatives, media exposure, and 
business self-regulation than on active state intervention. It adopts the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity together with the principle of solidarity, which means 
to overcome the defensive and restricted interpretation of subsidiarity as 
mere “devolution” or “let people do things by themselves.” The relational 
state is a modality of enforcing an active and promotional interpretation of 
subsidiarity as “a way to help people to do what they have to do.”
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Relational thinking challenges the assumption of the prevailing eco-
nomic paradigm that it is best to pursue economic growth at whatever social 
cost, and then pick up the pieces of poverty and broken families afterwards 
through tax and redistribution policies. An alternative approach, which 
puts relational priorities first, would seek to protect families and commu-
nities while pursuing a Gross Domestic Wellbeing and thus avoid the need 
for subsequent redistribution and social intervention. Changed priorities in 
schools would mean no longer aiming to maximise the potential of each 
child expressed in terms of economic or individual achievement. Instead, 
the first priority of schools would be to ensure that by the time young people 
leave, they are able to relate well to others, are prepared to take responsibil-
ity, and ready to contribute to the wellbeing of their family and community. 
Alternative goals based on relational thinking in the criminal justice system 
would have far-reaching consequences. Instead of a system aimed simply 
at retribution, or at rehabilitating offenders, the primary goal would be to 
reconcile relationships between offenders and the victims of their crimes, 
permitting them to be restored into responsible membership of their com-
munity (Weaver 2016). Relational businesses would no longer have the pri-
mary goal of maximising shareholder value at whatever cost to the other 
stakeholders. Recognising that there is more to sustainability than short-
term profits, a relational company would seek to maximise relational well-
being among all the stakeholders.
Summary: a new way of thinking and making society
The world system based of the financialisation not only of economy but, 
we may well say, of all social relations, experiences a chronic crisis and has 
to be reconverted. But how? In this chapter, I have argued that we do not 
have to resort to an abstract societal “model” but rather to facilitate ways 
of life (forms of a modus vivendi) which can empower the practices of a civil 
society that is not subordinate to the compromise between state and market.
It is possible to apply to this new civil society a notion of “reconversion” 
by analogy with what happened to market reconversion, when we shifted 
from an economy based on large industrial concerns to the information and 
knowledge economy. It can be defined as a reconversion of civil society if we 
think of it as a bottom-up promotion of networks of social relations that do 
not meet the criteria of monetary equivalence and/or the functional imper-
atives imposed by state laws, but respond to the need to create relational 
goods. The reconfiguration of civil society according to this scenario will 
also redefine the ways of being of the state and the market.
The emergence of aftermodernity
3 Shedding light on society through 
a relational (not relationist) gaze
Which sociological look do we need to 
see the relational society?
In this chapter, I intend to clarify what it means to have a “relational gaze,” 
without which we cannot see the nascent relational society beyond moder-
nity. Such a society can only exist if social interactions and transactions 
manage to build structures that are capable, in turn, of sustaining reflex-
ively managed relational flows.
For example, if we want to understand the evolution of capitalism, we 
must ask ourselves how the concept and reality of what we call “capital” 
changes. Simplifying, we have three ideal-typical ways of observing the phe-
nomenon: the objectifying gaze (which applies positivistic knowledge), the 
subjectivising gaze (according to which knowledge is observer-dependent), 
and the relational gaze. Whoever uses the former sees capital as the accu-
mulation of economic power of a social class (or elite or lobby or other) over 
a mass of exploited people, with the processes of inequality that it entails. 
Who uses the second, sees capital as an ability to anticipate (“discount”) the 
future, creating subjective expectations that produce a reality from which to 
profit by using the medium of money. Both these ways of conceiving capital 
have their own validity. But they remain inside modernity. I am interested 
in seeing if and how social capital changes as a kind of social relation – and 
social structure – that generates another type of society. For this purpose, 
another kind of gaze is needed, which I call relational.
The issue of the scientific gaze
The scientific gaze tries to render the observer’s work “rigorous.” Exactly 
what the term “rigorous” means is somewhat debatable. For classical sci-
entists, it means that the work in question is appropriate to the observed 
object, and as such is controlled, replicable and devoid of any distortion; 
for those sciences based on constructivism, on the other hand, such terms 
lose their value since a gaze creates, even imagines, its object. In any case, 
each science has more than one way of looking at reality, depending on 
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how it constructs its relationship with reality. Such a relationship is a gaze, 
called “knowledge.” Precisely because it is a relationship, a gaze represents 
a combination of the four components of any relationship, that is the value 
attributed to the gaze, its situational goal or intention, its means, and its 
norms of use.
What happens in the case of the scientific gaze is similar to what happens 
when a light is switched on in a room. What is seen depends on various fac-
tors: on what the person switching on the light wishes to see, on the observ-
er’s visual capacity, and on the characteristics of the device projecting the 
rays of light in terms of the rays’ colour, their intensity, and their capacity to 
penetrate the observed objects. Each device possesses different qualities and 
powers, and each observer is interested in seeing different things.
Important questions of social ontology, epistemology, and social prac-
tices emerge here.
As regards social ontology, the observer may adopt a realistic stance, 
which presupposes the existence of a reality beyond the observer, together 
with the possibility of distinguishing the observer from the observed 
(Porpora 2018a). Alternatively, the observer may adopt a constructivist 
position whereby, in the words of Luhmann, reality is the observation itself 
(Rasch 2012). This approach leads towards deconstructionism, where the 
gaze is an expression of nothingness, of the void, of insoluble paradoxes, 
and thus a sort of optical illusion. On the other hand, “critical realism claims 
that it is possible to gain knowledge of actually existing structures and gen-
erative mechanisms, albeit not in terms of a mirror image – in this respect 
Rorty is correct in his criticism of the naive realists – but certainly in terms 
of theories, which are more or less truthlike” (Danermark et al. 2002: 10).
Critical realism, constructionism, and deconstructionism are ontological 
positions implying very different epistemologies and practices.
The transition from the 20th to the 21st century was characterised by a 
boom in constructionist and pragmatist approaches that completely sub-
verted the realistic perspective of the sciences. Tired of, and disinterested 
in, an understanding of the world based on structures and dynamics, these 
new approaches proposed a vision that constructs the world around selected 
values and self-referential operations, thus deontologising observed reality. 
Constructionism is sometimes a silent ontology, and at other times a flat 
ontology: “[c]onstructionism is ontologically mute. Whatever is, simply is. 
There is no foundational description to be made about an ‘out there’ as 
opposed to an ‘in here’, about experience or material. Once we attempt to 
articulate ‘what there is’, however, we enter the world of discourse […] The 
adequacy of any word or arrangement of words to ‘capture reality as it is’ is 
a matter of local convention” (Gergen 1994: 72–73).
According to critical realism, we need to distinguish three domains in 
the world (Bhaskar 2008): the observable domain of social phenomena (the 
“empirical” domain), where events are witnessed; a further domain exist-
ing beyond human experience, where the causal structures resulting in 
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observable events interact (the “actual” domain); and a third, empirically 
undetectable domain where the potential, but non-actualised, underlying 
causal structures of objects are located (the “real” domain). This scheme of 
things represents a “deep ontology”, unlike the flat, monovalent ontology 
offered by empiricism.
The gaze of a person adopting the social ontological perspective of criti-
cal realism, not only tells us what is “real” insofar as we see it in its empirical 
manifestations and in its ongoing causes, but also reveals the potential of 
that which exists within the depths of reality (reality as potential). It avoids 
ideological, abstract utopias, but offers a “concrete utopia” instead.
Without doubt there are innumerable styles of gaze, just as there are innu-
merable ways of relating to the world. These include narrative, discursive, 
highly imaginative, dramatic, scientific and futuristic styles, among others. 
Nevertheless, ultimately, we always end up asking ourselves what exactly it 
is that our gaze gathers.
Kenneth Gergen’s “turbulent ontology” suggests that diverse gazes can 
be seen as the products of different confluences of relating between people’s 
different activities and experiences (Shotter 2012: 10-12). While these con-
fluences of relating undoubtedly play an important role, this does not mean 
that in a gaze reality loses its boundaries, its stratified structure, that is the 
layers constituting that reality. Following on from Kenneth Gergen (2009), 
what is meant by the idea that an observer’s view of relations, such as work 
or the family, reveals ceaseless, unrepeatable forms of life consisting of 
intermingling movements? If Gergen’s perspective, according to which “we 
live our lives embedded in the turbulent flow of a number of intermingling 
activities” (Gergen 1973) is taken to the extreme, the result is a gaze that is 
incapable of identifying defined structures and processes, because that gaze 
only perceives conflations between elements and layers of reality.
Critical realism does not deny that the observer plays an essential part 
in perceiving and processing what is observed. However, it distinguishes 
between strong constructivism and weak constructionism and only accepts 
the latter subject to certain conditions. As Bhaskar and Danermark (2006: 
283–284) point out, “To weak constructionism, which involves the idea that 
there is a necessarily interpreted element in the construction of any theoret-
ical understanding and any social object, a critical realist has no objection. 
However, if [constructionism] is taken to imply that the phenomenon inves-
tigated is just a theoretical interpretation or cognitive construction, or that 
a social phenomenon such as some specific form of disability exists only as 
an idea or belief, then it is clearly false.”
A clear distinction needs to be made between the relational gaze and the 
relationist gaze. Many of those who have declared their adoption of a rela-
tional gaze, in truth, have been relationists insofar as what they adopt is a 
pragmatist approach that distorts the meaning of “relational” by transform-
ing it into a mere interactive or transactional process. Emirbayer (1997), 
in his Manifesto for a relational sociology, never defines what he means by 
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“relation” and “relational sociology”, but instead talks of a “transactional 
sociology.” Many authors followed Emirbayer’s example by further radi-
calising his constructionist pragmatism. Considerable confusion ensued, 
to the point where Dépelteau and Powell (2013) came to the conclusion 
that relational sociology is nothing more than a play on words (Powell and 
Dépelteau 2013).
If one accepts these authors’ approach, the relational gaze becomes a 
completely contingent, more or less random, turbulent transaction, with 
reality remaining inaccessible. The relationship between the observer and 
the observed risks being turned on its head: rather than being conceived 
as the observer’s questioning of an observed or experienced reality, it 
becomes the exploration of what that reality could be in a purely contin-
gent world. As Luhmann (2002) would say, that gaze is not so much con-
cerned with understanding reality as it is, as with what “could be otherwise” 
(contingency is, quite simply, the fact that things could be otherwise than 
they are). These authors’ gaze, even when understood as a relationship, is 
driven by the desire to transform human beings and society. As Gergen 
says, “As I will propose, when the logics of reflective pragmatism are fully 
extended, we enter a new territory of understanding, one in which the vision 
of research is radically altered. We replace the captivating gaze on the world 
as it is with value-based explorations into what it could be. This conception of 
a future forming orientation to research opens the way to new aims, prac-
tices, and reflections” (Gergen 2015a: 287, italics mine).
The idea that the researcher’s gaze has to change the world rather than 
merely reflecting it does not seem to be perfectly consistent with Gergen’s 
professed Buddhist ontology. On the one hand, he rejects Western tradi-
tions – both the Christian religious tradition and the secular Enlightenment 
worldview based on reason – and proposes a pantheistic, humanitarian, 
pacifist view of the world. On the other hand, however, he claims that 
“human nature is a cultural construction” that can and must be changed 
with a view to building a new “relational humanism” (Gergen 2015b: 151).
Given these characteristics, it is easy to see why Gergen’s humanism, like 
that of all radical constructivists, leaves ample room for some version or 
other of post-humanism or trans-humanism. It ends up negating the bound-
aries between the human and the non-human, and as a consequence, the 
distinctive character of the human gaze is lost. So, is there no difference 
between the gaze as a human relationship, and the gaze as an actor-network 
relationship? Perhaps we need to look a little closer at what we mean when 
we say that a gaze is a relationship; in other words, we need to further exam-
ine what we mean by the term “relational.”
The relational gaze
Adopting a relational gaze means first and foremost, observing social real-
ity as a product of relational processes that are responsible for generating 
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social structures and for reproducing or modifying them over the course of 
time. This viewpoint does not reduce relationships to structures, just as it 
does not reduce structures to relationships. Relations work within a struc-
tural context, regardless of how fluid and dynamic they may be, and this 
context is relationally constituted. Structures and relations forge a multilay-
ered social world. Within a stratified social ontology, the assumption is that 
social relations and structures are co-principles of social reality, without there 
being a conflation of the two.
In my view, it is certainly correct to say that social relations are “flows,” 
in the sense that they consist of reciprocal actions and transactions gener-
ating processes endowed with a certain fluidity (degrees of contingency). 
Social structures are not fixed as material buildings. Social relations 
always have some dynamism. However, as Bateson (1972: 83) argues, “The 
river shapes the banks and the banks guide the river. Similarly, the ethos 
models the cultural structure and is guided by it.” To keep the metaphor, 
processes and transactions (the waters) flow within a context in which they 
themselves are conditioned by structures (the river), which they themselves 
forge in turn.
In general, a social structure changes through a morphogenetic process 
that starts from an initial structure at time T1, and through an interac-
tive phase occurring between time T2 and time T3, generates an elabo-
rated structure at time T4 (Archer 1995) (see Figure 4.1). Dépelteau, as 
most relationist sociologists, is right in analysing what happens during 
the T2–T3 phase, when relations show their interactional moment, but he 
fails to see the structure emerging at the end of each cycle of change. He 
sees only “continuity of change”: “We never get involved twice in the same 
social process (in the same ‘couple,’ ‘family,’ ‘classroom,’ etc.)” (Dépelteau 
2018: 503). He does not see the interplay between interactions and struc-
tures for two reasons: firstly, because his ontology is flat (“single-level 
ontology”), not stratified, and assimilates relations-as-interactions to 
relations-as-structures; secondly, because he does not distinguish between 
the temporal phases. It is important to understand that relationships are 
the object of sociology both as interactions-transactions (relationship as a 
process), and as emerging effects that possess a structure (relationship as 
a structure).
What I want to underline are the differences that exist between different 
orders of social relationality, that is, between the processual (interactional 
and transactional) order and the relational structural order, the latter being 
the outcome of processes that formulate structures (see Figure 3.1). I believe 
that this is the framework with which points of convergence between rela-
tional and processual-transactional sociology can and ought to be found 
(Vandenberghe 2016).
The social interaction of Ego and Alter always occurs within a specific 
social context constituted by a conditioning structural network. Of course, 
as White (1992) states, dyadic interactions are already embedded in a larger 
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network that includes the netdoms of Ego and Alter.1 Here I limit myself to 
exemplifying the two-way relationship for sake of simplicity.
If we look at the interactions and transactions within the temporal inter-
val T2–T3, we observe the relational order of reality as a process (in which 
the structural network is questioned and can be reproduced or changed). 
However, when interactional networks stabilise, albeit temporarily, after a 
certain number of T1–T4 cycles, a new context is somehow generated. A new 
structural network emerges which, as a structural relational order of reality, 
will impact subsequent interactions and transactions (as in Figure 3.1).
The structures (rivers) are emergent phenomena constituted by flows 
(relations in the temporal phase of interactions and transactions) through 
the cycles of morphogenetic and morphostatic processes. They regenerate 
continuously after the water (the flow of relations) has gone. So, at time T1 
of the morphostatic/morphogenetic process, we can observe a certain struc-
ture (the river), while at time T4, we see another structure emerging from 
phase T2–T3 of interactions, transactions, and exchanges. What happened 
between T1 and T4 is certainly dynamic and fluid, but this does not mean 
that structures are purely fictitious or emerging in the sense of appearing 
but without having any stability and consistency. This happens in physical 
 1 White (1992) defines networks as social spaces with broader temporal relational extensions 
than any smaller abstraction of momentary dyads; domains are the lifeworlds constitut-
ing the phenomenological contents and horizons of those relational spaces; networks and 
domains—netdoms—merge in type of tie, delivering a set of stories and sense of temporal-
ity to the relationship.
Figure 3.1  Different orders of social relationality: processual (interactional/
transactional) and structural
Source: Author.
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(quantum) reality as well as in social reality when we go from the micro level 
to the macro level through the meso level.
Supporting my argument are the studies by Jussi Lindgren and Jukka 
Liukkonen (2019) who have offered a new interpretation of quantum 
mechanics according to which reality does not depend on the person meas-
uring it. These authors concluded that the correlation between a position 
and momentum, that is their relationship, is fixed. In other words, reality is 
an object that does not depend on the person who measures it.
Therefore, those who speak of a liquid society, such as Bauman, must 
ultimately recognise that behind and beyond liquidity there are precise 
structures of inequality and discrimination.
I would agree with relationist sociology according to which the relational 
order of society has a transactional character when we look at it in a certain 
temporal phase (the phase T2–T3, between time T1 and time T4 of the mor-
phostatic/morphogenetic process). Surely, one cannot enter the same water 
at different times, because the flow is unceasing. However, one can enter 
the same river, where the term “same” means the ipse (the same substantive 
entity), and not the idem (with the same characteristics as before), according 
to the distinction made by Ricoeur (1990).
In sociology, the processual perspective cannot be intended as a “meta-
physics of becoming” based upon a radically flat ontology, because other-
wise we could not account for the fact that social relations as transactions 
(the water) generate structures (rivers) that qualify, and cause the relational 
configuration of, the social fabric. This is the relational gaze.
Quantum physics states that the world is made up of relations that appear 
now as waves and now as corpuscles. For its part, relational sociology holds 
that the social world is made up of relations that appear now as processes 
(flows, wave equivalents) and now as structures (corpuscle equivalents). The 
problem that remains to be solved is to understand, in physics, how waves 
become corpuscles and, in sociology, how processes become structures, that 
is how we move from micro to macro. As Figure 3.1 shows, the relational 
thinking I propose constitutes the bridge between the two theories: in phys-
ics, between classical mechanics and quantum mechanics, and, in sociol-
ogy, between the structuralism of classical sociology and the processualism 
of relationist sociology,2 as it does an operation that they do not see, that 
is it connects the micro to the macro through the meso level, which is the 
level at which the elements of interactions and transactions combine to give 
rise to an emergent. As I wrote with Archer (Donati and Archer 2015: 13), 
 2 As is known, quantum physics has been heavily influenced by the Upanishads: Subhash 
Kak (2008). The Wishing Tree: Presence and Promise of India. Delhi: Munshirm 
Manoharlal; Carlo Rovelli. Helgoland. Milano: Adelphi, 2020. The same can be said for 
the influence of Oriental thought (Veda, Upanishads) on relationist sociologists with 
respect to the conflation that they make between mind and reality. On the issue of emer-
gence, see Porpora (2018b).
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“We defend an emergentist conception of relationality, which generates real 
and causally efficacious – but not ‘substantialist’ – emergent properties that 
unite this approach with Critical Realism. (Henceforth, those who reject 
emergence will be referred to as Relationists.).”
The difference between observing and gazing
Observing is an operation of indication. Indication does not become knowl-
edge if it does not go through the process of recognising what one intends to 
know. And recognition is a relational and reflexive process.
The sociological gaze is not simply observing something/someone from 
a distance; it is not an aseptic, emotionless operation devoid of momentum 
(as in Luhmann, for example), but is an “involving operation,” that is an 
operation in which the observer is involved in what is being observed. For 
this reason, it possesses a theoretical value (the search for the truth) and a 
practical value (insofar as it is a critical action in regard to the world), which 
is quite unlike that of impersonal observation.
Hence, the idea that a gaze, unlike mere seeing, is not something that can 
be offered by a third person, but requires the viewpoint of the first and sec-
ond person too; indeed, it involves the perspective of the interplay between 
the three perspectives. The problem is how these three perspectives are to 
be combined.
What is missing is a sociological outlook achieved through a complex 
relationality that is not limited to one of them. In other words, we need to 
understand the complexity of the “relational gaze.”
This is not taking the “middle ground” between objectivism and sub-
jectivism, since it presupposes “another” viewpoint different from the 
objectivity-subjectivity dualism. The relational gaze is based on a social 
ontology, an epistemology, and social practices that are all relational 
because they have abandoned both holism and individualism. This gaze 
applies to all realities, but is particularly significant in the case of sociology 
where the object consists of social relations, their genesis and morphogene-
sis, their processual dynamics, and their established structures.
For example, when we encounter a group of people, it is normal for us to 
wonder who they are, that is whether they are members of a professional 
team, an informal group of friends, the members of a club or association, 
simply a group of tourists on holiday, and so on. In attempting to establish 
the nature of the group, we inevitably identify the group in terms of the 
relations between the group’s members. The identity of the group does not 
correspond to individual characteristics, but to relational characteristics. 
In practice, if we wish to answer the question “who are they?”, we have to 
carry out three operations: (i) acknowledge the group of people we see (the 
empirical phenomenon); (ii) ask ourselves what structures and mechanisms 
are at work in the interactions and relations between the group’s members 
(the domain of the actual, i.e. what it is that makes the relationship between 
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these individuals social); (iii) and ask ourselves which potential structures 
and mechanisms are not revealed (i.e. are not empirically visible), but could 
underlie the dynamics of that group (the domain of the real as a latent 
structure).
We can adopt this gaze in regard to all social phenomena, such as work, 
the family, health, well-being, solidarity or conflict, domestic life, friend-
ship, and trust. Take the case of work, for example. The three phases of 
a person’s gaze when observing this phenomenon consist in the observer 
focusing on, (i) work as the performance of services by one or more persons 
(empirical); (ii) which social structures and mechanisms give rise to said 
services, and what and/or who renders them such (actual); (iii) the potential 
capacity for change possessed by those structures and mechanisms giving 
rise to the activities observed (real). This is how the relational gaze encour-
ages us to transcend the taken for granted.
A gaze becomes relational the moment that it focuses on the relationship 
between the observer and the observed and identifies the terms of the rela-
tionship on the basis of its causal properties and characteristics, rather than 
on the mere appearance of interactive processes. In fact, interactional prag-
matism goes no further than the first two operations (a and b), thus failing to 
reflect on the latent structure of the relationship between agents/actors and 
on the potential generative mechanisms of that relationship.
A gaze thus becomes truly relational when it employs meta-reflexivity in 
the form of relational reflexivity. Relational reflexivity is defined here as the 
reflexivity that an agent exercises not on him/herself in relation to the con-
text (as inner conversation), or on what the Other thinks or does, but on the 
relationship with the Other. It is therefore an act that operates as a relation-
ship-steering mechanism, as opposed to automatic or non-relational social 
mechanisms (Donati 2015b). Let us now examine what this means exactly.
What do we mean by “relational”?
The concept of “relation” is widely considered problematic, in which it is 
polysemic and is used at various levels of reality, with diverse meanings, and 
often in a confusing, indiscriminate manner.
I propose to distinguish between five different meanings of the term 
“relation,” based on the ontological status of the term and on the setting in 
which the relation is observed.
Relations in the logical sense
This is the primitive meaning proposed by Aristotle as a logical category. 
Saying that there is a relation between something (or someone) and some-
thing (or someone) else implies that a certain distance or proximity (to pros 
ti) exists between the two. The “structure” of the relation is that of a log-
ical entity (of the observer’s thought) of a “spatial” character, which does 
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not have any consistence in itself, but depends on substances, that is on the 
terms that are placed in relation to one another. A relation as such is an acci-
dental property that needs substances (the terms of the relation) in order 
to exist. This classical idea of relation is totally inadequate when trying to 
understand the meaning and weight of the modern concept of relation as the 
emergent effect of the mutual action of two or more agents.
Physical relations with the natural world (physical setting)
These are physical relations impacting the subject. For example, a child 
touches something very hot, this causes the child pain, and he/she pulls his/
her hand away and becomes aware of the fact that very hot things should not 
be touched; we notice a beautiful sunset and we stop to contemplate it; if a 
storm strikes accompanied by thunder and lightning, our reaction is to seek 
shelter. A relation dictated by the physical senses, which signals pleasure or 
pain, is a pre-social relation; but this relation is then processed in the mind 
through cultural mediation, meaning that this processing is conditioned by 
cultural habits and manners acquired from previous interactions. For exam-
ple, when looking at a beautiful sunset, a person may experience feelings that 
translate into previously acquired images which the observer may reflect on 
through the mediation of previous experiences. The view of a tornado arriv-
ing triggers relations mediated by what the observer has discovered in the 
past. In any case, the relationship with the natural world is not a reciprocal 
action between subjects. It is a subject-object relationship. The relational gaze 
here consists in the way in which the subject processes the response to physi-
cal stimuli on the basis of his/her own acquired sociocultural experience.
Relations with the practical world
In the practical world, a relationship is a position adopted in regard to 
things, situations, and contexts insofar as they are human artefacts or the 
products of society. As Archer (2010: 294) writes, “in the Practical Order, 
tacit skills are emergent from the affordances and resistances presented by 
objects and the assimilation of and accommodation to them on the part of 
the subject. Activities such as competently playing tennis, a musical instru-
ment, touch typing, or driving all depend upon “catching on” and, at more 
advanced levels (such as improvising at jazz or manoeuvring an articulated 
lorry), upon acquiring a real “feel for the game.” From my point of view, 
in this order of reality, the use of objects constitutes a social practice that 
implies a specific relationality (e.g. when we prepare a family lunch, go 
to the gym, drive a car, or interact with a robot). What is of fundamen-
tal importance if we are to understand the meaning of these relations is 
that their referent is an “object” which encapsulates the representation of 
actions previously performed by human beings, and therefore, it incor-
porates a relational message so to speak. The relational gaze upon these 
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“object relationships” requires a sort of relational “dialogue” with objects 
and not just a physical relationship as in the previous world. For example, 
if somebody receives notification of a message on Facebook, that person’s 
mind will respond to the message on the basis of the relationship that the 
message implies. In this world, specific mention should be made of relations 
with smart AI and robots, since they are not inert objects. A relationship 
with objects possessing their own “autonomy,” such as sophisticated robots, 
raises specific problems in those cases where the agent treats such robots as 
if they were “people.” In these cases, it is necessary to distinguish between 
human and non-human relationships.
Relations with the social world, that is with human 
beings and groups of human beings
In this world, a relationship is both an orientation or symbolic reference hav-
ing a reciprocal meaning (as defined by Weber) and a bond between people 
and their social roles underlying morality and social integration (according 
to the sociology of Durkheim). It may initially consist of a meaningful ori-
entation that generates a bond or a bond giving rise to an inclination; in 
either case, the two components (symbolic reference and social binding) are 
connected and interwoven. I have called these two elements refero (symbolic 
reference) and religo (tie), and I would argue that their combination pro-
duces an emergent effect, that is a social relationship as a social structure 
with its own characteristics and causal powers. Here, the nature of a rela-
tional gaze is that of an effect deriving from the contributions of the related 
subjects, who generate an emergent.
Latent relations with a reality that transcends 
the empirical and the actualised
Relations with realities that are hidden from view because devoid of all 
materiality – such as religious or supernatural realities – are what we may 
call latent; however, they are no less real as a result of their latency. These 
latent relations possess their own potential. They connect us with a world 
that we cannot experience through the physical senses, but that includes 
important realities (called “values,” “ultimate concerns,” “living symbols”), 
which we cannot measure using quantitative methods, but which are key 
to the forging of the subjects’ identities and the structure of such relations. 
These values include trust, peace, and fraternity, which are of an invisible, 
intangible nature. The relational gaze on these realities goes beyond any 
established cultural system and sociocultural interaction, because cultural 
meanings are reinterpreted in order to reach a meta-reality.
I have distinguished between these five types of meaning of the term “rela-
tion” in order to avoid any generic definition and any confusion between the 
different layers of reality (stratified social ontology).
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Let us take as an example the statement “things speak to us,” as if things – 
non-human objects – were capable of relating to us humans. The relation-
ship between us and the objects involved in this statement can be interpreted 
in different ways, which are precisely different layers of reality. The relation-
ship can be seen as a logical relationship, as a physical relationship, and as 
a practical relationship. If the object is natural (a stone, a cat, a flower), it 
seems to me difficult that the relationship can have the characteristics of the 
inter-human or transcendental one. The case in which the object is a human 
artefact is different, because in the artefact (like a work of art or a robot), 
the relational gaze can glimpse the intentions of those who produced it to 
establish a certain relationship of human value.
Of course, when we see great works of art or a beautiful sunset, this trig-
gers feelings and emotions in us, and these stimulate thoughts which have 
a relational character for us, but this dialogue is entirely processed within 
our Self (Scheve (von) 2018). Objects offer us perceptive stimuli, memories, 
signs, and symbols which we ourselves give meaning to, and which we men-
tally “converse” with/reflect on in order to relate to them. If we want to 
understand the contribution to the relationship made by the observer and 
by the observed respectively, a reflexive relational gaze is needed.
Bruno Latour’s Actor Network Theory (ANT) currently lends support 
to the argument that the human/android distinction will gradually cease 
to exist, insofar as it sees the network of relations between humans and 
non-humans as a subject-agent acting on its own behalf (the actant). What 
kind of relational gaze can there be if, as Latour argues, the distinction 
between humans and non-humans gradually ceases to exist?
As Whittle and Spicer (2008: 611) claim, the “Actor Network Theory, oth-
erwise known as the sociology of translation, rejects the idea that ‘social 
relations’ are independent of the material and natural world.” Latour’s view, 
like that of all relationists who eliminate the aforesaid distinctions, leads to 
one losing sight of the unique nature of social relations. If we lose the spec-
ificity of the different relationships and their own contribution, we can no 
longer see the responsibilities of the network’s various agents. As Graham 
Harman (2009) has pointed out in his object-oriented philosophy, the rela-
tionist metaphysics of Latour cannot properly accommodate the capacity of 
objects to cause or mediate surprises for other objects.
I wonder what kind of gaze and what type of relations can be attributed 
to the actant. What relations can human beings have with the actant? Latour 
suggests that we adopt a “hybrid gaze” that eliminates the subject-object 
distinction (Blok and Elgaard 2011). The social (i.e. the relation) takes the 
form of indistinct interactions, and eventually vanishes, the moment the 
human subject disappears. The relational gaze of sociology no longer pos-
sesses human characteristics, becoming as it does a hybrid thing.
At this point, the problem is that of understanding what is meant by a 
sociological gaze that has been rendered so “hybrid” by technological 
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progress that human beings now question their own identities and capaci-
ties. In order to understand such changes, a truly relational gaze is required.
The sociological gaze needs a relational reflexivity
If the sociological gaze is a way of reflecting on what surrounds us, bearing 
in mind our own inner reflections, then we must understand what it means 
to be reflexive “in relation” to a context. Let us take the definition of reflex-
ivity given by Archer (2007: 4): “reflexivity is the regular exercise of the men-
tal ability, shared by all normal people, to consider themselves in relation to 
their (social) contexts and vice versa.” What does “in relation to” mean here?
If we accept this (mental) definition of reflexivity, then it is difficult to 
understand what role the relationship plays as an entity distinct from the self 
that thinks within itself. The concept of relationship runs the risk of playing 
a purely logical role. The Ego’s gaze seems to be sociologically relational 
because it takes into consideration what comes from other people, together 
with the opportunities and constraints offered by the situation, and reacts 
reflexively from its own viewpoint. “Reflexively” here means that the Ego 
pursues what it believes to be a good life through an internal conversation 
that firstly defines and dovetails the Ego’s own concerns (internal goods), 
then develops practical courses of action (individual projects as micropoli-
tics), and finally establishes sustainable practices (modus vivendi) that can 
satisfy the Ego itself.
What this definition of reflexivity fails to account for is the role that 
the social relationship plays in the reflexive process, as an emergent real-
ity with its own causal powers and properties. In my view, the relational 
gaze requires relational reflexivity because the correctness and reliability of 
the cognitive process is guaranteed by rendering the relationship with the 
object of investigation reflexive3 and not by the correspondence (or symme-
try) between the mind of the knowing subject and that mind’s object.
For example, one may wonder why parents who themselves are good 
people have children who are socially deviant, and, vice versa, how it is 
that individually deviant parents manage to have honest, successful chil-
dren. Empirical research shows that such outcomes can be ascribed to the 
fact that children are socialised not so much by their individual parents, 
but rather by the relationship that their parents have with one another. 
The socialisation of children is a result of the relationship between par-
ents, ceteris paribus. Different outcomes depend on how relational reflex-
ivity works within the family. While in the first case, well-meaning/good 
 3 “Reflexive” is not the same as “reflective.” Reflexivity is an act of relating to an object by 
an acting subject; therefore, it implies an agency. Reflectivity is an automatic reaction 
effect, or a state of being reflected, as happens when light is reflected from the mirror.
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parents may have deviant children because they, the parents, fail to be 
reflexive in regard to their mutual relationship, in the second case, deviant 
parents (such as drug addicts and criminals) may have successful children 
because, albeit unconsciously, they actually exercise a positive relational 
reflexivity between themselves. On a practical level, by reflexively modi-
fying the relational dyadic or group network, deviance can be prevented 
(Weaver 2016).
What gaze do individuals adopt on the basis of their inner reflexiv-
ity? Let us examine the ideal types of reflexive mode identified by Archer 
(2003, 2007). The gaze of communicative reflexivity is dependent on the 
outside world (“significant others”) and is mediated by family attachments 
because the Self is incapable of separating itself from such attachments. 
The gaze of autonomous reflexivity is self-centred or self-referential. The 
gaze of meta-reflexivity is prompted by the individual’s dissatisfaction with 
the existing situation and by criticism of what that individual’s action has 
achieved. The gaze of fractured and impeded reflexivity is wholly disori-
ented and leads to inaction, since such people find it very difficult to make 
decisions, to establish courses of action to be consistently pursued, and 
above all to engage in anything more than survivalist day-to-day planning; 
their internal conversations cannot lead to purposeful action, but tend to 
exacerbate personal distress and disorientation resulting in an inability to 
think, deliberate, and act with conviction.
In developing her original analysis of these different types of personal 
reflexivity, Archer examines how social structure (continuous or discon-
tinuous, etc.) conditions individuals (without determining their courses of 
action however); yet there is no in-depth focus on the role played by the 
social relationship that mediates between the structure and the specific 
modes of reflexivity characterising different people. If one believes that 
the mediating social relationship plays a secondary role derived from the 
inner conversation, then we are led to Dépelteau’s (2013: 818) argument 
that we need to abandon the concept of structure in order to give priority 
to pure interactions and transactions.
I don’t think this is Archers’ intention, but in any case I wish to clarify my 
point of view. I argue that, on the one hand, social structures influence per-
sonal reflexivity by acting not directly on the individual’s mind, but through 
the social relations that give shape to personal identity and are acted upon by 
relational reflexivity. On the other hand, only by focusing on how relational 
reflexivity is implemented can we ascertain the influence of social structures 
on the acting subjects (and understand the structure of social relations).
According to my relational sociology, the gaze becomes relational if the 
investigator observes the contextual relations as such, together with their 
independent dynamics, in order to perceive how relations – as real entities 
existing outside of the observer – modify the mental activities (reflexivity) of 
the individuals concerned and their re-actions. This is what I mean when I 
say that a relational gaze is achieved through a relational reflexivity (Donati 
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2011b). We need to understand the limits of a vision of reflexivity consisting 
of an individual’s internal conversation, as well as the vision of reflexivity 
as determined by structures or social system, if we are to see the relational 
reflexivity that is necessary in order to achieve a relational gaze.
I believe that the concept of social relation employed by Archer is not very 
far from the definition of social relation proposed by Max Weber:
The term ‘social relationship’ will be used to denote the behaviour of 
a plurality of actors insofar as, in its meaningful content, the action 
of each takes account of that of the others and is oriented in these 
terms. The social relationship thus consists entirely and exclusively in the 
existence of a probability that there will be a meaningful course of social 
action – irrespective, for the time being, of the basis for this probability.
(Weber 2013: 26–27, emphasis mine)
In other words, the social relationship is traced back to the actions of 
individual agents, since the action of each actor, to be meaningful, takes 
account of the actions of the other actors and is oriented in such terms. The 
relationship is not an entity that exists between them with its own reality.
Weber’s definition is partial and insufficient for the purposes of a compre-
hensive sociological analysis. It fails to offer an in-depth view of social phe-
nomena, since it only grasps the referential orientation of the relation (the 
refero), whilst ignoring its binding structure or structuration (the religo), 
and does not account for the emergent impact of their combination.
Weber does not mention the subject’s acknowledgement of the worth of 
the relationship itself. The worth of the relationship is given by the individ-
ual subjects concerned and does not possess its own ontological status. Even 
when Archer talks about relational reflexivity, the internal evaluation of the 
relation or relationship is the one given by the person concerned; that is, it 
is how the agent sees, considers, and values that relationship subjectively.
If we accept the idea that a gaze, including a sociological gaze, is the 
product of the observer-agent’s mind, then we risk adopting a radically 
constructionist position whereby the individual may take on any sociocul-
tural identity he/she chooses. In fact, many current-day scholars, including 
certain critical realists, accept the constructionist approach in regard to 
gender roles, as if these roles were fully editable, and entirely equal to, or 
interchangeable with, any other social role. In this regard, Archer (2019a: 
29) argues that the identity of a human being (i.e. human personhood) does 
not concern that person’s bodily constitution, since it consists in the capac-
ity to adopt a first-person perspective. But, if we assume that the body is 
irrelevant for the mind, it also becomes irrelevant to social relationships. 
Therefore, the latter become pure mental entities, and, with the advent of 
ICTs, they can be identified with internet connections.
Thus, one can understand Archer’s (2019b) statement according to which 
relational reflexivity, which regards social interaction, “is not different in 
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kind” from personal reflexivity. In this way, the relational gaze is dependent 
once again on the subjectivity of the agent and does not concern the rela-
tionship between the subject and the Other, while from my point of view, 
relational reflexivity is, on the contrary, of a different kind from personal 
reflexivity.
To understand relational reflexivity, one may ponder the question: “am 
I willing to be questioned by reality (or by the Other)?”. The willingness 
to be questioned thus means changing one’s reflexivity because of the rela-
tionship, that is because the relationship raised by the question changes the 
context itself so that a new relationality is required. What reality (or the 
Other) tells me may change my perspective, that is my manner of thinking in 
the first person. The Self becomes involved by what is not the Self. In other 
words, the Self must consider the existing relationship with reality and with 
the Other, while bearing in mind a point of view which is not its own.
A relational gaze – the relational perception of things – clearly means 
questioning reality on the basis of one’s own interests; however, this opera-
tion is not confined to within the observer. The fact that the relational gaze 
adopts the viewpoint of the relationship means that it is the result of a com-
bination of first-, second-, and third-person perspectives. One perspective 
does not suffice if one wishes to grasp the relational nature of reality. The 
relational gaze avails itself of all three perspectives. Of course, exactly how 
these three perspectives are utilised will depend on the narrative context.
For example, if John turns to a friend and says: “Why don’t we go for a 
walk together on Sunday?,” John’s gaze is on his friend in the first-person. 
The “We-relation” (going for a walk together as a “We-relation”) is only a 
possibility, a symbolic reference, and not a certainty, a binding tie. If, on the 
other hand, John is invited by a colleague to a party to be held the following 
Sunday, and in reply to the invite says, “Ah, next Sunday I’m going for a walk 
with my wife,” then John is speaking in the first and second persons, since 
he is also speaking on behalf of his wife and including her in the We-relation 
of the Sunday walk, and replies to his colleague from the point of view of 
that relation. If John is telling his friends how he spent the previous Sunday, 
and says, “Did anyone see my wife and me together last Sunday?,” he is 
adopting the perspective of a third person, because it is the viewpoint of an 
impersonal gaze, that is it refers to what happened in the third person.
The first-person perspective is clearly unavoidable, since the gaze is that 
of the observing subject. The second-person perspective entails dealing 
with the Other’s concerns, which means adopting the view of a reality that 
goes beyond one’s own interests, that is the relational good, which tran-
scends and resolves the problem of the dual hermeneutics (Donati 2019). 
The third-person perspective renders the observation impersonal and, in 
some way, represents the implicit or explicit finalism of the relationship that 
the observer is observing from the point of view of the sociocultural context. 
I believe that there is no reason to negate the role played by the third-person 
perspective: this term can be interpreted as the reference to the objectivised 
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“we-ness” of the relation, that is to the actualisation of the being together, 
which goes beyond both Ego and Alter, from the viewpoint of the impersonal 
sociocultural context. The third-person perspective expresses an imper-
sonal gaze which is common currency in everyday conversation. However, 
it has to be combined with the first and second-person perspectives if it is 
not to reify and depersonalise the gaze. For example, the gaze of a person 
who wishes to see the “relational reality” of an institution (such as family, 
school, or company) as a social phenomenon that goes beyond individual, 
contextualised cases needs to adopt the third-person perspective. However, 
this gaze, if it is to provide any meaning in the lifeworld, must be interpreted 
also from the first- and second-person perspectives.
Summary
I have tried to argue that in social sciences, as in other sciences, the diverse 
ways of observing reality should not entail the adoption of a purely relativist, 
processual, or transactional point of view. There is another way – through 
the relational gaze – of seeing and appreciating reality in its “being,” that 
is in its ontological essence, which is not fixed but which unfolds within the 
framework of the contingencies that arise. I have discussed the conditions 
under which the relational gaze may be distinguished from other gazes, such 
as objectivising and subjectivising gazes, or combinations of both, or from 
other types of gaze altogether. The relational gaze makes intelligent use of 
first-, second-, and third-person perspectives, without relying on just one of 
the three. In other words, it is capable of distinguishing between personal 
reflexivity (internal conversation), relational reflexivity (meta-reflexivity 
concerning the relations), and systemic reflectivity (the reflective mecha-
nisms of relational networks), and recognises the role that each plays.
The relational gaze focuses on the relationship between the observer and 
the observed, by adopting the point of view of the relationship and render-
ing the relationship itself reflexive. It cannot be restricted to the viewpoint 
of the observer, whose mind constructs its chosen object of observation; 
neither, indeed, is it simply the viewpoint of an external world that is intro-
jected in the observer’s mind. It is not a mechanical operation, but neither 
is it pure interaction or transaction. More specifically, it cannot be defined 
merely as the “observation” of an autopoietic, self-referential system. The 
relational gaze is the triggering of a relationship that is responsive to sense 
perceptions and emotions, and thus to feelings, which constitute a commen-
tary on its ultimate concerns; but it is certainly not passive. It is a complex 
activity triggered by a person’s relational reflexivity.
Relational society is based on this kind of gaze, otherwise it does not 
exist.
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Part II




4 Relational society as a 
morphogenetic configuration
How do we conceive of society?
In the year 1991, talking about the so-called postmodern era, I wrote, “… 
what happens is understandable as social morphogenesis under conditions 
of high complexity.”1 I suggested to rethink social theory and the rep-
resentations of society by leaving aside the grand narratives of the past, and 
restarting from the very basic concept of social relation.
The social morphogenesis scheme appears to be particularly suited to give 
an account of how the objective and subjective factors, internal or external 
to a given society, combine and interact with one another so as to generate 
a society that is different from the preceding one.
The fundamental thesis of this chapter is that the morphogenesis of soci-
ety comes about through social relations, which are the connectors that 
mediate between agency and social structure. The generative mechanism 
that feeds social morphogenesis resides in the dynamic of social relations 
networks. In order to observe this phenomenon, it is necessary to invoke a 
general theory of social relations.
What do I mean by “society”? What I call “society” is not a more or less 
orderly, more or less conflictual collection of agents/actors (whether individ-
ual or collective) that share an arena of action. The society of which I am 
speaking is made by individuals but is not made of individuals. Certainly, 
only individuals can activate it, but society is another thing with respect 
to what individuals are and carry in society, even if enhanced with smart 
technologies.
Every society lets itself be understood based on a fundamental criterion 
of a suprafunctional nature, which defines its operating modalities (i.e. how 
that society draws its guiding distinctions) and, thus, its qualities (how it 
conceives its difference as compared to other societies) and its powers (that 
for which it causes certain outcomes and not others). For example, if one 
 1 My translation from P. Donati. Teoria relazionale della società. Milan: FrancoAngeli, 
1991, p. 11.
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chooses as basic criterion the kind of functional differentiation predomi-
nant in a society, then one arrives at distinguishing between segmentary, 
stratified, and functional societies, as Luhmann does. If one argues that a 
new society is arising different from the archaic, pre-modern, and modern 
ones, one needs to identify the basic criterion on which such a new society is 
founded in order to qualify it properly (Donati 2011a: 203–207).
All of the classical sociology adopted a particular criterion, which in 
general was dualistic or binary. For example, it contrasted pre-capitalist 
society and capitalist society (K. Marx), society with mechanical solidar-
ity and with organic solidarity (E. Durkheim), communitarian relations 
and associative relations (M. Weber), Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft 
(F. Tonnies), societies based on concentric circles and societies based 
on intersecting circles (G. Simmel), and so on. Many contemporary 
authors also carry on using dualistic typologies. For example, Berger and 
Luckmann (1995) propose the distinction between “integrated” societies 
and societies “exposed to crisis.”
All these theories typically share a dualistic view regarding the process 
that leads from one type of society to another type. For relational sociology, 
one society distinguishes itself from others by the way in which its relations 
are qualified and by the way in which the networks of relations that define 
it are configured. To speak of the morphogenesis of a society thus means 
speaking of transformations of the social relations that make that society in 
as much as they “exceed” initial structures.
From the standpoint of the relational paradigm, society is the product 
of associative and dissociative relations that arise in response to condition-
ing societal structures and continuously alter them. It is a matter of under-
standing how the structural dynamic of relations creates a society that is 
different from others due to the fact that its relational generative dynamic is 
different. The social morphogenesis scheme seeks to fill this gap. It does this 
with the support of a theory of reflexivity that makes it possible to analyse 
differing forms of society on the basis of differing forms of reflexivity that 
each society promotes and enables. In any case, it is about different types of 
relationality that we are speaking.
In other words, “making society” implies that the social relations among 
participants are conceived and lived as a modus vivendi, that is, as a way of 
conducting one’s existence with others in a social sphere that is not differ-
entiated according to functions, but according to relations, instead: this is 
to say that it is distinguished by the sui generis qualities and powers that 
constitute it. Such relational modalities confer a specific configuration upon 
every “society.”
A society is never perfectly integrated and conflict-free. It usually has 
problems with both social and system integration. Belonging to a “we” does 
not at all mean that internal diversities are lacking or negated. Internal 
differentiation (among agents, their cultures, their relations) is necessary 
for the existence of a society. Differently from the functionalist approach, 
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relational sociology maintains that the guiding distinction of the aftermod-
ern society is a form of relational differentiation that leads to configure 
society in a suprafunctional way.
A theory of social relations and their structure
When I think about social relations for what they are, it always occurs to 
me to compare them to air. What they have in common is the fact of being 
invisible to the naked eye and of being essential for human life. The analogy 
stops here. However, the comparison between what air is for the human 
body and what social relationality is for the identity of human persons can 
be instructive.
Air does not have its own molecular structure: it is simply a mixture of 
gases and of solid and liquid microscopic particles; its basic elements com-
bine together, altering its composition while they take in or expel certain 
gases depending on conditions of pressure, temperature, etc. But it does not 
have a “form” in the same sense in which this concept is implied when talk-
ing of social relations. It might seem that the same thing happens for social 
relations, but this is not the case. The social form is not an aggregation or 
composition of elements but is instead the relational structure – active and 
modifiable – that exists and operates among its elements, which can be rad-
ically replaced by other elements. Air does not have this quality. What air 
can cause (good or bad weather) is of the order of probabilities. What social 
relations can cause is of the order of possibilities.
Many of the relations of everyday life are indeed highly contingent (ran-
dom) in their composition of motivations, desires, feelings, aspirations, 
plans, rules, interests, means employed. Relations seem to fluctuate in a 
similar way to air in that they are composed of a mixture of elements, which 
are scarcely or not at all ordered, that continually alter the relations’ qual-
ity. Air can be more or less hot or cold, dry or humid, still or windy, clean 
or dirty; it can acquire various types of scents and odours, and so on. The 
same thing may appear to happen to social relations: they can be more or 
less warm or cool, stable or unstable, and so on. Thus, it would seem that 
there is a decided resemblance between air and the social relation. Marx 
said as much in his famous pronouncement (stated in the Manifesto of the 
Communist Party of 1848), which was taken up by Berman (1982) in con-
nection with the experience of modernity: “All that is solid melts into air.” 
The solidity of the social relations of the past is transformed into air. But I 
wonder: is this how things really are?
My response is yes and no. On the one hand, relationships seem to become 
extremely fluid (think of the mixture of female and male characters in gender 
relationships). But, on the other hand, unlike air, social relationships tend 
to be structured according to particular forms (which I call “social mole-
cules”). These forms consist of elements linked by a specific relationality 
that is exercised among them. Of course, the elements of the social relation 
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are not of a chemical-physical order of reality. These elements belong to the 
order of action and interaction. So they include feelings, emotions, opinions, 
intentions, projects, material objects. All these elements enter exchanges 
and transactions from which an emerging effect is generated. This is how 
new structures are elaborated. Such structures are qualified by the kinds of 
qualities and powers pertaining to the social relations that make them up. 
In their turn, these qualities and powers of social relations decide the effects 
that the relations have on people and social formations.
Perhaps a virtual society is like air, but a concrete society has a tendency 
to structure itself. Indeed, whoever claims that our society is becoming “liq-
uid” must then admit that, in fact, there exist social structures endowed 
with great stability and influence over individuals’ lives (think of the struc-
tures of inequality).
Those who maintain the analogy between air and social relations evoke 
attractive images, but from an ontological and epistemological point of 
view, the analogy is very limited and ultimately misleading.
The ontological and epistemological presupposition of this perspective 
lies in the fact that relationality is the mode of existing of that which belongs 
to the social order.
I assume that “being in relation” is an expression which has three analyt-
ical meanings:
1 It says that, between two (or more) entities, there is a certain distance 
which, at the same time, distinguishes and connects them.
2 That such relation exists – that is it has a reality – in itself (from Latin 
“ex-sistere,” which means “to be out having its own consistency” in 
respect to its generators) with its own qualities and causal powers.
3 That such a reality has its own modus essendi (the modality of “being” 
inherent to the relation), that is a structure, be it more stable or more 
volatile.
These three meanings are analytical, because – from an empirical view 
point – every relation contains all these aspects, which are closely linked to 
one another.
Let us turn now to the structure of the social relation and enter “inside” 
the social relation. If we define the social relation as an emergent effect of 
a reciprocal action between Ego and Alter in a social context, the relation 
can be seen from the subjective side (of Ego and Alter, respectively) or as 
“object” (objective reality) between the two.
Let me remind of the following three semantics of the social relation:
1 the semantics of the relation as refero, that is as a symbolic reference 
grounding in a motivating value intentionality;
2 the semantics of the relation as religo, that is as bond, structural con-
nection made of norms and means;
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3 the generative semantics of the relation understood as an emergent from 
the combined provisions of refero and religo in a particular configura-
tion (relational effect).
Many authors define the social relation in terms of a structure of interde-
pendence between mutual expectations. Other scholars conceive of social 
relations as “transactions.” Of course, these definitions touch upon relevant 
aspects, but have the great limit of not showing how the emerging structure 
is elaborated, because they do not enter into the relationship. They merely 
observe the effects produced by the individual actions of the agents.
In my view, the relation as effect of reciprocity (Wechselwirkung) takes on 
a form endowed with its own qualities and causal powers, which requires 
a reference to the specific social context in which the interactions between 
agents/actors take place. The context can define the social relation as a sim-
ple event (e.g. a person asks for a beer in any pub, pays, and leaves), or as a 
bond that was created through multiple reiterations over time (e.g. the rela-
tion between a patient and his/her personal doctor), or a bond that derives 
from ascriptive factors (e.g. the relation between parents and their children).
Let us take a synthetic look at the social relation’s composition and form.
Composition
The social relation is composed of elements that come from Ego and Alter’s 
actions but these acquire a different significance when they become ele-
ments proper to the instantiated relation since they enter into a new form 
(see the definition of the form on the next page). The elements in ques-
tion are those that give meaning to action and are therefore very diverse: 
expectations, goals, means used, etc. with respect to certain individual 
affinities, utilities, needs, and values.
An interesting way to conceptualise the analytical elements of every single 
action is to group them into four categories: the goal or target (T) pursued 
in a situation, the means used to reach the goal (M), the norms (N) that are 
followed in relating to one another the elements of the relation, and “latent 
cultural value” (C) that the relation incorporates.
The most difficult element to be grasped is the “latent cultural value.” It is 
not an abstraction, but corresponds to the criterion used for evaluating the 
action’s goal (T). It answers the question about “why” (in-order-to motives) 
an agent/actor performs an action and seeks a situational relation.
The relation as emergent can be analysed in its composition with refer-
ence to the above-mentioned four analytical elements, provided that we 
distinguish these elements as components of the single actions and as com-
ponents of the elaborated structure. In other words, within the emerging 
structure, the action’s elements take on a relevance different from those 
present in the agents/actors’ single actions. The four orders of elements 
are not necessarily congruent with one another; on the contrary, their 
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coherence is always problematic, at the levels both of single actions and 
of the social relation.
The combination in question, which has an autonomous relational struc-
ture with respect to the single actions that generate it, can be read as a black 
box. As a black box, it can be trivial or non-trivial, that is it can always gen-
erate the same output, or it can always generate different outputs. Of course, 
morphogenesis exists when the black box is not trivial.
Form
This is the relational structure that organises the elements coming from sin-
gle actions and combines them in such a way as to impart to them a certain 
arrangement (relational effect) that has a causal power over the participants. 
It is a result of a morphostatic/morphogenetic process.
The analysis of this process (see Figure 4.1) starts at Time1 by observ-
ing the relationship R in question as placed within a social and cultural 
structure that conditions it. For example, let think that we observe the 
employer-employee relationship as the focus of our research interest. Then, 
we get empirical information about the interactions between the actors/
agents in a temporal phase between Time2 and Time3. Empirically, we want 
to know how their actions reproduce or change the initial relationship R 
in the interactive network linking employers and employees (relational net-
work analysis). This network is our black box, in which the agential elements 
Figure 4.1  The basic general scheme of the morphostatic/morphogenetic process by 
which social relations are reproduced or changed
Source: Author.
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combine so to reproduce or change the outcome, which is observed at Time4 
as elaborated structure (relationship R′).
In general, in a social network, the mix is formed through the encounter- 
collision (i.e. a certain combination) among the goals, means, norms, and 
values of single actions within the conditions at the network’s boundaries.
In short, the social relation is the emergent effect of reciprocal actions 
reiterated over time among social actors occupying different positions in 
a societal configuration (system or social network). The relational analysis 
translates the network into a matrix (i → j/j → i) from which we infer that 
the relational effect is the result of Ego and Alter’s contributions plus the 
contribution added by the relation as such (Tam 1989).
The reciprocal action (interaction), if stabilised for a certain period of 
time, causes an effect to emerge consisting in a structure of interdependence 
(or configuration of the relation, or its “figuration” as Elias 1978 would say), 
which can be reiterated or changed over time. The elaborated structure can 
be a (relational) good or a (relational) evil depending on the (positive or 
negative) influences that it has on the subjects/actors of the relation and 
depending on the consequences (outcomes) that it has on the broader net-
work of interdependencies (social networks) in which it is embedded.
A fundamental warning: when I speak of the “target” or “goal” of a rela-
tion, this expression is to be understood as strictly correlated (if not equiv-
alent) to the expression “guiding distinction” or “directive distinction” of a 
relation, which is the distinction used by the agents/actors in order to make 
a selection among a variety of possibilities. What the relation aims at (i.e. 
its end) is to keep the distinction that makes that relation specific in respect 
to other, different relations. For instance, if I visit the doctor, the goal of the 
relation is to get medical care; if I am to achieve this purpose, I must firmly 
distinguish between the therapeutic relation and other kinds of relations 
possible with the doctor. One must do a relational work aimed at distin-
guishing between this specific relation in respect to other relations.
In a human biological cell, antigens exist to help our body distinguish 
molecules as self or non-self. In a social form, antigens exist to help a pecu-
liar social form distinguish social relations (molecules) as specific (self) or 
extraneous (non-self) to that form.
Let me explain this idea with the words of Viviana Zelizer:
In all economic action, I argue, people engage in the process of differen-
tiating meaningful social relations. For each distinct category of social 
relations, people erect a boundary, mark the boundary by means of 
names and practices, establish a set of distinctive understandings that 
operate within that boundary, designate certain sorts of economic trans-
actions as appropriate for the relation, bar other transactions as inappro-
priate, and adopt certain media for reckoning and facilitating economic 
transactions within the relation. I call that process relational work.
(Zelizer 2012: 145–146)
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Let us consider, for example, the doctor-patient relation. Both the agents/
actors have goals, means, norms, and values, which are in part convergent 
and in part divergent but, in any case, are understood subjectively in differ-
ent ways. The relation that emerges is made of elements that come in part 
from the doctor and in part from the patient, and is an activity-dependent 
reality operating between the two. Although the relation is supposed to be 
of a therapeutic nature with a view to improving the patient’s health, it is 
possible that the actions’ elements do not lead to this type of relation but to 
some different types of relation. For example, in reiterating their relation-
ship, patient and doctor happen to talk about their existential problems and 
the therapeutic relationship becomes a conversation over matters that have 
nothing to do with the health issues, or they develop a friendship relation, 
and one of them becomes member of a club attended by the other where the 
therapeutic relationship becomes informal instead of being restricted to the 
formality of the doctor’s office.
Another example is the relation between partners in a couple. When Ego 
and Alter decide to form a couple, they try to adapt their respective situated 
goals, means, norms, and motivational values so as to create a relation from 
which each partner can receive what he/she expects. “Being in” this relation 
means pursuing some opportunities while accepting some constraints. Both 
the opportunities and the constraints are continuously renegotiated. The 
action of free giving, that is, the unconditional acceptance of the other’s 
expectations by one or both parties, is possible but is an exception because 
normally the two partners try to find an arrangement that satisfies their 
personal needs. The difficulty with such an arrangement arises from the 
fact that the relation is a “third party” or tertium that mediates between Ego 
and Alter. It has its own reality, which is relevant not only for the partners 
but also for other actors/agents outside the couple who observe it, evalu-
ate it, and have their own expectations of it. Whoever observes the couple 
attributes certain properties and powers to it that are different from the two 
partners’ personal expectations.
We could say the same thing about the relation between employer and 
employee (which is formally spelt out in a contract that establishes the rela-
tion), or between teacher and student, and so on. The ways of combining the 
elements provided by Ego al Alter with their actions depend on the nature of 
the relation and of the social context (boundary conditions). If the setting is 
a family context, it will have a family form; if it is a medical office, a school, 
a business, a public assembly, etc., we will find different relational forms for 
each of these settings.
The group relation can be seen as an extension of the dynamic between 
Ego and Alter to a plurality of subjects, but of course, complexity increases. 
Some examples come to mind, such as the case of the “reflecting team” used 
in mental health services that conduct therapy with individuals and families 
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in difficulty2 or the case of the “family group conferences” (Seikkula and 
Arnkil 2006)3 that work to help parents manage problems with their chil-
dren in situations of risk by building interactive networks between them 
from which a relationality can emerge that supports the parents in their 
tasks. In these group dynamics, we can see that the network connecting 
participants is formed on the basis of a “social molecule” (about which I 
will say more later), which is formed by the modality of relational reflexivity 
adopted by the participants who, anyway, have different individual modes 
of reflexivity.
The relation as generative mechanism
Social morphogenesis begins within relations, and it is through relations 
that new social forms are generated. It is in the social relation’s form4 that 
compatibilities, contradictions, and complementarities5 between the ele-
ments that compose the relation are, or are not, realised in varying ways 
and degrees.
When the social relation approximates to a habitus, reciprocal action takes 
on a reproductive character, based on negative feedback. Social morphogen-
esis comes about when the relation involves the reflexivity of subjects and 
entails positive feedback, in particular, relational feedbacks (Donati 2015b). 
 2 The “reflecting team” is a method of social work aimed at providing relational services 
to people in difficulty or at risk through the building of a relational network between 
professionals and all the people involved in a particular issue (Andersen 1991). The team 
removes barriers between therapists and clients, lets everyone participate in a dialogue in 
which there is the attempt to achieve a change in the situation by continuously questioning 
the roles and relations among all the participants. Operating in this way, the professionals 
encounter people in a state of need without pre-existing hypotheses, engage in a conver-
sation that probes what has still not been seen or thought, in a form of communication 
that aims to let an alternative understanding emerge regarding what has been defined as 
problematic. To the extent that the network operates with these relational modalities, pos-
sibilities for change are opened up. These possibilities are evaluated in light of therapeutic 
goals and, thus, we are in the presence of what I call a relational system of observation, 
diagnosis, and relational guidance.
 3 A family group conference (FGC) is a decision-making and planning process in which 
the “wider family group” (parents, kin, friends, neighbours, other families) makes plans 
and decisions for children and young people who have been identified either by the family 
themselves or by service providers as being at risk and in need of intervention that will 
safeguard and promote their welfare. It is possible to define an FGC as a relational service 
because it is based on a participatory approach in which social services work together 
with parents, children, and other important relations to find the right way to care and 
protect the child by stimulating the reflexivity of the people involved and their relations.
 4 The form of the relation answers the question: “What type of relation do we have/want 
between us?”
 5 According to what Archer theorized (1988: 219–226, 258–273).
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A relational feedback, differently from individual positive feedback (which 
is an individual variation introduced by Ego into the relationship with 
Alter), is a positive feedback working on the relational structure of the par-
ticipants’ network. It operates when the subjects perceive that their rela-
tional structure is like a reality that influences them for good or for evil as 
relational subjects. Then, the agents can reproduce or modify the relational 
structure of their network. They can stabilise it or destroy it, depending on 
the kind of reflexivity that governs the feedbacks, and of course, reflexivity 
can also be blocked.
In general, the relation is a generative mechanism to the extent that it con-
tains reflexivity, and the latter makes the black box non-trivial. That is why 
the emergent relational structure has qualities and properties that “exceed” 
social interactions (which have an événemential character: they are pure 
“events”). Among various properties and powers belonging to the relational 
dynamics leading to Time4 (Figure 4.1), I would like to emphasise two that 
are connected to each other.
Firstly, the social relation is intrinsically reflexive, in the sense that it 
“always circles back” on to the subjects that are in the relation. Naturally, 
reflexivity can be minimal, impeded, distorted, or fractured and in that case 
so will be the relationality among the agents/actors. Precisely because they 
“exist in relation,” agents/actors must think and act focusing on their rela-
tionship beyond individual intentions or actions. The structure of the relation 
is reflexive in that the axis of the refero is not only a symbolic reference to the 
goal that Ego and Alter intend to realise (i.e. define which relationship to have 
between them), but it is also a continuous bring back (referre) what emerged 
from their prior interactions to their new resolutions. In case, there is no solu-
tion to the problem of how to define the mutual relationship, there will only 
be a (contingent) interaction, not an established social relation.
In my opinion, it is in the quality of the reflexivity put in place by the 
agents that the ethical value of the relationship resides, to the extent that the 
relationship requires a “response” (responsibility), that is, being responsible 
to oneself and to others for the results of interactions. Obviously, reflex-
ivity will have quite different characteristics from one relation to another 
and from one context to another. In the market, for example, things happen 
very differently than in the family. In any case, the reflexive character of the 
relation is decisive for social dynamics. We can speak of the relation as the 
“reflexive mechanism” of the social realm.
Secondly, and in parallel, the social relation can never be purely mechan-
ical because it has a ternary, not binary, structure. Automatic mechanisms 
are binary (stimulus-response, 0–1, yes/no)6 and do not have purposes (read: 
desires), since they perform functions. The social relation, instead, contains 
 6 As Simmel (1989: 258) claims, “The formula of the purpose is ternary, that of the mecha-
nism [is] only binary.”
Relational society as a morphogenetic configuration 81
a finalism – one that may or may not be realised because of other counter-
vailing mechanisms that are at play. Insofar as the relationship operates 
with a finalism it constitutes a particular generative mechanism, which can 
obviously produce very different effects. It is not a given that the relation’s 
finalism corresponds to the ends of the singular subjects who are in relation, 
even when they are in agreement. On the contrary, it is highly probable that 
the outcome caused by the relation is distanced from the particular goals 
(wishes, expectations, etc.) of the singular subjects in relation precisely in 
that it is an emergent effect that mediates between subjects. The finality may 
be simply to enjoy the products of their relationships. In any case, to say 
that relations have an ethical dimension, simply means that relations have a 
moral value since what they mean to the agents is good or bad, or an inscru-
table mixture of both.
Often the actors/agents that appeal to noble “values” such as peace, 
justice, and solidarity are not efficacious in generating a congruent social 
structure because they do not see how to give form to the social relation 
that is meant to realise that value. In order to understand the problem of the 
relation’s form, it is useful to think of it as a “social molecule.”
I use the term “molecule” to state that the components of a social relation 
have to connect in a peculiar way in order to produce an emergent effect 
endowed with a certain stability and causal powers, if the social morpho-
genesis has to generate an elaborated structure. Although a certain degree 
of contingency can and should be introduced in the process through which 
an emergent is generated, not all possible combinations of the relational 
components can be effective in producing a specific kind of social relation. 
In general, every social sphere (like an organisation, an association, a public 
office, a school, a hospital, a family, a pub, etc.) is identified by a species- 
specific kind of social relationality, with its associated effects.
In talking about the social relation as a molecule of the social world, I 
think that this is more than a metaphor for the molecule which exists in the 
physical-chemical world. In the latter, a molecule (elementary or composed) 
is the smallest particle which retains the characteristics and specific proper-
ties of a physical substance and is capable of autonomous existence (as long 
as it can). Something similar happens – as loose as the analogy may be – 
with regard to the social relation which characterises a specific social sphere 
or context or fabric. We can think of the social molecule of a youth gang, a 
neighbourhood, a voluntary association, a firm, a school, a cooperative, a 
bank, and so on.
Take the example of schools. Of course, every school is different from 
any other. But, after all, each one is a school, not a family or a corpora-
tion. School system can be very different from one another, for example 
centralised in France and decentralised in the United Kingdom. But does 
that mean that all schools have nothing in common? Why do we call them 
“schools”? Is that only a nominalist convention? When I argue that schools 
are characterised by a specific social molecule, I am referring to the fact that 
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they have in common a system of relationships that distinguishes them as 
schools from any other type of social relationship systems. But of course, 
the molecule is different for each school, just as all humans have the same 
DNA in common but each one has a unique composition.
The social relation as molecule of the social
The social realm tends to organise itself in “molecules” that – if stabilised – 
generate the social structures that characterise a context. If I go into a pub, 
the social context that I find there envisions certain goals (I cannot ask to 
buy a bicycle), certain means for achieving these goals, certain rules and 
values, not to mention certain combinations of these. There are pubs for 
young people, who go there to get a drink and find friends. And there are 
pubs for older people, who go there to play cards. In this, the social molecule 
of the pub is materialised; it can also, obviously, be changed, in which case 
the social molecule meets a process of social morphogenesis.
Let us see what is meant by the assertion that we can think of the social 
relation as a “molecule” whose elements, with their internal combinations, 
confer on it particular properties and powers. I must repeat that the reality 
of an established social relation (when it is an emergent effect, an elabo-
rated structure) continues to be activity dependent, since there is no deus ex 
machina that makes it exist independently of the subjects. It exists outsides 
the subjects, but cannot work without them.
We can briefly recall the specific social molecules that characterise the 
different types of society.
A tribe or clan exists in as much as whoever is part of it feels bound 
within the “tribal molecule,” that is embedded in that organisational prin-
ciple of the tribal or clan structure that is the same for everyone and does 
not leave margins for variability. The assertion by Durkheim, according to 
which the collective conscience coincides point by point with the individ-
ual conscience, cannot be absolutised because collective representations 
cannot completely block the reflexivity of all individuals. There is always 
the possibility that some member(s) of the tribe can avoid the coercion 
of the “collective conscience.” This possibility does not detract from the 
fact that the collective mechanisms are at work: to claim that a tribe implies 
a peculiar social molecule is equivalent to claim that in tribal societies the 
social differentiation is segmentary, and not stratified or functional, let 
alone relational in the sense intended here.
Pre-modern traditional societies are generally “stratified.” In this arrange-
ment, each social stratum has its own “social molecule,” the molecule of 
that specific social stratum (or class). The social relations in the medieval 
aristocratic class have a social molecule that is different from the profes-
sional or artisan classes organised in corporations or guilds (physicians, 
notaries, carpenters, butchers, etc.), and from other classes (think of the 
peasants) as well. Each stratum or corporation has its own social molecule 
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in terms of the aims, means, norms, and values of the social relationship 
that each individual belonging to this stratum must comply with.
Modern societies break away from the molecular structure of the pre- 
existing social strata and inaugurate a type of social molecule that, in its own 
properties and powers, is completely different as compared with all those 
that came before. This is a molecule that tends to nullify its morphostatic 
character. The form of the modern molecule is based on the principle of 
functional differentiation as its basic principle. In late modernity, functional 
differentiation opens up to the guiding value of contingency (the value of the 
plural) as the superordinate value of action,7 which involves the maximum 
possible variability and variations of social relations.
In fact, we say that a society is “more modern” to the degree to which its 
social molecule promotes pluralism, that is an increasing pluralisation of 
all social forms as its directive distinction. In postmodernity, the process 
is radicalised. The social molecule appears as an aggregation/combination 
of elements that is a “form without form,” in the sense that postmoderni-
ty’s social forms reject any kind of “canon,” predefined standard, truth, or 
stiff identity. It does this on the basis of principles of freedom and equality 
among all participants. In a certain sense, postmodernity can be defined as 
a form of society in which the structures of social relations are intrinsically 
(i.e. normatively) morphogenetic in that social morphogenesis is simultane-
ously the value and the norm that guides all of society in all its expressions. 
In the postmodern form, social identity is like that of the protagonist in 
Philip Dick’s novel A Scanner Darkly who, in continuously adopting differ-
ent identities, loses the sense of self.
The goals and means of the social relation follow an evaluative criterion 
that opens the door to the world of the possible. This criterion consists in the 
continual creation of variations and variability. This process is extended to 
all social spheres, albeit gradually. It affects, at different and non-sequential 
times, all social institutions, like the political system, the economic institu-
tions, the family, the school. Social processes make use of generalised sym-
bolic media that can operate only on condition of being able to realise the 
normative value of maximum openness to the possible (“being politically 
correct” is its basic norm). The slogan is to create ever new and ever greater 
opportunities as goods in themselves for the individuals irrespective of their 
relational consequences, except of course for damages to others. In the first 
place, money and political power do this. The same thing is required of all 
other generalised symbolic media, in particular the use of influence to form 
public opinion.
We can represent the social relation as a molecule with a chart (Figure 4.2) 
indicating that the relation’s structure consists of four elements and their 
reciprocal links. The four elements are: (G) the concern/interest selected 
 7 The term “superordinated value” is taken from Berger and Luckmann (1995).
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or selectable as directive distinction for the relation; (L) the cultural value 
attributed to the relation’s concern/interest; (A) the means available to pur-
sue the relation’s concern/interest; (I) the logic of relating (through distinc-
tions and connections) the other elements L, A, and G.
For example, if we want to carry out a survey on how individuals choose 
to make a couple, what is at stake is the relationship with the partner. The 
elements of this relationship could be detected through the answers to the 
following questions: (G) which people are interested in living as a couple, or, 
conversely, do not consider such relationship as an interesting purpose for 
them?; (L) what value to attribute to that relationship? (it could be a mar-
riage, a simple cohabitation, a temporary experience); (A) what means are 
considered suitable to achieve the goal?; (I) how do individuals put these ele-
ments together in order to configure an acceptable modus vivendi for them? 
From all this, we can draw, with various techniques, a profile of the various 
ways of structuring the couple relationship in a certain population.
Figure 4.2  The model of the social relation as a “molecule of the social” and its 
environments
Source: Author.
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Each element of the relationship has a border with a specific environment. 
The environments are as follows: (L) the cultural value attributed to the 
selected social relation borders on the environment of the possible ultimate 
concerns/interests that can be attributed to that relation; (G) the situational 
goal selected or selectable as directive distinction for the relation borders on 
the environment the other agents’ situational goals (the environment of the 
interests pursued by others); (A) the means adopted for getting the relational 
goal borders on the environment of the possible resources and opportuni-
ties that would actualise the situational goal; (I) the norm chosen in order 
to relate L, A, G borders on the environment of the available logics to make 
distinctions and connections so to perform the relation.
It should be noticed that the component called “norms” is to be understood 
not as a legal constraint, but as the logic (and therefore rules) of relatedness 
between the elements of the social relation which enables them to connect in 
some way and produce the emergent effect (in this regard, norms are not only 
restrictions, but also enablements). Norms can foster innovation. Indeed, such 
norms are required. Examples abound. The field of norms introduced by law 
in order to change family patterns is very rich in this respect: for instance, to 
make the parental leave compulsory for the father (together or instead of the 
parental leave for the mother) innovates family relations. The field of social 
services and social policies is another one: for example, introducing the norm 
of “governing by networking” leads many welfare services to be changed from 
a vertical structure to horizontal configurations characterised by forms of 
circular participation and dialogical settings.
On the basis of this conceptualisation, we can feature the social molecule 
produced by modernity in the following way (Figure 4.3). It is constituted by 
four base elements that are combined together:
 (G)  The situational target or goal of the social relation is the direc-
tive distinction that works to select a variation as a broadening of 
opportunities; to produce social morphogenesis, the variation must 
be freed from all ascriptive constraints (i.e. it must be maximally 
contingent).
 (A)  The means for achieving this goal can be of the most diverse kinds, 
but what is essential is that they be treated as “money” because 
money is the generalised symbolic means of interchange that makes 
it possible to render all objects equivalent, depriving them of their 
constraints; as a matter of fact, money is the trigger of typically 
modern relationality, which renders social relations indifferent, 
making their ascriptive character and intrinsic quality disappear.
 (I)  The norms (internal logic) of the modern social molecule are rules 
that must promote the production of variety; they are typically 
acquisitive which means that they valorise competition rather than 
concomitant complementarities.
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(L)  The value of the relation’s interest, working as guiding distinction, 
is its indifference towards unconditional values (i.e. its polytheism of 
values, as Max Weber would say); this is to say that the relation 
assesses reality on the basis of values that are always fungible with 
other values; the culture of this society (society of individuals) is 
characterised by relativism and decontextualisation of relations; it 
is fed by a theological matrix for which transcendence belongs to 
the individual’s skills, to her self-affirmation, and is non-relational 
(Donati 2010).
Concerning the environments of the typical modern social molecule, 
Figure 4.3 tells us that (G) the selection of variety in order to change social 
structures and institutions is related to an environment where other rele-
vant people make selections of their interests in a different way, from which 
the competition arises; (I) the rules combining the elements are related to 
Figure 4.3 The structure of the social relation (social molecule) typical of modernity
Source: Author.
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an environment in which the binary logics of distinction and connection 
typical of modernity are found; (A) money serves as a means to address 
relationships with the external environment where physical, scientific, and 
technological resources are found; (L) the cultural value is related to a the-
ological matrix that derives from Protestantism considered as the engine of 
an evolutionary process of individuation and rationalisation (as portrayed 
by Parsons 1967).
If we observe things in this way, we can come to appreciate the truth 
and, at the same time, the fallacy of Luhmann’s thesis. It is well known that 
Luhmann (1995) maintained that the adaptive function of society, that is 
the instrumental function performed by money as a generalised symbolic 
means of communication, is the dominant and specific function of the mod-
ern social system, in contrast to the systems of pre-modern societies. A 
society – Luhmann (1976: 517) asserts – that gives institutional primacy to 
monetary mechanisms (i.e. on a systemic level, to its economy) will therefore 
orient itself towards an “open” future and will conceive of itself as progres-
sive (as moving ahead). In his opinion, modernity consists precisely in the 
creation of a continuous variability due to the fact that functional primacy 
is given to the economy, which disengages money from specific values and 
social norms (for more details, see Donati 2011a: 150–152).
Luhmann takes up and brings to its extreme consequences the perspec-
tive of Georg Simmel according to which the more the objects are exchange-
able, the more the same objects are perceived as replaceable, and therefore 
they lose their specific qualities. They become abstract entities. Money 
represents the purest form of these exchanges, a form of interaction that 
is separate from the content of the interaction itself. Consequently, in the 
monetary economy, all relationships between people tend to be considered 
as measurable and able to be calculated, and the calculation prevails over 
sentiment. I guess that those relationist sociologies that reduce relationships 
to pure interactions and transactions, willingly or unwillingly, reflect this 
culture of money as a means of making all relationships equivalent, includ-
ing those between humans and non-human entities, for example robots.
So far, Figure 4.3 is in agreement with Luhmann’s theory. Where my 
relational theory disagrees with Luhmann’s theory is that in his opinion, 
modernity does not have a standard norm, while I believe that the modern 
relationality also depends on a standard of normative value. This standard 
model enhances a type of “pure relationality” (that of money, which is not 
tied to anything) understood as the possibility that social relationships may 
be or become immune from any social bond. In this case, it is not money – 
like all genres of means – that makes society “always otherwise possible” 
(as Luhmann claims), but it is, instead, the cultural value that is attributed 
to social relations in the typical molecule of modernity, and related social 
norms. It is this normative value that legitimises the use of money as a 
universal converter, that is, the use of money as the abstract equivalent of 
everything, and even of human persons.
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From modern to aftermodern relationality
We might wonder: when is it that the social morphogenesis of modernity 
comes about? From the point of view of relational sociology, this happens 
when the relationality unique to its social molecule finds itself confronting 
a type and degree of contingency that it is no longer able to manage. Society 
(as defined here) approaches a breaking point in which agents/actors experi-
ence increasing failures. The collapse of the social molecule that characterises 
the structures of the acquisitive society becomes possible. This happens in 
the spheres experiencing the most radical processes of modernisation. Many 
emergent phenomena signal the advent of a turning point, which is indicated 
by the formation of another social molecule, of an aftermodern type, begin-
ning from the sphere of cultural latency, that is, by a change in values that 
support new situational goals. Obviously, there is a modernity that continues 
and a modernity that collapses. These processes are represented in Figure 4.4.
The transition begins at a breaking point where social disasters induced 
by the modernisation processes cannot be solved by modernity itself (it is 
the concept of “reflexive modernization” proposed by Beck, Bonss, and 
Lau 2003). The turning point for the change of the relationship as a social 
molecule occurs through the adoption of a principle of suprafunctional 
non-equivalence. This turning point initiates the processes of social mor-
phogenesis that lead to the emergence of the aftermodern social molecule. 
This does not prevent some processes of neo-modernisation from contin-
uing to persist, while in any case, the modern social molecule degrades in 
increasingly wider areas of society.
The collapse of the modern relation can be described as the fading of the 
competitive contradiction between culture and social structure based on an 
individualistic transcendental matrix. This configuration is followed by the 
birth of experiences in which a different synergy emerges between a new culture 
Figure 4.4 The transition from modernity to aftermodernity
Source: Author.
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and a new structure, both characterised by attributing a relational meaning to 
values as well as social roles, functions, and performances (Figure 4.5).
Rushworth and Schluter (2011: 2–3) write, “This means learning to see 
life from the perspective of relationships, as opposed to seeing it from 
the viewpoint of materialism or individualism. Instead of assuming that 
income or profit should generally be the ultimate goal for personal, corpo-
rate or government decisions, we argue for relational wellbeing instead – 
since ultimately our relationships are what matter most in life. Learning 
to think relationally calls for a Copernican revolution: instead of placing 
material wealth, or individual rights and freedom, at the centre of our 
metaphysical solar system, with all other things – including relationships – 
revolving around them, we place relationships at the centre, to reflect bet-
ter what we ultimately value. As an example, take the decision to buy a 
microwave oven: we may consider the decision financially (can I afford it?), 
or spatially (is there room in the kitchen?), or environmentally (how does 
this affect my carbon footprint?) – but what about relationally? Having a 
Figure 4.5  The molecular structure of the social relation typical of an aftermodern 
society
Source: Author.
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microwave could either enhance or lower relational wellbeing in the house-
hold. Reducing the time spent on preparing food could either permit more 
time for talking together over the meal, or else lead to family members 
eating at different times and not talking together at all. Looking at the deci-
sion through a relational lens will bring this dimension into perspective.”
The structural principle of the passage to aftermodernity is that of a social 
molecule that is no longer based upon functional equivalence but is based 
upon a principle of non-fungibility of social relations. Figure 4.5 illustrates 
the features of the emergent molecule:
 (G)  The social relation’s target/goal is to select variations according to 
the type and degree of relationality that they entail, that is through 
relational (not functional) differentiation, with a view to producing 
relational goods.
 (A)  The means for achieving the goal can be extremely diverse, but they 
must be such as to allow for the production of relational goods; 
they should promote a network of social exchanges that confer a 
relationally satisfying identity upon the agents/actors.
 (I)  The logic of the aftermodern social molecule is relational, mean-
ing that it promotes the rules that coordinate values, means, and 
situational purposes in order to respect the non-fungibility of 
social relations; in short, relations cannot be indifferent or made 
equivalent.
 (L)  The value attributed to the relation is chosen on the basis of the 
meaningful experiences that the agent can obtain from that relation 
in contrast to what can be offered by other types of relations; in 
short, the cultural matrix is relational rather than individualistic.
Confronted with society’s possible collapse, that is with a crisis in its integra-
tion on both social and system level, significant parts of society activate mor-
phogenetic processes that consist in creating networks of relations in which 
the functionalist principle is replaced by suprafunctional principles. Money is 
replaced by other generalised means of interchange and communication, or 
by other generalised means of social relationality. For instance, money can be 
replaced with time (see the experience of the time banks). The cultural matrix 
changes in order to acknowledge and promote the value of social relations 
as the distinctive criterion of the new social molecule in which the means no 
longer have a pure functional primacy. The new molecule gains ground if 
and to the extent that the primacy of the adaptive function is replaced by the 
criterion of the intrinsic value of each social relationality.
Where is capitalism going to?
My differential relational sociology differs from other relational sociologies 
because it points out that the peculiar/differential constitution of each soci-
ety, each social sphere, and each social system is based upon the different 
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(sui generis) structure of its “founding social relation.”8 In particular, this 
theory argues that the likelihood of generating a new emergent and stable 
social formation increases when (i) each agent in a relationally shared con-
text believes that the others view her/him as a relational subject, (ii) can 
distinguish between actions producing relational goods or relational evils, 
(iii) anticipates limited disapproval from others that can lead to positive 
feedbacks (i.e. an unmanaged increase in other divergent relationships), 
(iv) is positively motivated to adopt convergent complementarities with the 
others through relational feedbacks, and (v) can rely on previous experi-
ences of contexts producing relational goods or evils.
To better understand this perspective, it is worth returning to the already 
mentioned analogy, albeit very loose, between a physical molecule and a 
social molecule. In both cases, the word “molecule” is used in order to high-
light the fact that a structured set of elements and their reciprocal relations 
identifies the peculiar qualities and powers of a matter or substance, which of 
course is ontologically wholly different in the physical and social orders: it is 
basically fixed in the natural order (although not as much as it was believed 
in the past), while it is highly contingent and interactive in the social order.
The word “substance” is here used by taking into account what Wendy 
Bottero writes on relationality, when, criticising Bourdieu’s approach to 
relationality, she speaks of “the substance of social interaction” (Bottero 
2009: 399) and “the nature of social networks” (ibid: 417).
Whilst Bourdieu prefers a “relational” rather than a “substantialist” 
reading of social position, his retreat from the substance of social inter-
action creates a number of problems in his explanatory framework. There 
are three issues here. Firstly, by stressing the relational properties of social 
position, Bourdieu sometimes places an undue reliance on homologies 
between structurally equivalent positions to explain social action, without 
sufficiently attending to the substance of those social positions. Secondly, 
many of Bourdieu’s core concepts – habitus, field, and, more generally, 
social space – depend upon assumptions about their interactional prop-
erties which are left unexamined. Key elements of Bourdieu’s conceptual 
framework presuppose the prevalence of a particular network pattern – 
homophily, where agents associate on the basis of social similarity. But the 
significance of homophily for Bourdieu’s account of social practice is never 
fully confronted, and is treated as a theoretical a priori on which concepts 
like the habitus sit. However, the existence of homophily cannot simply be 
assumed, and to adequately situate Bourdieu’s account of the habitus (and 
field) greater attention must be paid to the substance and patterning of 
social networks. Thirdly, by “bracketing off” the concrete nature of social 
 8 Following Hegel, Günther (1976: 349) talks of a balance between exchange and order 
so to combine them in a new codifiable principle that may be called “founding relation” 
(Grundverhältnis or “basic relationship”).
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networks as a feature of social space, Bourdieu ignores the variable interac-
tional properties of that space, and so downplays the intersubjective charac-
ter of practice (Bottero 2009: 403–404).
In my view, such substance exists in so far as there is a covalent bonding 
between the elements or parts that generate the substance with its particular 
qualities and powers. By covalent bonding, I mean the stable bond of attrac-
tive and repulsive forces between agents who share elements of their actions. 
The nature of a social network is its molecular quality, that is the quality of 
its constituent social molecule, for instance, the molecule which constitutes 
a company, a voluntary association, a political party, a cooperative, a kin-
ship, etc. as a sui generis network. These different forms of association are 
obviously contingent and a matter of degree. What is essentially relevant 
is their peculiarity from the viewpoint of the qualities and causal powers 
which influence the interactions in a relationally contested field or organisa-
tion. Let me explain a bit more.
In chemistry, a molecule is defined as an electrically neutral group of 
two or more atoms held together by covalent chemical bonds. In sociol-
ogy, I argue, we can speak of a social molecule as a group of elements held 
together by co-relations which form a sui generis social bond. Since social 
morphogenesis, unlike the chemical or biological, is open to evolution and 
not predetermined, in the same vein, we can say that social molecules are 
not predetermined and are open to changes, which anyway are not casual 
or indeterminate, precisely because the elements of the molecule and their 
reciprocal relations shape a peculiar pattern that distinguishes one social 
sphere (a “relational order”) from another.
The social molecule, then, unlike the molecule in physical nature, is not 
a pre-established composition, determining which other components it can 
“mix” with, but it is a structural and cultural configuration of elements 
acted by people and emerging from their interactions (the interactional 
order). The latter can change the molecule characterising the stuff of a social 
formation or context, but what the word “molecule” wants to underline is 
that the qualities and powers of that social formation depend on the char-
acters of its basic relationality. This is, I guess, what we mean when we talk 
about a “tribal relation,” a “feudal relation,” a “capitalist relation,” a “third 
sector relation,” a “market relation,” a “teacher-pupil relation,” a “profes-
sional relation,” a “family relation,” an “internet relation,” a “therapeutic 
relation,” a “neighbourhood relation,” a “friendship relation,” and so on 
and so forth.
In society, unlike in the physical order, the spheres of social relations 
are neither like a gas, or a liquid, or a solid (in a gas, the molecules move 
freely and are independent of each other, in a liquid the molecules are 
loosely attached, and in a solid the bonds are strong and hold the mole-
cules together). The social fabric is not like that, although many speak of 
some similarities. What I call social molecules are patterned emergents in 
the social realm. They can emerge through morphostatic or morphogenetic 
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processes and are structured in a way or another due to their internal rela-
tional constitution. Their elements interact and establish relations of interde-
pendence between them and with their respective environments in a setting 
which is relationally contested because the actors/agents intend to influence 
the peculiarities of the kind of molecule they are engaged to produce (e.g. a 
different form of capitalism, friendship, school, family, care, and service).
When we talk about capitalism, we talk about a socio-historical forma-
tion in which the economic (analytical) dimension of social relations rules 
the other dimensions within all those social relations that characterise this 
social formation. It is highly misleading to separate economic and social 
relations as if they were two empirically different kinds of realities, as some 
scholars do. To claim that, under capitalism, economic relations can be 
“conceived as a particular kind of social relations nested, in a way that is 
supportive and subversive at the same time, into more encompassing social 
relations” (Streeck 2012: 4, italics mine) leads to conceive of economic rela-
tions as a sort of subset of social relations, while they are fully social rela-
tions, and hence leads to the confusing position of having to “show how 
economic relations upon closer inspection turn out to be social ones” (ibid).
The fact that economic relations mould an entire historical formation 
has to be understood not on the basis of their dominance over other non- 
economic relations, but on the basis of the fact that there is a peculiar struc-
ture (what I call “social molecule”) which pervades all spheres of society, 
that is economy, politics, laws, lifeworlds, styles of life, families, and even 
religions as cultural systems. This is what I mean when I say that the quality 
of a social formation is due to its social molecule. If a new society has to 
come, it should have a different social molecule. That is what lies below the 
assertion that unprecedented relational subjects are building such a new 
social molecule.
This perspective is very instructive about the future of capitalism. If cap-
ital, as that specific social relationship of which Marx spoke, has config-
ured the whole of modern society, we must understand if and how the social 
molecule called the “capitalist relationship” has changed or will be able to 
change in the future.
Reflecting on Marx’s thought, Shaikh (1990: 72) writes, “Taken by itself, a 
sharp stone is simply a relic of some ancient and inexorable geological pro-
cess. But appropriated as a cutting instrument, it is a tool or, in a somewhat 
more murderous vein, a weapon. As a stone, it is a natural object. But as a 
tool or weapon, it is an eminently social object whose natural form is merely 
the carrier of the social relations which, so to speak, happen to have seized 
upon it. Even any particular social object, such as a tool, can enter into 
many different sets of social relations.”
With respect to this correct statement, I observe that when a stone is used 
as a weapon, social relationships do not change its natural substance (being 
a stone), but change only its meaning for those who look at it and use it. The 
stone is now a weapon and no longer a simple physical object, that is it refers 
94 Insights into the morphogenetic changes
to social relationships and not to physical relationships. If we change the 
relational context, we do not change the natural substance of the stone, but 
we change its sense and its use relations. So, in society, we can always take 
physical nature in “another way.” One wonders: is this also the case for social 
entities created by mankind? I would respond positively in the case of inert 
object that cannot act by themselves, but whose operations totally follow the 
commands of those who use it. For example, the loom used at the beginning 
of industrialisation, which we find treated in Marx’s analyses. One wonders: 
is it the same for entities such as artificial intelligence (AI) and robots, and 
in some respects information and communication technologies (ICTs)? In 
no way. It is clear that, if we apply an AI to the loom, social relationships 
change. Digital smart technologies do not have a physical substance such as 
that of stone or loom, but they are human artefacts that involve a relational 
context in which the interactions between the user and the object change rad-
ically. The digital “intelligent” entities at least partially escape the control of 
those who use them. They open up to a set of possible relationships that are 
not predictable. Herein lies the discontinuity between the modern (capitalist) 
economy and the aftermodern digital economy.
If we follow this reasoning, we see that the new economy opens up to 
the world of possibilities by moving away from physical nature (and from a 
culture that operates with analogical symbolic code), and therefore we must 
ask ourselves whether it is still possible to believe that substance and rela-
tionships are co-principles of reality, or if we have to completely abandon 
the substance and speak only of relationships. I believe it is not so. Even 
digital artefacts (AI, robots, ICTs) have a “substance”: they are what they 
are. Once created and deployed, they are not liquid entities that can take any 
form. Therefore, the problem is to understand what substance we are talk-
ing about in the case of human artefacts. The artefacts I am talking about 
only admit a certain set of relationships and not others, which means they 
have their own structure. This structure is their “substance.”
For those involved, this substance determines certain social positions and 
not others. It is up to users to respond reflexively to what those substances 
tend to determine in user behaviour. A morphogenetic analysis of the pro-
cess is required (according to the sequence: conditional relational structure 
[of AI, robot, ICT] → interactions of the structure with users and between 
users → change of the initial relational structure). Change is played in inter-
actions and transactions, but the process generates a structure (substance), 
however, provisional. Therefore, the principle of the co-evolution of sub-
stance and relationship still holds true. The mediation of the relational con-
text opens up to logics that may no longer be those of the pure and simple 
antagonism between capitalists and proletarians predicted by Marx. This 
is the phenomenon of the hybridisation of social relations, and, with it, of 
social identities (Donati 2020).
The digital age spreads self-employment and networking. Someone may 
observe that digital tools (cell phones, tablets, AIs, robots, apps, etc.) are 
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still governed by the large multinationals that produce and manage these 
tools, such as the Silicon Valley multinationals. Undoubtedly, this observa-
tion has its share of truth. However, one can no longer speak of an expro-
priation of the proletarians by a capitalist class, because, to an increasing 
extent and in the long run, digital technologies will make many economic 
activities more autonomous, will make them virtual, and therefore work will 
become the expression of a widespread intelligence and entrepreneurship.
The social framework in which these tools are used gives the worker 
more room for manoeuvre. A capitalism of social networks emerges in which 
the fundamental capitalist institutions change their relational structure: 
the means of production assume a private character only in use, but their 
ownership depends on the network; the profit motive is limited not only by 
national governments and international authorities (such as the WTO), but 
also by a growing competition from non-profit, civil economy, and third 
sector organisations. The typical competition of the capitalist market per-
sists and also takes on new forms of exploitation of human beings. However, 
something new changes the previous structure. The capitalist-worker rela-
tionship is increasingly mediated by social networks in which there is a rela-
tional evaluation made by users of goods and services in terms of reputation 
and responsibility against companies. In short, a new relationality of social 
networks creates another capitalism, in which capital becomes – more than 
before, but differently than before – a human and social relationship (close 
to what today we call human capital and social capital), in which power is 
not based essentially on the ownership of the means of production, but on 
the qualities and properties of the relationships linking people.
Structural effects and relational effects: the 
added social value of social relations
I suggest distinguishing between structural effects and relational effects. 
In the T1–T4 sequence of every social morphogenetic cycle, the structural 
effects are active at time T1 vis-à-vis agents/actors that begin to interact at 
time T2. The relational effects intervene in the T2–T3 phase and have as 
outcome the emergent structural elaboration at time T4.
Structural effects exert their influence on an arena of agents/actors that 
is a black box: we cannot foresee how the agents/actors will elaborate the 
influences exerted by the conditioning structure on them.
By their nature, structural effects have a tendency to exert strong pressure 
to uniform the agents’ behaviour irrespective of their individual subjectiv-
ity (opinions, values, and reflections). An example of structural effects is 
the influence that a surgical team exerts on its members. In this setting, 
the habit of swearing is also practiced by individuals who would normally 
prefer not to do so. The reason is that there is a collective pressure on every-
one due to their having to cope with the stress coming from the interven-
tion’s invasiveness and drama (Blau 1960). Likewise, those participating in 
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collective mass movements often find themselves behaving in a way that is 
contrary to their own values inclinations because of the pressure exerted 
by the mass of people. The same thing happens when someone has to vote 
openly in a public assembly due to the fear of others’ judgement.
Nevertheless, even in the most structured situations, it is rarely the 
case that all the individuals involved behave in the same way, caving into 
structural pressures. In such a case, when someone distances him/herself 
from the group’s social behaviour or norm, the relational effects are revealed. 
In these the agents’ freedom is expressed, which is possible because they 
relate to the situation in a different way on the basis of a meaningful differ-
ence: they take on a different cultural model in relation to the purpose of 
their actions (the L-G axis in Figure 4.5). By enacting different behaviours, 
they create relational effects that escape the conditioning structure.
In the intermediate T2–T3 phase of social morphogenesis, empirical 
research can observe the respective contributions of individuals and net-
works of relations to final outcomes. Individual contributions come from 
the redefinition that the Self undertakes of its own identity and action when 
the relational context is changed. The contributions of social networks 
derive from how others influence the redefinition of Me-We-You in the circle 
of interactions. The two types of contributions are interconnected. This has 
been verified, for example, in a study on why and how social interventions 
succeed in influencing young people belonging to deviant gangs to stop 
committing crimes (Weaver 2016).
Let us suppose that we pose the question, “Why do some people stop 
offending and others do not?” To answer this question, we must hypothesise 
the existence of a black box that operates between the structures that condi-
tion people’s behaviours, on the one hand, and, on the other, the outcomes 
of the interactive networks in which the people find themselves. What must 
be investigated is the way in which the relations are configured in phase 
T2–T3. The agents/actors have constraints and enablement that come from 
the outside as well from the network’s dynamic. Even though the people act 
with a certain autonomy, and depending on their reflexivity, it is the oppor-
tunities offered by the network that decide whether there will be a cessation 
of criminal behaviour or not. What is important is to see the sui generis real-
ity of relations that can produce relational goods or evils depending on how 
they influence individual choices by opening or restricting the possibilities 
of creating another relational order of reality.
It is in this connection that the issue of the different ways of conceiving 
social capital comes up. Holists understand social capital as the civic culture 
that certain institutional structures instill in citizens. Their primary focus is 
on the ways that cultural norms structure the relationships in which social 
capital is embedded. Social capital is seen mainly as a structural effect. 
Methodological individualists emphasise, instead, a micro-sociological 
definition of social capital as a rational choice of individuals who relate to 
each other spontaneously.
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In my view, social capital must be understood as a type of social rela-
tions that have particular qualities and powers in that they produce, not so 
much civic conformity or normative reproduction, as relational effects, that 
is effects that come from the creation of meso level networks of relations 
in which trust, cooperation, and reciprocity can operate autonomously. 
Contribution of individuals as such is not enough, nor is the presence of 
a regulatory cultural system sufficient, but it is necessary to consider the 
added value of relationships as such.
What needs to be highlighted is the fact that the social network operates 
with a reflexivity of its own that is characterised in that it entwines agents’ 
internal conversations between them and in this way generates a relational 
reflexivity between the nodes in the network which exceeds the individual 
(personal) reflexivity of agents. Examples are what we call team reflexivity, 
group reflexivity, reflexivity of the We-relation that are not reducible to the 
single subjects but have their own dynamics (and story), being of different 
kinds at different moments.
The network’s relations change because individuals seek to realise an 
identity of their own that cannot be achieved except through the network 
itself (in which the dimension of reflexivity is played out, i.e. Me, We, You). 
In short, in the intermediate T2–T3 phase of every morphogenetic cycle, 
the place where change occurs is located in the relational network in which 
personal reflexivity, social (interpersonal) reflexivity, and system reflectivity 
meet one another. The subject of this encounter is not the individual as such, 
but the relational subject.
What relational effects bring to light is the added social value (SV) of 
social relations that are put into play in phase T2–T3 of the morphogenetic 
cycle.
The added social value of social relations
In the abstract, saying “added value” means, briefly, making reference to 
an increase in something/someone’s value. The increase is produced by 
something/someone that has acted/operated on something/someone that – 
via a causal effect – has increased its value. When this happens through the 
social relation, we have the added social value of the social relation, that is, 
the added SV that the social relation confers on something/someone. It is 
the social relation that valorises something/someone.
The social relation can valorise things, (individual or collective) agents/
actors, or social relations and in this latter case, we are moving towards 
producing a relational good.
An associative network or a third sector organisation creates because, 
in producing goods or services (e.g. a service providing care for children, 
the disabled, and the elderly), it uses a greater quantity and a better quality 
of social relations as compared to the social relations used by the market 
or public administrative bureaucracies. If, then, these more numerous and 
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better relations are targeted not only at simple service offerings as such but 
also at relations among the subjects involved in the service, then the ser-
vice itself becomes a relational good. It becomes a relational service strictly 
speaking, because the service is made of relationships and not of functional 
performances.
Saying that a social relation has an added SV means noting the fact that 
when two entities bond together, they generate a third that goes beyond the 
properties and powers of each of them and is irreducible to their sum.
The complex of refero-religo that is brought into being generates an added 
value because it increases the value of the constituents of the relationship, 
by virtue of the social relation itself. This is an effect that emerges from the 
relation’s properties and causal powers.
This perspective helps us to see the partiality and non-generalisability 
of the definitions of social relations such as that proposed by Shih (2020: 1) 
according to which the relationship is “a process of mutual constitution that 
reproduces imagined resemblance, where actors self-identify with others on 
the basis of a Wittgensteinian network of perceived similarities overlap-
ping.” This type of relationships also exist, but in this case, the relationship 
has little added value, as it is limited to cementing a network of individuals 
characterised by a reflexivity which is highly dependent on significant oth-
ers, and therefore little individualised, which is typical of Eastern cultures. 
These relations can also emerge in the West, but only under the pressure of 
catastrophic events, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, when everyone is called 
to conform to the same imagined similarity, that of potential victims of the 
catastrophe, and therefore to live in heavily regulated social networks.
In order to understand the enhancement process implemented by the 
relationship, it is necessary to conceptualise the “relation that valorises,” 
given that not all relations have the capacity to produce this emergent effect. 
And so we ask: how is the relation that confers added value configured?
The SV of an entity X (something, someone, or even a social relation) 
can be defined as a function of the social relation (r) between two subjects, 
ego and alter, who carry out the interactions (i) (exchanges or transactions) 
between them, that is, SV (X) = f {r [i (ego/alter)]}. More generally, the SV 
of an entity X is a function of the network of relations (Nr) among all of the 
network’s subjects (or nodes, Ss) which carry out the interactions (Ii) in the 
network: SV (X) = f {Nr [Ii (Ss)]}.
Networks of relations differ in many ways as to how they treat an entity X. 
Each network valorises X in a different way. Certain networks do not valorise 
X at all, but exploit it or annihilate it. Only certain networks of relations pro-
duce relational goods while other networks produce relational evils.
If we stay with the simple case of the dyadic relation between Ego and Alter, 
the relation that confers added value can be seen according to four dimen-
sions that are interrelated among themselves. The diagram of Figure 4.6 
indicates four boxes in which the four prevailing meanings of the added 
value of social relations are placed. They are indicated with the letters A 
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(exchange value), the letter G (use value), letter I (relational value), letter 
L (value as dignity). Arrows are drawn between the four boxes to indicate 
their reciprocal relations. In addition, between A and G, the area of values 
in an extrinsic (instrumental) sense is indicated in a circle, and between L 
and I, the area of values in an intrinsic sense (as a value in itself). Let us look 
at the four meanings of “value” more closely.
 (A)  The relation confers an exchange value when, through the relation, 
the instrumental value of something/someone is increased with ref-
erence to a pricing system (added value in terms of utility).
 (G)  The relation confers a use value when it can better help satisfy 
something/someone’s fulfilment needs (added value in terms of 
suprafunctional goals).
 (I)  The relation has a relational value as a factor that activates con-
nections that increase the subjects’ opportunities and capacities 
(added value in terms of the creation of relations that improve the 
Figure 4.6  The different meanings of the value added by the relation to something/
someone (analytical dimensions of a relational complex)
Source: Author.
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opportunities and/or capacities, qualities, and powers of what/
whom has been put in relation); the relations that we call “social 
capital” (trust, cooperation, reciprocity) optimise this criterion 
(added value in terms of bonding).
 (L)  Something/someone is valorised in its/his/her value of dignity 
(meaning intrinsic value) when, through the relation, there is an 
acknowledgement and amplification of the sense of dignity (rec-
ognition and respect) that something/someone has in and of itself/
oneself without the possibility that this value (Würde in German, 
worth in English: Collier 1999) can ever be a matter of negotiation.
These are the analytical dimensions of social “value” that the relation can 
add to something/someone. In social morphogenetic processes, the value of 
something/someone is modified. It can be increased or decreased or, indeed, 
nullified in some or all of its dimensions. Valorisation is an operation of 
enhancement that comes about through a particular combination among all 
or some of the four dimensions of Figure 4.6.
For example, in the field of human services, in order to produce added 
SV for the well-being of people, the task of social workers is to mobilise a 
network of social relationships that increase the value of people in dealing 
with their problems. They can get it if and to the extent that they refer to 
the ability of social relationships to mobilise opportunities and resources – 
including relationships themselves – which are qualifications for the parties 
involved.
This type of operation is, in theory, specific to non-profit organisations 
due to their supposed good motivations. But this better quality of the non-
profit sector is not at all obvious. In order for this to happen, it is necessary 
that these organisations give priority to valorisation criteria that make ref-
erence to the relational value and to the value of dignity (Figure 4.6). This 
means that there must be the potential for a certain quality and quantity of 
social capital, that is relations of trust, cooperation, and reciprocity.
These relations have to do with the areas of dignity and relationality (area 
L-I) of the value, that is, with the area of relations that confer an intrinsic 
value on something/someone (X) (the box at the bottom right of Figure 4.6). 
If this area works so as to valorise positive relations, then relational goods 
can be produced which, in turn, feed social capital in a sequence that is not 
circular but has the linear character of a time sequence (as we will see later). 
In this way, the relationality that unfolds in the interaction among actors 
can increase or decrease the parameters (trust, etc.) of the social capital on 
which public relational goods depend. If these parameters go below a cer-
tain threshold, or even reset to zero, not only is a public relational good not 
produced, but social capital is also consumed. This is what happens most of 
the time if the process of valorising something/someone remains confined 
within the area of exchange value and of use value (area A-G, the box at 
the top left of Figure 4.6), that is in interactions that privilege the social 
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relations’ extrinsic value. Many empirical investigations demonstrate this. 
Suffice it to say that I am referring here to the vast literature on the positive 
correlations between people’s well-being and the quantity and quality of 
their social relations.
A final annotation. In principle, the area of extrinsic value (area A-G: 
e.g. Marx’s capital or Habermas’ strategic action) and the area of intrinsic 
value (area L–I: e.g. Buber’s I–You relation or Habermas’ communicative 
action) are at the antipodes (in Figure 4.6). Nevertheless, in real valorisa-
tion processes, there is a differentiation underway depending on the timing 
and the issue at stake, for which it is advisable not to dichotomise forms 
of valorisation. It is not a given, for example, that added relational value, 
which in and of itself has an intrinsic qualitative character, is necessarily 
incompatible with, let us say, added exchange value, which is extrinsic. On 
the contrary, the current tendencies to promote cooperation between profit 
and non-profit entities, for example by establishing organisations of dif-
ferent nature that associate them in order to produce relational goods, are 
going in just such a direction whereby a process of “composite” valorisation 
in which all four of the valorisation criteria (in Figure 4.6) work together to 
create a “total” added SV.
Societal morphogenesis as a surplus of relational forms
The passage from the modern structure to the aftermodern structure is a 
morphogenetic transformation of modern capitalistic society through a sur-
plus of new relational forms.
From the previous chapters, we know that modern society is based on 
the state-market binomial. The social molecule of this structure leaves indi-
viduals free to act within an arena of competitive opportunities regulated 
by political power. The means-target axis (A-G in Figures 4.3 and 4.6) pre-
vails and makes the value and normative components (the L-I axis) of every 
social relation functional to itself.
Precisely due to the way in which it is configured, this structure neu-
tralises the relationality of civil society where a third sector is operating in 
an attempt to privilege the values-norms axis. The latter seeks to develop 
new forms of sociability that have difficulty in becoming institutionalised. 
There is thus an open conflict between the state-market binomial, on the one 
side, and a new civil society, on the other. Where is this conflict headed? Is it 
possible to believe that a society different from the modern one can emerge?
My hypothesis is that a societal morphogenesis is in fact being produced, 
which is making the third sector emerge in such a way as to alter the lib/lab 
structure. To verify this hypothesis, it must be demonstrated that in impor-
tant sectors of society the binary lib/lab structure is being replaced by a tri-
adic structure in which, in addition to the lib and lab components, the third 
sector component is gaining ground so as to give rise to a new social mole-
cule that goes towards forming a new relational system on a societal level.
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Many empirical studies have shown that this dynamic is effectively 
underway.
Let me give some examples referred to the spreading of initiatives “gen-
erating the civil” and the emergence of civic entrepreneurs catalysing social 
innovations. As to the former, one can quote the renewal of self-sustained 
community foundations, the creation of ethical banks, the adoption 
of communitarian economies (like the economy of communion), the 
non-governmental organisations based upon the principles of social soli-
darity and extended reciprocity between insiders and outsiders, the produc-
tion of commons on the Internet, the processes of civil constitutionalisation 
of human rights (Teubner 2012), the civic networks providing welfare ser-
vices by adopting third sector criteria instead of market criteria or public 
administration standards (Donati and Colozzi 2001).
As to the emergence of new civic entrepreneurs, the starting point con-
sists in observing that we cannot solve complex horizontal problems with 
vertical command-and-control solutions. “The speed of change toward 
third-party provision of all types of public services continues to outpace the 
ability of most public officials and agencies to manage these collaborations 
effectively” (Goldsmith, Georges, and Burke 2010: 8). Therefore, “grow-
ing cadres of civic entrepreneurs eager for change bring bold interventions 
that push the bounds of how to address public problems. They are a savvy, 
motivated, and results-oriented group of individuals who, through disrup-
tive innovations, create opportunities and hope” (ibid: 25). The basic idea 
that pushes civic entrepreneurship is to combine communal ideals with the 
efficiency and technological know-how of business, which produces effec-
tive community change.
To my mind, the normative impulse supporting social innovation is the 
following: any civic entrepreneur should enforce a social morphogenetic 
process which has to change the given hierarchical governmental (condition-
ing) structure by setting up partnerships among a variety of stakeholders, so 
to create a complex network which generates social innovations (elaborated 
structure). “Create an environment for social change” is its slogan.
It is essential to keep in mind that these innovations, and in particular 
the role played by the third sector, do not replace the state-market bino-
mial, but change it, precisely by causing its morphogenesis. The shift to a 
new social formation happens through morphogenetic cycles in which the 
conditioning structure (state-market arrangements at time T1) cannot work 
without introducing a “third actor,” which means that the hierarchical and 
mercantile codes have to relate to (and interact with) the networking code 
that forces and binds them to include relational imperatives (in T2–T3). For 
example, the state has to adopt a social governance style of action, implying 
more civic participation in designing and implementing its plans, instead 
of using a pure authoritative style; and the market has to consider the rela-
tional dimensions of its modes of production and consumption, implying, 
among other things, an active, symmetrical, and non-instrumental role for 
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the non-profit sector within it. The triangulation state-market-third sector 
produces then (time T4) an elaborated structure constituted by new config-
urations at the macro, meso, and micro levels.
If we analyse the social processes through which modernity is passing 
into crisis and its members (individual and collective) are becoming newly 
reflexive, we see that emerging social forms are arising in those areas where 
market and state generate gaps, which cannot be dealt with without chang-
ing the social relationality involved in such situations.
Jonathan Rushworth and Michael Schluter (2011) argue that learning to 
think relationally is the first step towards building a more relational world. 
They claim that there are three main elements to Relational Thinking: 
(i) learning to see public policy and personal issues through a relational 
lens; (ii) changing goals, values, and practices of organisations; and (iii) 
developing an analytical framework appropriate to relationships. Let us see 
how this can be achieved with an example.
The instructive example of social cooperation
From civil society are arising initiatives of a cooperative type which are 
trying to create a socially responsible economy able to alter the laws of the 
capitalistic market. Their objective is to keep the law of profit under control 
by linking money to social constraints. This is exactly what Luhmann held 
to be an anti-modern action because it does not operate with functional cri-
teria and does not open up to more contingencies; rather, it does the oppo-
site in that it ties the contingencies created by money to prosocial demands. 
It is a fact that social cooperation truly exists to the extent that coopera-
tive relations do not adopt the law of functional equivalence: they reject the 
criterion of valorisation based on monetary equivalence. Their ability to 
thrive is thus always problematic. From an empirical standpoint, coopera-
tive initiatives usually transform into capitalistic organisations. Why?
In my opinion, the success of social cooperation depends on its ability to 
stabilise an after-capitalistic social molecule. Let us see what this means.
Social cooperation is an organisation characterised by its own social form 
(molecule) that is based on the following interwoven elements:
 (G)  The goal is to produce goods that are not sought for reasons of 
profit but which must have a prosocial end, that is they must satisfy 
needs that cannot be made subject to exchange for profit.
 (A)  The means (financial capital, work, technologies) are chosen and 
treated in a manner appropriate to the pursuit of prosocial goals.
 (I)  The organisational norms or rules are non-distribution constraint, 
internal democracy as the cooperative’s mode of governance, the 
joint and several liability of the cooperative’s members.
 (L)  The value (the distinctive criterion that valorises the worth of coop-
erative organisation) is prosociality, which means to provide bene-
fits not only for those who work in it, but also for the surrounding 
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community, and is applied to the mode of production, the desti-
nation of goods, and the use of proceeds; sociality, then, means to 
take care of the people working in it as well as of their families 
and the community as a whole according to a subsidiarity principle 
rather than in terms of acquisitive competition.
The integration among these four components is always problematic. It 
requires a high and appropriate level of reflexivity in managing relations 
among the elements of the specific social molecule that we call “cooperative 
form.” In particular (see Figure 2.3), system integration (A–G) and social 
integration (L–I) are difficult to combine according to a concomitant com-
plementarity that is able to connect them efficaciously. When the impulse to 
create a social cooperative that comes from the sociocultural area (values 
and norms) does not find complementary correspondents in the system area 
(means and goals), the cooperative initiative goes into crisis.
This happens because the concomitant complementarity between social 
and system integration must confront challenges that lead the cooperative 
to adopt a contingent complementarity.9 For example, managers use money 
for a collective profit, thinking of then investing it for prosocial purposes. 
But in this way, they abandon the primacy accorded to the value of sociality. 
The constraints that prevent the contradictions between profit motivation 
and prosocial ends weaken and lead to competitive contradictions between 
system requirements and social integration requirements. When this hap-
pens, cooperative enterprises become market enterprises.
Throughout history, many social cooperatives have experienced a capi-
talist drift. The drift in the direction of a capitalist mode of operation can 
only be avoided if social integration (the value of sociality [L] combined 
with regulatory norms [I]) manages to make the integration of the system 
relational (i.e. it manages to use means of production [A] appropriate for 
prosocial purposes [G]). If the target of producing relational goods, and not 
other things, must be achieved, all the factors of production (money, labour, 
technologies) must be assessed in a relational context that organises them so 
as to produce these goods.
Generalising the discussion, we can say that the creation of “other mar-
kets” (not capitalistic markets) depends on introducing a new relationality 
into the components of the cooperative form (its social molecule). This is 
precisely what is happening in some sectors of the economy, which, not by 
chance, are often called “relational” such as the production of a commons 
 9 For the concepts of constraining contradiction, concomitant complementarity, concomi-
tant compatibility, and contingent complementarity, see Archer (1988: 153–175, 235–237). 
Contingent complementarity here means a situational logic in which relationships are 
oriented towards increasing opportunities at the cultural system level and specialisation 
at the sociocultural level.
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on the Internet (Bauwens 2008), relational tourism, the relational enterprise, 
the civil economy (Bruni and Zamagni 2004; Rushworth and Schluter 2011).
The social molecules that escape from modernity have a certain char-
acteristic: in an implicit or explicit way, they orient towards producing 
relational goods – instead of individual or aggregated goods – through rela-
tions. This is precisely the task of social capital. In the international debate 
on this topic, at times social capital is considered as an explanans and at 
other times as an explanandum. The solution that I propose lies in observing 
social capital inside a morphogenetic sequence with respect to its products, 
that is, relational goods.
To clarify this point, I propose a scheme (Figure 4.7) that synthesises my 
foundational theses according to which social capital is a product of relational 
goods and, in its turn, is a regenerator of relational goods, or vice versa, rela-
tional goods generate social capital which, in turn, regenerates relational 
goods. This recursivity can be clarified by introducing the morphogenetic 
scheme that takes into account the temporal phases and the autonomous 
(“stratified”) contribution of each element in the single phases of the process.
Figure 4.7 wants to offer a solution to a long-standing issue: whether it is 
social capital that generates relational goods or vice versa. The answer is 
that there is no logical priority of one over the other, but instead a mutual 
determination between the two that develops in sequences of time cycles. 
Figure 4.7 The generation of relational goods through social capital (and vice versa)
Source: Author.
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The influence of one on the other depends on the phase in which we observe 
the social process.
Let us look at an example of the added SV of social capital and the (re)
generation of relational goods over time.
Time T1: suppose that a plurality of actors wants to create a day-care 
service for children or home care for elderly people that has the characteris-
tics of generating relational goods for them. This target can be achieved by 
mobilising relations among the concerned (formal and informal) caregivers 
and the individuals who need the service, with particular attention to the 
primary and secondary networks of those to be assisted. This generates a 
situation from which more or less social capital can emerge in terms of trust, 
cooperation, and reciprocity among the actors.
Phase from time T2 to time T3: the fact that more or less social capital is 
generated depends on the agents and the network that is created and mobi-
lised. Here the agents’ and their networks’ reflexivity comes into play.
Time T4: if the dynamic in the network interactions of the second phase 
(T2–T3) has generated more social capital, instead of consuming it, then the 
initial project of producing a relational good is achieved; otherwise, if, in 
the second phase, social capital was only consumed or destroyed, relational 
goods are not produced, and the project fails. After time T4, another mor-
phogenetic cycle will begin.
This framework avoids conflations between relational goods and social 
capital, keeping them distinct yet also relational with one another.
So we can speak of an added SV of social capital that (i) consists in (re)
generating (rather than consuming, annihilating, etc.) relational goods; 
(ii) can be measured with the associative network’s capacity to produce 
internal and external relations that act in a reflexive manner (Donati and 
Solci 2011: 101–109) in such way that the shared interpersonal relations are 
made more efficacious, that is they increase the network’s operative efficacy 
(the strengthening of the target T applied to the associative network).
Added SV is the difference between the initial situation at time T1 and 
the situation at the end of the morphogenetic cycle under consideration at 
time T4. It measures the capacity of an associative network to be efficacious 
qua association (thus, to not be subject to something/someone other than 
itself) in that it measures the capacity of a network to produce sociability 
as an added value (i.e. as the enhancement of its relational parameters: e.g. 
the degree of reciprocity, cooperation, trust, and affinity). In the event that 
social capital has decreased, consumed, or destroyed, we will speak of a 
subtracted SV.
A practical example can be that of the Tagesmütter (the so-called mother 
of day). This figure can be created with a contract issued by the munici-
pality to the mother of a young child (0–3 years old) who takes on the 
task of caring for other children (two or three of them) of approximately 
the same age in her home (it is a family day care). The contract creates a 
relation among the involved families, which assign themselves a shared 
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objective or task (the care of their children, entrusted to the Tagesmütter). 
In this action of trust and reciprocal cooperation, there is the premise and 
promise of a relational good. It depends on the second phase (how the 
interactions among the families go) as to whether their interactions will 
operate so as to generate, and not consume, social capital. In other words, 
if a relational context is truly created consisting in trust, cooperation, and 
reciprocity among the children’s parents (who, due to the type of rela-
tion established, know and spend time with one another in keeping with 
qualities and powers that a day-care centre organised in a bureaucratic or 
mercantile manner would not produce), then social capital generates a net-
work of families in which relational goods flourish; otherwise, the social 
intervention takes another path.
More generally, organisations can be considered as being of the third 
sector when they are configured as social spheres that produce relational 
social inclusion through a virtuous interaction between relational good 
and social capital. The interaction is virtuous both because it enhances 
each of them in turn and because it operates with prosocial, civic, or civil 
finalities.
How social relations realise social morphogenesis
There exist many and differing types of social morphogenesis. To con-
clude this chapter, I would like to propose a typology based on the ways 
in which the conditioning social structure (at time T1) constrains social 
relations in the intermediate phase (T2–T3) of the morphogenetic cycle. 
The constraints can have to do with each of the social relations’ dimen-
sions (goals, means, norms, values) and also with the relations between 
these dimensions.
For the sake of simplicity, I propose to classify the ways that social rela-
tions are constrained along a continuum that goes from highly determined 
(highly bound) modalities to highly chaotic (highly unbound) modalities. 
I then propose to explore an intermediate modality: relationally steered 
morphogenesis.
1 Highly constrained (highly bound) social morphogenesis starts from a 
social structure that allows agents/actors fairly limited degrees of free-
dom because it occurs within cogent and inalterable constraints. Actions 
are apparently free, but they operate as in a labyrinth from which it is 
difficult to exit. Lib/lab structures are of this type. They constrain sub-
jects’ choices to an arena of limited opportunities by a strict regulation 
based on the compromise between state (lab) and market (lib).
2 In contrast, chaotic (highly unbound) social morphogenesis is what 
happens in a processuality that minimises or annuls the constraints 
imposed by the structures at the morphogenetic cycle’s initial time. Its 
reason for being is to create relationships that do not have to respond to 
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structural constraints. The social molecule annuls the normative com-
ponent. It affirms relationality as an end in itself. This type of morpho-
genesis mirrors the relativistic and pragmatist thinking that is typical of 
the late modernity, which is relationist, not relational, precisely because 
the relationship must not respond to mutual expectations for a com-
mon good, but is an indeterminate sequence of events. Behind this way 
of thinking and acting, there is the paradigm of the capitalistic mar-
ket, which generates ever new products and ever new possibilities in 
an expansive and evolutionistic scenario, without responding to con-
straints. Thus, it does not need social bonds; on the contrary, it erodes 
them and has to hollow them out; it creates them and makes them dis-
appear immediately afterwards if it wants to expand. For this reason, 
it requires adaptation and openness on the part of agents. Individuals 
must be “open” to any outcome or solution, hoping that it will be posi-
tive but with no assurances. Economic institutions, for-profit markets, 
and corresponding political structures open up possibilities (variations) 
that are selected on the basis of the fact that they do not demand any 
constraint apart from combinatory gain, which takes place in the single 
interaction or, indeed, in each exchange or transaction. A paradigmatic 
example is the idea of the “pure relation” theorised by Giddens (1992) as 
paradigmatic for all emergent social relations in post-modern society. 
In his view, pure relationship means that the relationship exists solely to 
meet each partner’ needs and will continue only so long as it succeeds 
in doing so.
3 In the intermediate zone between highly constrained social morpho-
genesis and chaotic social morphogenesis, there are forms of social 
morphogenesis guided by modalities centred on managing relations, 
and networks of relations, with a certain intentionality and symbolic 
purpose that generates norms and means along the way: this is guided 
or steered social morphogenesis. It generates new social forms on the 
basis of their own guiding distinctions. These distinctions, however, do 
not act as constraints on the arena of opportunities but serve, rather, to 
broaden opportunities by modifying existing constraints.
Obviously, constraints are not easily changed, but the agents/actors intend 
to achieve this by generating a new relational order through steering their 
interactions in the intermediate T2–T3 phase, in order to change the con-
straints posed by the conditioning structure. If we understand constraints 
as the initial system’s guiding distinctions, steered social morphogenesis 
aims to alter such criteria. For example, it changes the freedom-equality 
pair to the equality-solidarity pair, or it moves from the binary constraint of 
freedom-equality to the ternary constraint of freedom-equality-solidarity. 
There are many social practices moving in this direction. Examples of the 
first kind are all those procedures which are based upon “concertation” as 
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a method of conflict resolution.10 Examples of the second kind are all those 
social policies which provide welfare entitlements on the basis of the fact 
that the individual accepts certain conditions for performing acts of soli-
darity towards other individuals or the community. In the fiscal field, many 
incentives to economic actors are given on the condition of acting in a man-
ner which is supportive to weak people or particular disadvantaged social 
groups.
The operations proper to a steered social morphogenesis are modes of 
connecting fundamental principles governing the processes rather than 
opposing them with binary thinking. Changes of social forms are not con-
ceived as an adaptation to an environment that is evolving and imposing 
choices that alter relations’ primal way of being (their sui generis nature), 
but instead as an empowerment of the potential that the relationships pos-
sess in themselves, with their possible variations. The steering operations 
are carried out by continuously reorienting the relationships towards the 
purpose to which they must aim, taking into account the necessary varia-
tions in the means and norms. This is possible if agents return (reflexively) 
to the roots (value and objectives) of what constitutes and characterises the 
target relationship as a new social molecule. The generation of new social 
forms, including transformations of personal and collective identities, is 
rooted in the goal sustained by the latent values that characterise, distin-
guish, and constitute that social form – which is not reducible to the whims 
of the actors/agents.
The distinction among the three types of social morphogenesis consists 
precisely in the way social relations are conceived and treated. Highly con-
strained social morphogenesis conceives of social relations as transactions 
emerging from individual choices made in an arena of opportunities that is 
strongly delimited by existing social structures. Liquid social morphogen-
esis is a-relational, that is, it does not attribute any structure to the relation 
as such. Steered social morphogenesis operates with a relational code that 
confers creativity to the structure of the social relation, which can modify 
the existing reality by generating a new relational structure.
Summary
Modernity opened Pandora’s box of social relations, taking them from 
the world of the probable to the world of the possible “always otherwise” 
 10 The word concertation is used especially in European politics to define a modality of gov-
ernance. It means cooperation, as among opposing factions (for instance trade unions, 
corporations, and government), aimed at effecting a unified proposal or concerted action. 
Each actor accepts limitations on its freedom of action in order to give priority to a soli-
dary solution.
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(always possible in another way). Social realm now sees relationships of all 
kinds arise, where nature and culture continually fight and recombine. The 
tension between the two poles grows without breaks. Precisely this tension 
between nature and the artificial world, far from erasing nature, is today 
generating a new social relationality.
There are those who think that this relationality can be a “rational recon-
struction” carried out under the aegis of rational choice (Coleman 1993) 
and others who think in terms of self-organising complex systems (Günther 
1976). In my opinion, these approaches can easily end up in a form of upward 
or downward conflation, respectively. Instead, a progressive social morpho-
genesis seems to require a kind of relationality that responds to what I call 
“relational reason” (Donati 2009).
Unlike modern rationality, the relational reason seeks out significant 
social relations and not objects (the fetish of commodities). When the ques-
tion of meaning that is inherent in the social relation does not find an answer 
in what is offered by nature (things and human persons), it must necessarily 
build a social world that does not exist in nature. Human nature thus comes 
to be subjected to the tension of the artificial (the so-called post-human, 
hyper-human, cyborg). If the artificial does not take into account the nat-
ural needs of human relationality, it generates the non-human. This is 
demonstrated by the cases of communication technologies that produce 
psychic and social pathologies because they do not take into account the 
needs of human sociability.
In this tension between the relational nature of human beings and a 
purely rational or functional construction of society that disregards the for-
mer, spaces open up from which the relational forms that characterise the 
social morphogenesis of contemporary society are generated.
Compared to the past, the qualitative difference of today’s social mor-
phogenesis is found in this: modernity says “I” and opposes it to “You” 
(including the “You” of nature); the aftermodern says “We” and therefore 
seeks a relationality that creates synergy between what is natural and what 
is artificial, but it can realise relational goods only by overcoming the lack 
of relational culture of modernity. The new digital technologies can help 
create new “communities” (We-relations), but they also present strong risks 
as we will see in Chapter 9.
As Marx and Simmel foresaw, capitalist society was bound to generate 
more and more autonomous social relations that bent back upon the agents 
to condition their deeds (and the natural world) profoundly. The society 
of the future will be able to escape a chaotic social morphogenesis only if 
it succeeds in inflecting morphogenesis in terms of a “We-in-relation” (a 
relational We) – in other words, if society will be able to sustain social mor-
phogenesis through relational subjects.
5 The morphogenesis of 
social morality
Where the agency/structure debate has failed
What is it that comes to be socially defined as “morally good” or “bad”? 
Or simply acceptable or inacceptable? And by whom? Who defines which 
moral norms are accepted and which are excluded?
For many sociologists, social morality consists in the attribution of mean-
ing to the action taken by individual humans who, in aggregating with one 
another, arrive at a consensus that constitutes collective morality. The latter 
is then reflected back to single individuals, directing their actions towards 
a social order in which the moral distinction between good and bad corre-
sponds to that between normality and deviance.
What I want to emphasise is that, in the mainstream view of social 
morality, the circularity between agency and (cultural and social) struc-
ture glosses over two problems: (i) the issue of the relational constitution of 
agency/Self and (ii) the issue of the relational constitution of cultural and 
social structures.
In my opinion, much of the debate over agency and structure is flawed 
by these ways of reducing morality to a game between individuals and 
social structures. What they seriously undervalue and distort is the theme 
of morality as a relational phenomenon. The morality of social relations 
is attributed to the individuals as such, who feel uncertain, anxious, inse-
cure. The relatively autonomous role of social relations in forging morality 
is overlooked or relegated to the shadows.
My intention is to understand the origin and change of morality, not as the 
result of aggregations of individuals in a context defined by certain (social, 
cultural, and communicative) structures or, vice versa, as the influence of 
structures on individuals’ agency, but as the product of the relationality that 
develops in networks of social relations that connect social agents/actors.
The problem needs to be brought into focus. It is a matter of understand-
ing if – and if so, how – one can speak of an intervening variable, that is 
the morality of social relations as such, which constitutes a sui generis order of 
reality in as much as relations have simultaneously to meet individuals’ needs, 
on the one hand, and the needs of the governability of institutions, on the other.
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The question is, does a morality of networks of relations exist that is 
distinct from the morality of individuals and from that of sociocultural 
systems? Put another way, can we speak of morally good social relations/
networks and morally bad social relations/networks? Can we do this with-
out falling into the holistic fallacy of believing that social relations/networks 
can themselves think (morally)?
In my view, the morality of a social relation (or network of relations) is 
due to the fact that it can produce relational goods or relational evils. In 
order to produce relational goods, a social relation/network should meet the 
following requisites:
1 Be an emergent phenomenon.
2 Be morally good in itself and not merely a matter of subjectively being 
deemed so.
3 Be such as to give the subjects individual goods that they could not 
obtain otherwise.
Love, hate, forgiveness, and friendship are social relations – and not only 
individual feelings – that are morally good or bad as feelings. Contempt, the 
refusal to help, aggression, and violence are morally bad social relations, 
and not only individual feelings. Certainly, the moral qualities of social 
relations have correspondences in the properties of individuals, but they 
are not the same thing because these are two different orders of reality. The 
morality of reciprocity on the part of the individual (as a feeling, attitude, 
or act) is not the same thing as the morality inherent in the social relation of 
reciprocity. I will now try to explain these assertions.
An alternative view
In my view, morality can be analysed from three points of view, which cor-
respond to three different paths for the formation of moral agency.
Path [1] explains social morality by the conditioning of social and cul-
tural systems which, through their normativity, impose themselves on indi-
viduals’ agency. Here are situated theories of the “collective conscience” 
(e.g. Durkheim and Mary Douglas) and of cultural traditions (e.g. Putnam 
and Fukuyama). The morphostasis/morphogenesis of morality is explained 
there as the product of normative systems that reproduce themselves or 
transform themselves on the basis of a logic that is inherent in the same 
social and cultural institutions, in functional and/or communicative terms. 
As Mary Douglas (1986) would say, morphogenesis happens when institu-
tions, which are supposed to be thinking entities, change their way of think-
ing. As Luhmann would have it, the morphogenesis of moral norms is the 
product of the change of semantic codes due to the effects of reflective mech-
anisms of communication. He assumes that, in a funtionally differentiated 
society, the process of communication depends on the inherent laws of the 
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communication system itself, which is ironically expressed in the aphorism, 
“Only communication can communicate.” Morality is defined as a special 
form of communication that carries with it only indications of approval or 
disapproval. “The moral is not something good. Of course, that should not 
lead us to say that the moral is something bad […] The moral functions only 
as a distinction” (Luhmann 1993: 996). Trust itself, which for Parsons arises 
from the normative order of the open society, in Luhmann can no longer 
count on norms that disappear and must be entrusted to communication 
(Jalava 2003). But, I observe, this does not mean that there are no norms: 
the point is that the norms of a presupposed moral tradition are replaced 
by the norms of communication, that is by the mechanisms of codification.
Path [2] is opposite and complementary to the first one. It explains social 
morality as the product of individual actions that generate a collective sys-
tem of values and norms by aggregation. A number of individuals, driven 
by mechanisms of an aggregative type, participate in processes of identi-
fication with a shared set of symbolic and normative values that replace 
other, existing values. Here are situated the collective movement theories. 
Examples are radical feminist movements, antiglobal, LGBT, protest, and 
revolutionary movements, such as the so-called Arab Spring. The collective 
movement replaces certain values and moral norms with others. It is a mat-
ter of understanding what this path’s specific morphostatic/morphogenetic 
process is. In general, it consists in the fact that, given certain forms of sys-
temic conditioning, large groups (or even masses) of individuals set them-
selves up in reaction to them and radicalise certain values: these groups can 
be of a conservative type (e.g. fundamentalist religious or racial movements) 
or of a transgressive or rebellious type (e.g. radical social movements on 
gender issues or for the abolition of private property).
As I have already said, the majority of theories explain social morality as 
the product of a combination between these two paths. The most emblem-
atic example is the morality that I call lib/lab. This consists in the fact that, 
on the one hand, the morality of individual freedom and of free aggre-
gations of individuals (lib morality) is invoked while, on the other hand, 
morality is instead considered as an institutionalised entity that has the task 
of guaranteeing equality of opportunities in the relationships between indi-
viduals (lab morality). It is assumed that (i) on the one hand, free individuals 
can adhere (or not) to a shared system of values and moral norms (the lib 
dimension of moral agency), and (ii) on the other hand, the system of shared 
moral values works in such a way as to guarantee its own effective realisa-
tion through system mechanisms of a “mechanical” type (the lab dimen-
sion of moral agency), which end up strengthening individual orientations. 
Morphogenesis happens only if aggregations of free individuals change the 
moral system; otherwise, the system continues to be reproductive.
A macroscopic example of the lib/lab view is the idea of the European 
Union’s master plan as supported by the former President of the European 
Commission, Romano Prodi (2002: 20): “The integration of free market 
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forces and competition, on the one hand, with equality of opportunity for 
all citizens, on the other, is the master plan of the new European construc-
tion.” This is a vision of society that has its roots in early modernity and, 
to a certain extent, at the end of the 20th century has found expression in 
Giddens’ (1998) so-called Third Way. It was relaunched by Tony Blair in 
his speech to the British Parliament in July, 2014, when he proposed the co- 
penetration of state and the market because neither of them can resolve 
social problems by itself. Lib/lab theorists care little that actual reality 
demonstrates that this model produces more problems than it solves. They 
do not see that its failures are due to the fact that it forces social subjects to 
act within the double bind between state and market.
In my approach, there is also a rather more complex path. In this path [3], 
morality certainly depends on moral (primary and corporate) agents, but it 
has its own relational dynamic. If we agree that individuals necessarily find 
themselves confronting already existing institutional structures, the mor-
phogenetic process starts from individuals who create networks of social 
relations which, on certain conditions, confirm or alter moral institutions 
(social and cultural systems). Institutions, in turn, and always on certain 
conditions, strengthen or alter the morality of networks of social relations 
and, thus, influence individuals. In this path, the explanation of morality 
must come to terms with what happens in the intermediate space between 
individuals and institutions (normative systems). The ways in which (inter-
subjective and/or impersonal) social relations structure social networks 
become crucial. The understanding of the social morphogenesis of morality 
becomes much more problematic because the intermediate transitions are 
subject to great variability.
Figure 5.1 offers a representation of these processes. The graph contains 
two circles which are connected by an arrow going from the first to the 
second and by an arrow going from the second circle to the first. System 
morality is placed in the first circle, agency morality in the second. One 
affects the other. In the middle between the two circles there is a rectangle 
which indicates the existence of a network of relationships that connects 
the two previous circles and represents the morality of the social network in 
which the actors are embedded. Mutual input and output lines are drawn 
between this central rectangle and the two circles. These arrows indicate 
that the social network acts as an intermediary in the dialogue between sys-
tem and individual morality.
What I want to elucidate is the difference between the morphogenesis 
described through paths [1] and [2], which correspond to the morality of lib/
lab arrangements, and the morphogenesis that passes through social net-
works (path [3]), which corresponds to new relational configurations.
In the circular path between [1] and [2], what happens in the inter-
mediary temporal phase (T2–T3) of the morphostatic/morphogenetic 
process is regarded as an aggregation of individual behaviours that iden-
tify themselves – positively or negatively (through positive or negative 
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feedbacks) – with the same symbols/values that, if they are institutionalised, 
reflect on the aggregations of individuals and can be confirmed (morphos-
tasis) or altered (morphogenesis) by new aggregations of individuals. The 
keystone of this interpretation of social morality lies in individual agency’s 
adhering to one or another “group consciousness” (corporate actors), which 
can be of the majority or specific to minority groups (as is called for by 
the doctrine of multiculturalism). According to this view, the participation 
of individuals happens through their identification with a shared symbolic 
“focal point” (a social class, a cultural or religious tradition, or a social 
movement) that does not necessarily require specific interpersonal and net-
work relations among the participants.
In path [3], instead, we can observe changes of morality in much more 
detail through different moments because in phase T2–T3 operates a rela-
tional logic which is overlooked or underestimated by explanations based 
on the paths {[1]–[2]} (Figure 5.1).
The obsolescence of classic paradigms
The lib/lab paradigms of social morphostasis/morphogenesis can generally 
be traced back to a framework in which the conditioning structure at the 
initial time T1 dictates the moral norms with respect to which individu-
als must take a position in their interactions in phase T2–T3. This happens 
whether the conditioning structure privileges moral norms of a libertar-
ian and individualistic type (as happens in the United States since the lib 
side prevails over the lab side there), or whether the opposite happens, as 
Figure 5.1  How system morality and agential morality are mediated by the morality 
of social networks
Source: Author.
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in Europe, where the lab side of political regulation prevails over the lib 
side of the free market. In this paradigm, it is claimed that individuals can 
conform, or not, to the conditioning structure according to modalities that 
Merton (1938) synthesised in his famous five types of adaptation to legiti-
mate ends and means (among which are moral norms) that characterise the 
conditioning structure.
Merton’s typology is built on positive and negative feedbacks on the part 
of individuals vis-à-vis the conditioning structure’s ends and norms. These 
are first-order feedbacks. The scheme assumes that the formation of collec-
tive actors in phase T2–T3 consists in the adherence of a certain number of 
individuals to each of these modalities (this is an example of the use of the 
binary agency/structure, micro/macro scheme). The aim of this theory is to 
discover how some social structures exert a definite pressure upon certain 
persons in the society to engage in nonconformist rather than conformist 
conduct. Merton’s answer is that “certain phases of social structure gener-
ate circumstances in which infringement of social codes constitutes a ‘nor-
mal’ response” (Merton 1938: 672).
With reference to change in morality, it is assumed,
1 conformity and ritualism produce morphostasis,
2 renunciation leads one to stay out of the social arena, while
3 innovation, in as much as it alters norms but not ends, seems to consti-
tute the modality of internal development of the same system accord-
ing to the Parsonian model of modernisation (the Parsonian model of 
up-grading modernity and successful modernity).
Where is morphogenesis? My thesis is that the Mertonian type of scheme 
commits a series of fallacies. The first fallacy is that it explains morphogen-
esis through positive and negative feedbacks alone. The second fallacy, in 
parallel, is to assume that morphogenesis is produced by automatic mech-
anisms. For example, some sociologists assume that buying newspapers, 
donating blood, or participating in sport or cultural associations automati-
cally indicates that these individuals share a civic culture and have relations 
of trust, cooperation, and reciprocity with one another. Such a correlation, 
much less a causal connection, does not have any empirical foundation.
In other words, these theories overlook the feedbacks activated both by 
individuals and institutions on social relations, and they think that adher-
ence to certain norms produces social change in and of itself. To my way of 
thinking, it is not so. Adherence alone to the change of a moral norm (via 
positive feedback) is not sufficient for explaining the changes in the relations 
that individuals have with one another and with the object of their actions. 
If we want to understand the current morphogenesis of morality, it is neces-
sary to introduce a relational view on the ways in which moral norms form 
and change society.
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Why relationality matters in generating different morals
Feedbacks to social relations follow a different logic compared to the logic 
inherent in feedbacks to single actions. My argument is that feedbacks 
to social relations (relational feedbacks), rather than feedbacks to simple 
actions, change the normativity of the generative mechanisms that produce 
social morphogenesis through positive and negative feedbacks.
The argument’s key point is that reactions (feedbacks) to the single 
actions of Ego and Alter and reactions to the relation between them are 
different orders of reality. It is possible that Ego rejects (or accepts) Alter’s 
action and accepts (or rejects) the relationship with her/him, and vice 
versa, if and only if the feedback exercised towards the single action is 
of a different order of reality with respect to the feedback towards the 
reciprocal relationship. The different order of reality implies a different 
normativity (logical rules) in as much as agents refer to single actions or, 
instead, to social relationships.
Let me synthesise the differences between conceiving M/M processes on 
the basis of mechanical mechanisms (MecMec) and on the basis of relational 
mechanisms (RelMec). In the case of MecMec, moral norms arise from the 
adherence/deviation of individuals’ actions vis-à-vis system morality. In the 
case of RelMec, moral norms arise as a consequence of taking into account 
the autonomous relationality between agents. Let us look at this in more 
detail.
One, in the case of MecMec, moral norms are expected to operate inde-
pendently of the social interrelations among actors, and therefore,
• The normative order depends on conformity/deviance of individuals’ 
actions towards the system (this is the logic of the “agency and struc-
ture” debate).
• The feedbacks can be positive and negative, but not relational.
• The black box of the mechanism works with a trivial causality (operat-
ing with internal functional constraints and given boundary conditions).
• The normativity of social mechanisms is supposed to be “automatic” in 
so far as the interactions in the mediating social network (phase T2–T3 
of the morphogenetic process) are bound by standard norms.
• The outcomes are aggregative social phenomena or functional perfor-
mances, that is the outcome is determined by the mechanisms inherent 
in the social network conforming to structural constraints.
• As examples we can think of social systems/institutions working as 
goal-seeking machines (e.g. traffic norms); organisations relying upon 
belief-formation mechanisms, bandwagon effects, snowball effects, etc. 
(e.g. advertising agencies or election campaigns); procedural justice; 
procedural democracy; adiaphoric normativity in facing social issues; 
bureaucratic anormative regulations.
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Two, in the case of RelMec, norms are expected to emerge and oper-
ate through the dynamics of sociability/relationality among agents, and 
therefore,
• The normative order depends on social relations generated by agents 
and their networks.
• The feedbacks are positive and negative at the first order, and relational 
at the second order of the interactions in the network.
• The black box of the mechanism works with a non-trivial causality 
(whose workings depend on internal complexity and in interaction with 
the environment).
• The normativity of the social mechanisms is sensitive to the interactions 
in the mediating social network (phase T2–T3 of the morphogenetic 
process) and, for that reason, is nomos-building.
• The outcomes consist in the emergence of relational subjects (primary 
and corporate agents) whose normativity is an expression of an under-
lying interacting social network.
• As examples we can think of relational couples (e.g. the higher the com-
monality of the couple’s external network, the greater is the sharing 
of conjugal roles); civic associations; community foundations; social 
streets; peer production and co-production; relational goods; “Beyond 
GDP” indicators (where economic well-being depends on the quantity 
and quality of bonding and bridging social capital – see Stiglitz Report 
2009); justice based upon norms of social (relational) equity; fair trade; 
deliberative democracy; associative democracy.
RelMec are generative in as much as they are relational operations. They are so 
when the normative dimension of the mechanism corresponds to a “logic” (in 
the sense of a rule or set of rules) that combines the elements of the relationship 
between the agents (Ego and Alter) in such a way as to ensure some validity and 
efficacy in what emerges from their relationship. Otherwise, it is a MecMec.
For example, the basic mechanism of Western political democracy is the 
rule that after a contest between the majority and minority, one votes yes 
or no on a proposal. This logic (normativity) is not relational. The morality 
is inherent in the logic of numbers: the political decision is taken on the 
basis of the majority of votes. This is the moral norm leading to political 
decisions. In this case, voters vote through the mechanism of positive and 
negative feedbacks.
The activation of RelMec does not happen in the current political sys-
tem of parties because they operate with a binary morality that does not 
allow consensus building to happen through the establishment of networks 
of relations among the decision makers who are members of the different 
political parties. If this were possible, it would also be possible to form dem-
ocratic networks of decision makers in political bodies that reflect the net-
works of civil society.
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This possibility is available in the decision-making sphere of certain 
third sector organisations (such as in true social cooperatives) in so far as 
they give priority to the value of the relations of civil society, which their 
decisions create. It could also happen in the political system if a “relational 
state” model was adopted, which would operate through relational inclu-
sion rather than through a compromise between market and state, that is 
lib/lab inclusion. “Relational inclusion” means that a full participation of 
people in society (or a social subsystem) is realised by providing citizens 
with the opportunities to act as relational subjects in relation to other social 
subjects – with the same rights and obligations – and not on the ground of 
adhering to market competition ruled by the political power. The lib/lab 
system is built precisely in such a way as to make the system immune to this 
network of social relations.
Human social relations exist at a sui generis level of reality. Many exam-
ples can be given to show that this autonomous level of reality exists.
First example, reciprocating a gift cannot be explained by an automatic 
functional mechanism, nor as a mere individual response that Ego gives to 
Alter, who gave Ego the gift.1 Reciprocation is a relation that has its own 
morality; it is the expression of a moral norm that does not depend either 
on the impersonal function of the gift or on the individual action of giv-
ing “something” that is owed to one person in particular, but resides in the 
suprafunctional meaning of the true gift relation as such, as a good in itself 
(which means for the goods it carries with it beyond the utility of a particu-
lar exchange of things and/or services).
Second example, the electoral vote follows a different moral norm (logic) 
if it is given as a relation to a person or to an ideology in the contest between 
political parties. The reason resides in the fact that the morality of interper-
sonal relations is different from the morality that is applied to impersonal 
relations.
Third example, in a hierarchical network where the founding relation stip-
ulates obedience, the ordinary dynamics are mostly productive of conform-
ity to norms, while a network that works with a “be different” norm is more 
likely to produce anomie (think of that large part of consumer advertising, 
aimed at teenagers and young people, which carries the motto “be differ-
ent”). An example of conformity is Horstink’s (2011) research on a group of 
soldiers in the military. This study investigated the influence of relationship 
density and relationship power on moral reasoning. Findings showed that 
social network properties influence moral reasoning by creating similarity 
within groups. An example of the latter type is provided by studies on those 
social networks on the Internet that aggregate individuals who act as hackers 
 1 The idea that moral responsibility consists in the infinite debt of whoever has received the 
gift, as Bauman (1998) maintains, is clearly individualistic. Perhaps it is because of this 
that Bauman considers morality as a poisoned gift (Junge 2001).
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without having anything or very little in common (Haythornthwaite 2002, 
2005). In both cases, a crucial explanatory factor of the different outcomes 
lies in the properties and powers inherent in the specific relational morality 
of the networks.
In all of these examples, the morality of agency follows one “logic” rather 
than another because the reference to the relations entailed by the agency 
(i.e. the moral good or bad inherent in the relation) changes. If the rela-
tions are virtual, the morality also can become “virtual,” meaning that the 
moral norms lose some of the constraints characterising and binding inter-
personal relationships (it is empirically verified that, in the environment of 
virtual communications on the Internet, users are often encouraged to sim-
ulate or suspend certain rules of responsibility that they cannot avoid in 
real relationships). By changing reference to different kinds of relationality, 
morality can follow a different logic (e.g. in the anonymous matrix of com-
munication provided by the Internet, morality becomes more impersonal, 
and, by virtue of the means of communication, the rules combining goals 
and value-patterns may disregard the distinction good/bad which would be 
necessary in a non-virtual environment). On the empirical plane, we see that 
the normativity of being “ethical” towards individual persons or impersonal 
institutions (impersonal discourses, systems, distant others) is actually dif-
ferent precisely because of the different morality (tighter or looser, more 
expressive or more utilitarian, etc.) implied in these relational references.
It is for this reason that it is necessary to take into account unexpected, 
indirect, and perverse effects. The following seems to me to be an interest-
ing example. If we accept that in late modernity the sociocultural struc-
ture imposes the moral imperative to “be different” (i.e. “choose your own 
option of what is good and bad”), we can ask, why is moral indifference the 
unexpected and unintentional outcome? A possible explanation in terms of 
the morphostasis/morphogenesis scheme is the following. The morality of 
institutions pushes towards moral individualism, but the network of indi-
viduals has a structure and moral dynamic that are such as to nullify the 
value of personal choices. The network’s moral reflexivity is hindered or 
fractured (as is the postmodern public sphere in general), so that indiffer-
ence (non-differentiation) predominates in moral choices. This process is 
obviously favoured by those ICTs which work by cancelling out the value 
of moral differences due to the composition effect (choices elide with one 
another), so that the medium becomes the moral norm (“the medium is the 
message”).
The morality of welfare and its morphogenesis
From its inception, the welfare state has been the object of endless discus-
sions regarding its moral foundations and its consequences for the morality 
of society as a whole. It is not possible to discuss this issue extensively. I will 
come to the point.
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The point is that over the course of its development, the welfare state 
has adopted an increasingly impersonal morality. The moral responsibility 
for social problems (poverty, unemployment, health needs, pensions, social 
assistance, as well as education and housing, etc.) was handed over to an 
impersonal “system.” The welfare package (inclusive of all basic needs that 
must be satisfied to have a decent standard of living) has become an auto-
matic social right (a right of citizenship), in the sense that it does not take 
into consideration the beneficiaries’ conduct. The morality of this welfare 
resides in the principle of solidarity (i.e. of inclusion and social cohesion) 
realised through state redistribution.
With reference to Figure 5.1, we can say that moral responsibility passed 
from individuals to the system (from [1] to [2]), completely skipping over 
social networks (path [3/a, b, c, d]). The system has thus proceeded to pro-
tect single individuals, relieving the social networks (families, informal net-
works, associations, and institutions of civil society) of obligations towards 
the collective well-being.
In recent decades, a vast literature has shown the negative effects that this 
course of action has had on the forms of primary solidarity (informal net-
works) and secondary solidarity (networks organised in associative forms). 
The outcome of this story has been, and is increasingly, the crisis of the wel-
fare state, which derives from not only the State’s inability to address social 
problems (the fiscal crisis, the inadequacy of public bureaucracies, etc.), but 
also, and especially to the fact that it generates perverse effects, among which 
are the progressive lack of responsibility of individuals and the fragmentation 
of social integration. Undoubtedly, the rhetoric of conservatives and parties 
on the right when they speak about this issue is overblown. Nevertheless, 
beyond the rhetoric of conservatives, the problem is real.
The morphogenesis of the moral norms that justify the welfare state is thus 
in a radical crisis. My thesis is that the morphogenetic process of the moral 
norms that must give a moral meaning to welfare is blocked today because 
the existing model of the welfare state is propped up by the reproduction 
of lib/lab morality: the lib side calls for a return to individual responsibil-
ity (autonomous individual reflexivity) while the lab side relaunches public 
intervention with Keynesian types of adjustments, reaffirming the primacy 
of collective responsibility. The proposal of a “third way” that introduces a 
new mix between moral lib principles and lab principles (Giddens 1998) has 
not yielded significant results. Proposals of this type cannot work because 
lib/lab morality is blocked; it does not produce a creative morphogenesis, 
but only a bound morphogenesis.
It is here that the argument about the morality of social relations makes 
its entrance. Individuals must be morally free, and the social system must 
guarantee social solidarity, but how can we proceed so that by choosing one 
we do not eliminate the other term?
Figure 5.1 suggests that we look at how individuals and systems inter-
face through social networks: in other words, whether or not they invest 
122 Insights into the morphogenetic changes
the relationality of the networks with morality and how they consider the 
morality of interpersonal and communitarian relations as such. Freedom 
must make reference to the concrete relations that individuals create and 
in which they live. And the system must take care of relations by evaluat-
ing whether they produce relational goods or evils (this is the “relational 
state”). The goodness or badness of social relations comes into play, in and 
of themselves and in their effects. It is here that a new morality of welfare 
comes into being. Alongside other morphogenetic processes, another type 
of morphogenesis is taking shape, which I call relational.
On the theoretical plane, the sequence of change that the morality of wel-
fare has undergone can follow different paths of morphogenesis in the cycle 
T1–T4. I offer three as examples (Figure 5.1).
• T1: the “starting” situation is given by the systemic crisis of the wel-
fare state’s morality: the welfare state enters into crisis perhaps because 
it nullifies individuals’ moral responsibility by completely impersonal 
principles of responsibility, or perhaps because – vice versa – it appeals 
to individual responsibility while overlooking the norms of solidarity.
• In the intermediate T2–T3 phase: the interactions between agents repre-
sent the search for moral norms in response to the systemic crisis; these 
interactions can follow, roughly, three paths:
i Interactions are guided by an action model that tries to adjust the 
norms of negotiation between state actors and market actors, leaving 
aside other actors; this modality (of communicative reflexivity within 
the lib/lab system) represents a search for internal adaptations to the 
“system,” which are generally of an opportunistic type.
ii Interactions are predicated on action models characterised by an 
autonomous reflexivity, so that the social networks, lacking any 
shared moral constraints, become chaotic.
iii Interactions adopt action models supported by a meta-reflexivity 
that is oriented towards building social networks in which there is an 
important effect of “open coordination”2 between the parties, valoris-
ing the morality of reciprocal relations (relational steering).
 2 As an example, we can refer to the open method of coordination (OMC) adopted by the 
European Union. The OMC provides a new framework for cooperation between the 
Member States, whose national policies can thus be directed towards certain common 
objectives. Under this intergovernmental method, the Member States are evaluated by 
one another (peer pressure), with the Commission’s role being limited to surveillance. The 
European Parliament and the Court of Justice play virtually no part in the OMC process. 
The OMC takes place in areas which fall within the competence of the Member States, 
such as employment, social protection, social inclusion, education, youth, and training.
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• T4: the structure of emergent morality depends on how the normativity 
of phase T2–T3 was elaborated; according to the three above paths and 
three types of morphogenesis are possible,
i A morphogenesis of lib/lab morality (the lib/lab is not in and of itself 
morphostatic); the emergent norms are a combination of criteria of 
efficiency and efficacy in the definition of welfare morality.
ii An unbound morphogenesis of lib/lab morality, which means the 
appearance of moral norms of individual freedom and of collective 
constraints that proceed on their own, without significant connec-
tions between them, thus producing contradictions and perverse 
effects.
iii A morphogenesis of morality that amplifies, selects, and stabilises 
new opportunities on the basis of a normative criterion that valorises 
relationality between the parties as a primary good; for example, wel-
fare measures come to be considered as morally good/bad depending 
on whether or not they lead to the flowering of interpersonal rela-
tions (in the positive case, one speaks of “relational state,” “welfare 
society,” etc.); here the moral norm of social structures is based on 
the qualities and causal properties of the social relations that are 
promoted.
The third alternative (relational morphogenesis) indicates a morality char-
acterised by the moral norms of equitable and sustainable welfare as the 
product of sui generis relational networks. As examples one could cite, 
co-production (Pestoff 2009, 2015), public-private partnerships generating 
new networks at the local level (Evers 2015); social cooperatives able to be 
counter-cyclical instead of having only a buffering role on the impact that 
the systemic crisis has on citizens (Vidal 2015); and, in general, the so-called 
relational turn in social innovation (Fløysand and Jakobsen 2011).
Every society has to come to terms with an intrinsic ambivalence: on the 
one hand, it must make individuals understand that they depend on the col-
lectivity and that, therefore, the altruistic orientation must prevail over an 
individualistic orientation, but, at the same time, it has to push individuals 
to maintain a certain distance from the prevalent norms so as always to be 
able to develop their own evaluations and thus guarantee a certain degree 
of creativity, innovation, and pursuit of change on the part of the individual.
The problem of lib/lab is that its moral norms do not provide a solution 
to this ambivalence. We can take the case of bibliometric evaluations of 
scientific research. Leydesdorff (2014) considered the ethical and cultural 
consequences of relying on metrics to assess the quality of scholarship, 
and reached the conclusion that the present system, centred on individual 
production, penalises the research of groups, networks, and between coop-
erating individuals. The answer to the problem of how to combine individ-
ual creativity and collective subjectivity can only come from a relational 
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approach that highlights that innovation is a product of networks that 
share norms formed in an autonomous manner by the sociability of partic-
ipants without being imposed by a superordinate structure. The problem is 
whether the network is able to avoid the absence of or lack of clarity in the 
norms. The answer is the relational subject, the morality of the We-relation. 
Lacking this, networks fail.
Let me recapitulate the fundamental argument. The social and cultural 
structure given at T1 enters into a systemic crisis as regards the moral norms 
that it contains, explicitly or implicitly. The crisis leads to the commence-
ment of interplay in phase T2–T3, from which derive effects to which, de 
facto, society responds, depending on the case in question, with three types 
of morphogenesis that have three types of outcomes: (i) circularity of the 
morality between subjective norms and institutional forms (Beck, Bonss, 
and Lau 2003); (ii) widespread anomie and morality as a reaction to having 
hit bottom (Teubner 2011); (iii) morality generated through new forms of 
relational steering (Donati 2015b). This is the moral scenario of society dur-
ing the transition to aftermodernity.
The societal moral fabric in the era of globalisation
The scenario that we have before us is that of lib/lab systems continuing 
to operate while encountering growing failures and perverse effects. Their 
morality is self-defeating. The rapidity of failures depends on the acceler-
ating erosion of certain values and traditional norms that early modernity 
had preserved in the past. The immediate consequence of such failures is 
perceived as unbound morphogenesis, which means growing widespread 
anomie.
We can hypothesise that morality in the era of digital globalisation will 
proceed according to three concomitant types of morphogenetic changes 
typical of each T1–T4 morphogenetic cycle. The processes can be described 
through the morphogenesis of the basic structure of social relations (see 
relational-AGIL in Figure 4.2).
At time T1, we find a structure AGIL-1 that contains its own Morality-1, 
which conditions agents when they begin to interact with one another. 
At time T4, we end up with a new structure AGIL-2 that characterises 
Morality-2.
In phase T2–T3, three scenarios are possible:
a Bound morphogenesis: the network of agents operates on the basis of 
Morality-1, which at time T4 can produce both morphostasis (commu-
nicative reflexivity) or a bound morphogenesis (autonomous reflexiv-
ity); within the double bind of lib/lab morality, Morality-2 reproduces 
Morality-1 or is a variation of Morality-1 that maintains the lib/lab 
morality.
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b Unbound morphogenesis: the network of agents breaks the structure of 
Morality-1 and at time T4 generates an unbound morphogenesis, that 
is an anomic morality. Here the Morality-2 is characterised by a rela-
tional logic that is unable or refuses to draw distinctions (thought to be 
discrimination instead of a fair recognition of a difference that must be 
treated as such, because justice requires that different realities are not 
treated uniformly, but in an equitable way) and, thus, does not valorise 
connections, but fosters reflexivity in a fragmented or impeded way.
c Relational morphogenesis: the network of agents operates with strate-
gies of a relational steering type and produces relational morphogene-
sis. The structure of AGIL-2 is characterised by a meta-reflexive logic 
that indicates ends and means as a function of relations’ value. This is 
the case of morality that is generated in those social spheres where rela-
tionality is taken seriously as a source of moral norms. In other words, 
interactions are guided by the morality of the relation as such, which is 
based on relational feedbacks. New opportunities are created by means 
of relational steering: the network, in interaction with the exterior, 
introduces variations in resources, actors, power relations, and norms 
that legitimate the variations that stabilise relational feedbacks.
This framework underscores the fact that the structure of the relation that 
establishes and characterises the social network contains the moral norm 
that organises the means and ends of agency – both individual and collec-
tive – as a function of the value of the relation itself.
In case (Morality-2 a), a norm of collective utility prevails that maximises 
the criteria of efficiency and efficacy. An example is found in organisations 
that operate with a managerial style (business morality).
In case (Morality-2 b), a norm that maximises criteria of contingent pref-
erence prevails. It could be of an expressive or opportunistic type, in the 
sense of seizing the most attractive opportunities of the moment: for exam-
ple, the morality of Facebook networks.
In case (Morality-2 c), a norm prevails that gives priority to the crite-
rion of the moral value (the dignity) of the relation that characterises the 
social network. Civic networks, such as “social streets” (an initiative born in 
Italy and now widespread in many countries: see on Google), are an exam-
ple of this type if and when the relation that inspires associative agency is 
the value to be pursued, independently of its utility, efficacy, or efficiency. 
In these social practices, what matters is not the material goal that can be 
achieved (for instance, the maintenance of a common good like a public 
garden in the neighbourhood) as such, but “the sociality behind it,” that is 
the sociality among the neighbours who produce it.
The third solution at time T4 (Morality-2 c) entails the primacy of the 
moral value over the relation’s other components. Moreh (1986) has shown 
that the economic theory of utility does not take into account moral 
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behaviour, that is behaviour in which an individual faced with two courses 
of action may choose the one that is less profitable to him or her. According 
to relational theory, when the goals that the individual has to achieve consist 
of peculiar social relations (e.g. personal care, education, friendship, etc.) 
then the morphogenesis has to be steered towards the achievement of higher 
relational goods. My thesis is that this behaviour has greater probabilities 
of being chosen when the individual is in a relational context endowed with 
certain properties and powers rather than in another one. The context is not 
only a constraint, but also a resource, a pool of opportunities offered by the 
network formed with others.
Luhmann (2008b) wonders, “Are there indispensable norms in our soci-
ety?” His answer is negative. In his view, it is impossible reasonably to 
expect that any given moral or legal norm is normatively indispensable. 
This answer is in line with the ontological and epistemological premises 
of his approach, which is decidedly sceptical and amoral. I think that he 
should be challenged with an even more paradoxical question: “Are there 
still indispensable social relations in our society?” The latter issue is strictly 
linked to the former. Let us take the example of work relations. No doubt 
work is increasingly considered an indispensable social relation, not only 
from the standpoint of economic support, but also of the person’s emanci-
pation/humanisation, and in this sense, it is a moral imperative, which of 
course admits of exemptions in special circumstances (such as chronic or 
severe illness).
To understand the argument according to which there are social relations 
that are morally indispensable, it is necessary to consider the fact that social 
relations always involve morality. The practical moral norm (not the ethical 
principle, which is located on another level of reality, that is in the cultural 
system) is redefined and changes the moment that the agent reflects on rela-
tions with others in a context, and not when he/she reflects internally on his/
her own “I.” The individual’s internal reflexivity considers the moral norm 
in order to define his/her moral agency in terms of the aspect of his/her sub-
jective determinations (the process of discernment, deliberation, dedication 
is analysed in depth by Archer 2003), but the moral norm has a dynamic that 
does not depend only on individual agency, whether of a single individual 
or of a multiplicity of N individuals (aggregated or interacting with one 
another) – just as it does not depend entirely on the dynamic of structures 
(social and cultural institutions). The practical moral norm is formed and 
created in the relational process among agents. The problem is how we can 
analyse the contribution given to the formation of the moral norm inherent 
in the social relation (e.g. that of work and family) by, respectively, the single 
agents, institutions, and the relation itself.
The present moral imperative in Western culture, which has been absorbed 
into social theory, is that individuals should be active, intentional, auton-
omous, independent, reflexive, capable, and constantly able and willing 
to make rational choices in their lives. Behind this moral imperative for 
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agency, other aspects of what it is to be human remain in the shadows. In 
terms of actions, the human aspects consist in the fact that agents “always 
and as such have patients, beings which the action affects” (Reader 2007: 
588). Whoever teaches influences the student necessarily, but the student 
retroacts upon the teacher. Whoever sells necessarily conditions the buyer, 
but is also conditioned by him/her. Whoever cares for a sick person has an 
impact on him/her, but is also influenced by him/her (Hałas 2021). To put 
this more sociologically, every action entails a relationship. No single per-
son is ever completely an agent or a patient during any one moment of inter-
action. The Self is called, like it or not, to acknowledge itself as a relational 
subject. This reality is grasped if one understands that, from the moral 
point of view, what is at stake resides in the relation; indeed, what is at stake 
is the relation itself, considered for its moral properties and powers, because 
it is in the relation that what is good/bad, right/wrong is defined in (and is 
relevant to) the identity of being an actor or a patient, an active or a passive 
subject. When the relation presents itself as ambivalent, the ambivalence 
can be dissolved by determining what type and degree of reciprocity exists 
between Ego and Alter, given the fact that it is the properties and causal 
powers of reciprocity that define what is good or bad.
Summary
Morality is a social fact, but it is treated as being a problem of the individual 
or the system, or a mix of the two. Current mainstream sociologies explain 
changes of morality in terms of opposing accounts. For some, morality 
evolves by systemic emergence. For others, morality evolves through an 
emergence of subjectivity. If, until a few years ago, these two versions were 
seen as antithetical (Durkheim’s collective conscience vs Weber’s individual 
subjectivity, in particular “charisma”), today structure and agency seem to 
operate in a synergic manner. My explanation is that this happens because 
a lib/lab configuration of morality prevails, which intrinsically contains a 
double bind (the double bind of the system constraint on individuals to be 
morally “free”: see Bateson 1972: 271–278).
a The theses arguing for morality as “systemic emergence” main-
tain that morality becomes a product of functional systems that, 
in as much as they proceed only through communications and are 
(ontologically) only communication, de-normativise society, includ-
ing human beings, in a system that includes animals, plants, and 
every other entity, obviously including the entire artificial world of 
technology.
This thesis claims that in the differential and complex modern societies, 
the true protagonists of such events and processes are no longer humans 
or groups of humans with their material needs and their “values,” but roles 
and functions, systems and environments: a whole world of givenness and 
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system relations in which human individuals operate like mere interchange-
able and perfectly fungible elements. According to Luhmann (2008a), this 
fact leads to a new style of morality that is founded on the shared interest in 
reducing fear and no longer on norms.
It is in this way that the era of globalisation presents itself, according 
to some, as morally adiaphoric. Decisions that need to be taken can no 
longer and should no longer be regulated based on a substantive distinction 
between good/bad that appeals to some “nature,” “reality,” or “objectivity” 
because decisions on good and bad become “technical,” ethically indiffer-
ent, adiaphoric.
In this chapter, I have tried to show that this vision commits a macro-
scopic error of perspective because it does not see the human character of 
the social as a nomos-building activity. The type of morphogenesis that it 
recognises is only that of the dehumanisation of social morality.
b In contrast, the theses arguing that morality is becoming completely 
subjective (morality as “emergence of subjectivity”) commit an error 
of perspective that is symmetrically opposed to the previous one 
because they make the morality of institutions (structures) coincide 
with that of individuals. Those who support this thesis (including 
many academic scholars and even many magistrates in courts) argue 
that morphogenesis takes place through those cultural movements 
that claim that people, as pure individuals, have the right to define 
their identities and their relations as they like. The distinction between 
social relations (as structures) and subjective consciousness is no 
longer productive. What individualisation of social relations essen-
tially means is that the perceived relation is the social structure, and 
that, consequently, both the individual perception and the social 
structure might vary at people’s will. In their opinion culture becomes 
an experiment whose aim is to discover how we can live together as 
equal but different; the aim of normativity is less and less to prescribe 
a certain way of living and more and more to clear the institutional 
conditions for a multiplicity of lifestyles to be recognised. This means 
that any collectively shared definition of relationships and individual 
positions has gone.
My opinion is that these two broad currents are, at the same time, antithet-
ical and complementary (the moral norm refers to two polarities that are 
simultaneously opposite and complementary) because they entrust imper-
sonal morality to the system and locate the morality of free individuals in the 
system’s environment where it can fluctuate at will. System morality guaran-
tees subjective morality, which can create the most disparate social forms. 
On the basis of this perspective, the morphogenesis of morality would be 
destined to play out this game between individuals and the social system.
In this chapter, I have tried to show that this scenario identifies the 
processes of morphogenesis inside lib/lab that leads to the dissolution of 
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lib/lab. If we manage to see that morphogenesis happens through complex 
social networks, in which specifically human relationality takes on increas-
ing importance – which is different from that of animals and other living 
beings – we can glimpse other forms of morphogenesis. These forms are 
not simply the crisis of morality tout court, or the replacement of modern 
morality by the synergy between system amorality and subjective amorality, 
but rather the birth of a new morality that valorises the good/bad of social 
relations upon which human flourishing depends, as well as the morality of 
human persons.
Once upon a time, society was believed to rest on a morality. When a 
foundation could no longer be found in religious beliefs, it had to be 
sought either through reinterpreting these beliefs or looking elsewhere. 
Contemporary society does not prevent morality from still existing. Rather, 
it renders morality morphogenetic by continually generating and destroy-
ing moral norms through the reduction of what is moral to pure commu-
nication, understood as the transfer of information and images. Moral 
norms seem to become purely communicative. This kind of morphogenesis 
configures a society riddled with paradoxes. There are those who play on 
these tendencies to gain advantages. Others become their victims. Still oth-
ers react, creating other ways of making society, and are carriers of a new 
morality. In any case, in the long run, the key to solving the problem lies in 
the fact that a sustainable morality must come to terms with the normativity 
that is intrinsic in the properties and causal powers of each kind of social 
relation and, specifically, of the “relational pattern” that characterises the 
social network in which individuals define their personal identity at a given 
time among the manifold networks to which they choose to belong.
6 Morality and social networks
Who or what is responsible for the market outcomes?
Since the time of Aristotle, traditional ethics has imputed the morality of 
action to the “acting subject” on the basis of a principle of linear causality. 
Over time and, in particular, with the advent of the modern social sciences, 
the social, economic, and cultural conditioning weighing on the subject 
have been evidenced. The result has been to attribute moral responsibility 
to a “conditioned subject,” one that is constrained by existing societal struc-
tures (including so-called unjust laws).
Who does bear the moral responsibility for the fact that broad strata of 
society do not have equal life opportunities as compared to those who enjoy 
more favourable positions? It is easy to impute the cause of this social fact 
to societal structures that were produced in the past, for which no one in 
the present is responsible. Yet the fact is that structures do not think or act 
by themselves. They are not imposed on the human mind, as some assert 
(e.g. Mary Douglas). Structures’ causality is always mediated by agency. 
Nevertheless, structures do count for at least two broad orders of reasons: 
(i) because they define the field of immediately accessible opportunities; (ii) 
because they place constraints on agents in terms of incentives and sanctions.
This is our problem: given that the responsibility of agents is proportional 
to their freedom, it is a matter of understanding what freedom agents enjoy 
vis-à-vis market structures in order to prevent the harm that their actions 
bring to bear on distant others as a result of the causal mechanisms inherent 
in the market.
Who is responsible for the harm that one or more market agents/actors1 
bring to bear on distant others in an impersonal and unintentional way? 
 1 With the term agent, reference is made to the subject’s freedom; with the term actor, ref-
erence is made to the social role covered by the subject. Actors are subjects that act in the 
roles of functional systems. Agents are subjects who act in systems of interdependence, 
both interactive and structural. The harm that market agents/actors cause to “distant” 
others can come from functional systems as well as from systems of interdependence, but 
their moral responsibility is different.
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The “others” can be single individuals, vast social groups, and even entire 
populations. Moral responsibility can be direct, indirect, or adiaphoric.2
It seems relatively easy to identify direct moral responsibility when, for 
example, a financial trader directly sells tainted financial products with-
out informing clients of the elevated risk of loss, or when the owner of a 
sweatshop exploits underage or female workers, violating basic human 
rights. In these cases, Ego inflicts direct harm on Alter, who is a proximal 
(near) person, which does not exclude the possibility of harm done to third 
parties as well.
But what can we say when the economic action is done with the inten-
tion of harming no one, yet causes negative effects? Take the example of 
the decision to move investments to a new place to reap more profits when 
this decision involuntarily causes unemployment and poverty in other 
locations.
Traditional moral theory usually applies the principle of double effect (or 
the principle of the indirect volunteer). As commonly formulated, this prin-
ciple establishes that it is possible to legitimately allow or tolerate a bad 
effect that comes about through an act of choice if four conditions are met:
1 The action in itself, apart from the harm caused, is good or at least 
indifferent (e.g. moving an investment from one place to another).
2 The good effect of the action is what the agent directly intends, 
only allowing the bad effect to happen (e.g. the unintended effect of 
unemployment).
3 The good effect must not be obtained by means of the bad effect (in the 
example under consideration, this is possible).
4 The path must be the only one possible or, in any case, there must be 
a proportionately grave reason to let the negative effect happen (in the 
example, this is problematic).3
If these criteria are met, the individually honest investor can feel at ease. But 
is this really how things are?
The moral criterion of the “indirect volunteer” presupposes a “linear” 
society, where the intentionality and causality of social action can be estab-
lished with certainty. However, in a society in which interactions and rela-
tions are increasing out of all proportion, with marked circularities and 
long causal chains, this principle goes haywire.
 2 Adiaphoric responsibility is “technical” responsibility, which cannot be judged in the 
strictly moral terms of good/evil. Here, I am making reference to the “adiaphoric society” 
spoken of by Bauman (1993) and to the “adiaphoric company” addressed by Jensen (2010).
 3 J. L.A. Garçia, Double Effect, in Encyclopedia of Bioethics, New York, NY: MacMillan, 
1995, p. 637–639.
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A society in the process of globalisation increases the cases in which the 
morality of action is problematic because action has a multiplicity of effects 
that, for the most part, are not grasped by the individual subject of the 
action. The reason for this resides in the fact that the reticularity of society 
is increasing significantly, that is the production of effects that are the out-
come of complex social networks is increasing.
There was a time when people wondered whether the moral responsibility 
for poverty should be imputed to the fact that the poor are lazy, incapable, 
or maladapted or, instead, to certain economic and social structures. The 
social sciences have demonstrated for some time now that agents/actors’ 
(direct, indirect, or adiaphoric) moral responsibility can never be separated 
from the societal structures within which they operate.
The answers generally offered by economists consist in claiming that 
we are dealing with the unintentional consequences of free market “laws.” 
Harm is conceptualised as “side effect” or “negative externality.” Harm 
caused to distant others is held to be the inevitable consequence of freedom 
as the guiding value of the social institution of the market and, thus, a con-
tingency that is intrinsic to it. Redress can be thought of only ex post once 
rock-bottom has been reached.4 In democratic regimes, one expects that 
ex post consequences will be tempered and countered by political systems 
according to the societal arrangement that I call lib/lab.
The social sciences, however, point out that the market is a structure (or 
system) endowed with an ontological reality (Elder-Vass 2009) which, in a 
necessary and intrinsic manner, unintentionally harms distant others in a 
variety of ways, whether within single nations or in the relationship between 
developed and developing countries. These effects are called “unintentional 
structural effects,” precisely to indicate that they depend on mechanisms 
that elude the power of individuals. When they deviate from the actors’ 
intentions, they are called perverse effects (Boudon 1989).
Yet we wonder: is it really true that these mechanisms are inevitable and 
the effects unexpected? If it is true that these structures do not depend on 
the power of individuals, can we assert, for this reason, that harm to distant 
others does not have to do with the moral responsibilities of the agents/
actors?
Hard (holistic) conceptions and weak (individualistic) conceptions of the 
social structure both end up nullifying the moral responsibility of agents/
actors. System theorists shift responsibility on to societal structures (defined 
as adiaphoric). The theorists of individualism undermine the concepts of 
structure and agents’ moral responsibility relative to social facts.
I do not share either of these two explanatory modalities. My thesis is 
another one.
 4 This is the logic clarified by Teubner (2011).
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The social mechanisms or devices that cause certain effects (such as harm 
to strangers) are not a structure (either strong or weak) that determines 
agents/actors’ behaviour in a compulsive or nominalistic way. Social mech-
anisms are relational, in the sense that they are made of social relations that 
are enacted by individual or collective subjects. Societal structures are insti-
tutionalised social relations, which are the product of networks of relations. 
For this reason, there exists a moral responsibility on the part of individ-
ual and collective subjects for outcomes, even for the unwanted outcomes. 
However, in order to see what is at stake, it is necessary to understand what 
is meant by the fact that social structures are built by individuals, but are 
not made of individuals in as much as they are made of relations, and it is 
here – in the relational dynamic – that the problem of moral responsibility 
is to be found.
For example, poverty, unemployment, and inequality brought about 
involuntarily are the product of networks of social relations: indeed, they 
are themselves social relations in which all actors, whether close at hand 
or distant, share, in different forms and degrees, some moral responsibility.
Yet we must be careful. If we adopt a relational perspective, there is the 
risk of falling into positions of circular relativism. The risk is that of locat-
ing moral responsibility in a sort of hermeneutic circle in which subjects’ 
and structures’ responsibilities alternatively chase after each other and 
merge (central conflation).
George Soros offers an example of this when he says that economic struc-
tures are produced by the expectations (“reflexive rationality”) of financial 
operatives (on the stock exchange, in particular) and, at the same time, con-
sist of such expectations, which discount the future. In short, it is assumed 
that the structures of the financial markets are made by the reflexive truths 
of financial agents, who reproduce them in terms of expectations, so that 
market outcomes can be completely irrational without it being possible to 
clearly attribute the causes to structures or agents.
This is the danger of “relationism,” that is of adopting a view that locates 
responsibility in the pure circularity of relations among market subjects, 
which create the economic structures by which they are defined as mar-
ket agents/actors. In order to avoid relationism, it is necessary to adopt an 
authentically relational perspective, which consists in identifying the specific 
responsibility of each term of the relations and, at the same time, the causal-
ity imputable to the subjects’ relations as emergent effects.
Questioning the prevailing explanations of causality
In the field of sociology, holistic explanations seem to prevail. The most 
widely held version explains structural effects as expressions of functional 
requirements. It is claimed that also unintentional effects fulfil certain func-
tions that are necessary to the social system. Therefore, there is no respon-
sibility of single social actors, whether individual or collective. If the law of 
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competition demands that the prices of merchandise be kept low, the indi-
vidual entrepreneur has no choice but to pay lower salaries and resort to 
lay-offs, without worrying about the consequences for workers’ families. It 
is noteworthy that functional systems give primacy to the adaptive function 
(A of AGIL).
The possible impersonal social harm brought to bear on distant others is 
seen as inevitable, and even morally indifferent, because it is essential to the 
good functioning of social systems. A certain number of unemployed and 
poor workers are considered to be an inevitable systemic factor for which 
market agents/actors do not bear responsibility because the economic 
system only works if it is possible to resort to the mechanism that uses a 
certain share of the labour force entering and leaving the labor market, as 
required by contingencies. Is this holistic point of view acceptable on the 
scientific level? In my opinion, it is not acceptable once the so-called func-
tional imperatives (or the alleged laws) of the system are demonstrated to be 
neither necessary nor inevitable.
In the field of economic theory, the opposite point of view prevails, 
inspired by some version of methodological individualism. A great many 
mainstream economists hold that structural effects are “perverse” effects 
(unexpected and unintentional) due (i) to deviations from market mech-
anisms’ optimal functional mode (which is equal to perfect competition), 
and (ii) to potential and concomitant defects in the regulation that should 
be guaranteed by political systems (with legislation on the labour market 
and the redistribution effected by the welfare state). According to prevail-
ing economic policy, the perfect market should not produce negative struc-
tural effects – such as poverty – but only positive structural effects – such 
as legitimate or deserved inequality. Harm to distant others is considered 
an unwanted effect. The recipe for avoiding social harm thus consists in – 
(i) correcting those market mechanisms that do not correspond to perfect 
competition, (ii) correcting welfare state mechanisms that do not guarantee 
equality of opportunity for individuals in the market and that, on the con-
trary, generate poverty traps and other harm.
The outcome of this logic is always to resort once again to compromise 
between state and market. According to this reading of the processes, indi-
viduals do not bear either direct or indirect responsibility for the imper-
sonal harm brought to bear on distant others. The responsibility for social 
evils falls to the political collectivity, which should provide redress through 
impersonal measures (l’État-Providence as a safeguarding principle that 
lightens the burden of individuals’ personal responsibility, or completely 
relieves them of it).
This solution is not satisfactory for many reasons. First, it risks making 
single agents unaccountable. Single agents do not have to change their logic 
of preferences and can shift their personal responsibility on to the collec-
tivity. Second, it is not satisfactory because, as the history of the welfare 
state demonstrates, the solution that proposes to redress social evils by 
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socialising harm through a continuous broadening of social citizenship of 
a lib/lab type multiplies the state’s pervasive powers without civilising the 
market, given that it reinforces these same market mechanisms.
Do alternatives exist?
In my opinion, we need to begin by acknowledging that markets have 
become complex systems that no longer answer to linear logics. Systems 
develop networks that are black boxes in which each social relation is a 
structure that is refractory to its environment, so that the quality of that 
relation is regulated inside the system without it being possible to see the 
consequences on the outside.
Traditional ethics finds itself in a position of difficulty precisely because 
it is still anchored to linear thinking, that is to finalistic principles and to 
principles of linear causality, while market systems have expunged finalism 
and operate via functions and without a principle of linear causality.
It is easy to see the conflict between the functionalist perspective and the 
humanistic perspective. The former holds that all that which is possible for 
agents/actors is ethically licit, without it being possible to guide the sys-
tem ethically. For the latter, instead, social structures, being the product of 
human persons, can be changed by giving them an ethical finality.
What hope does the humanistic perspective have? Or put another way: 
is it possible to alter market rules by introducing ethics as an independent 
variable that functions as a constraint on economic activity, considered not 
only in the single act, but in the causal chain at a distance?
Apparently, the confrontation between a functionalist and humanistic 
perspective is impossible to win for the latter, because ethics cannot stand 
alone against the instrumental aims of the market, and also because mar-
ket’s perverse effects can happen even if agents/actors are personally hon-
est and the market’s rules respect ethical constraints. If we conceive of the 
markets as functional systems, neither the ethics of business (see the regu-
lations introduced in national and international financial systems after the 
crisis of September 2008) nor an organic ethics (such as that of the tradi-
tional Catholic Church teaching) can be successful. The answer can become 
affirmative if we realise that markets can be observed no longer as func-
tional systems, but as systems of interdependence, characterised by a grow-
ing interactionality and relationality. This is what the relational paradigm 
proposes.
In which direction should research be taken?
Let us start over again with the question: who does bear moral responsibil-
ity for causing impersonal harm to others?
Certainly, the interactions among market agents/actors matter. But 
exactly how do we define these interactions and their outcomes?
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We must first reflect on the fact that the points of view of methodological 
holism and methodological individualism lack relationality.
As regards the holistic position, it should be pointed out that the func-
tionalist theory of social systems encounters insurmountable limits and no 
longer functions beyond its own restricted operative domain because human 
persons are not an irrelevant environment for systems’ autopoietic mecha-
nisms. People assess and judge these mechanisms and can react reflexively 
on their modus operandi (voice and exit). Agents/actors feel responsibility 
for the devices that run systems despite (or perhaps because of) the fact 
that system mechanisms operate “impersonally,” that is, by giving priority 
to adaptive requirements (A of AGIL) as a function of preset goals (G of 
AGIL), with no concern for problems of legitimation and of social integra-
tion (the dimensions of latency and relationality, the L-I axis of AGIL).
As regards the individualistic position, I point out that the Coleman boat 
that determines market results (Coleman 1990) is not made of individuals 
who can act according to their wishes and even less according to the think-
ing of rational choice theory. The network that connects them is not a reality 
that they can alter to their liking on the basis of individual preferences and 
tastes. The network cannot be configured on the basis of a purely internal 
reflexivity of participants because it has to do with the dynamic of social 
relations as such.
We need a second-order observation that reasons about relations in terms 
of reciprocity and, for this, is able to observe agents’ responsibility in build-
ing certain networks rather than others. In short, the moral responsibility of 
agents for the impersonal harm brought to bear on strangers becomes visi-
ble when the former are not considered as atoms, but as relational subjects.
In such a case, it becomes plausible to understand that there exists a 
moral responsibility of agents, if and to the degree that (i) agents consider 
the effects of their social relations, in as much as they are distinct from tech-
nical relations, and (ii) they adopt a vision of the market that makes mani-
fest the ethical value (criterion) that is used latently as the argument for the 
function-goal of economic activity.
The market as a black box
Let us observe the impersonal damage to distant others as an outcome 
brought out by the process that brings from a certain distribution of N 
actors to another distribution, passing through the modification of the net-
work of their market relations (i.e. the black box).
At the beginning of the process (time T1), we observe N agents/actors, 
embedded in a social context that influences their opportunities and 
action preferences, who start interacting. The context is a structure pro-
duced by previous morphostatic/morphogenetic (MS/MG) cycles. This 
structure defines the positions and resources of the N agents/actors in the 
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initial distribution of their conditions (X). In the interval of time T2-T3, 
the N agents/actors make their individual and reciprocal choices, so that 
the choices combine with one another generating a network of relations 
between the N agents/actors. This network is a black box that operates 
the mediation between the initial distribution of the N agents/actors (X) 
and the resulting distribution (Y) which emerges at time T4. It is a mat-
ter of knowing this network (black box) and understanding its structural, 
cultural, and agential dynamic. In distribution Y, we see what the market 
has produced in terms of better or worse conditions among the N actors 
involved. We can find the relational goods and the relational evils that the 
black box (the market) has produced.
To see the effects on other distant ones, the market needs a third party to 
act as a sort of supervisor. This entity has the task of assessing the responsi-
bilities in generating harms to distant others and intervene into the market 
process. It is necessary because (i) the morphogenetic process cannot be 
“finalised” ex ante (harms are emergent effects), (ii) the black box is not 
trivial. At the same time, it cannot be constituted by a single entity external 
to the overall process, be it an international organisation, an international 
network of NGOs, advocacy, or third sector organisations, consumer or 
worker organisations. It should be a relational network of the main stake-
holders. Here is the point where the for-profit sector and the non-profit sec-
tor must cooperate through agreements that empower a third party – to 
which they rely because it represents them both – to evaluate the results of 
the process and to propose changes in the various aspects of the process 
itself. What this network of stakeholders can do is change the initial condi-
tions, the black box, and/or the resulting distribution.
This requires a deep change in the dominant economic ethics, which con-
siders the N market players as autonomous and rational – and generally 
hypo-socialised – subjects who are ethical in as much as they respect the 
regulations in economic transactions (lex mercatoria). Such an assumption 
forgets that subjects are not truly autonomous because (i) their interests, 
preferences, and choices are already embedded in particular contexts; 
(ii) their rationality is quite limited by the system’s complexity, and 
(iii) there are many non-rational factors at play.
In order to find a solution to the problem, it is necessary to avoid seeing 
the causes of harms to distant others only in individuals or only in (social, 
cultural, and economic) structures. Theories of exchange on the free mar-
ket and theories of hierarchical structuring are losing their explicative 
capacity. Harms to distant others are increasingly caused by impersonal, 
remote networks in which agents/actors’ moral responsibility takes on an 
indirect or adiaphoric connotation. The question is, if, on one side, free 
inter-individual exchanges and, on the other side, organisational hierarchies 
give way to “social networks of stakeholders,” what will be the fate of moral 
responsibility?
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The moral criteria for imputing responsibility: the 
role of reflexivity and of the relational subject
Let us ask ourselves how we can understand the causal connections between 
an average market agent’s action and its effects.
In the case of lib/lab theories, things are quite clear. Agents make their 
choices from among the opportunities offered by structures and with the 
degree of freedom allowed by the structures. This theory emphasises the 
pressure of structures on individual actions. According to this theory, 
agents act in a certain way even if they are aware of the harm that they can 
cause because the environmental pressure is so strong that they would oth-
erwise be labelled as deviant (Blau 1960) and thus would be marginalised 
from their social group of belonging. The black box works in such a way 
that harmful outcomes are imputed to structures, not to agents.
The solutions of voice and exit emerge from those who discern that distri-
bution Y of the opportunities that emerged at time T4 is not morally (and in 
certain cases, nor politically) acceptable. At this point, to whom is respon-
sibility to be imputed?
The ethics of traditional cultures judges results in a deductive manner, ex 
post, with a retroaction that does not see the social causes of the process; it 
limits itself to judge the actions of the N market actors and asks to change 
their preferences and choices. But how can responsibility be imputed to 
individuals if the causes of the harm to distant others are not clear? Asking 
to compensate those who have been harmed with a public intervention or 
with an appeal for private charity does not alter the black box.
If the process must avoid generating relational evils and producing rela-
tional goods, the black box must be modified, making the process more 
reflexive on how it operates. Making the process reflexive means to “turn 
back” and identify the responsibility of who and/or what (social mecha-
nisms) have operated in the black box so to produce the social evils. This 
means adopting a relational ethics.
In order to understand how structures can be changed, it is necessary to 
understand how they are causally generated.
Structures are made of relations, and relations are made of reciprocal 
actions (with their intentions, norms, means, and values). What we call 
“market rules” are relational structures. Precisely, due to their relational 
characters, they generate an “other” reality with respect to the individuals 
and structures that we observe in a given space-time. This “third” is con-
stituted by emergent effects, which traditional ethics does not see because 
it judges individuals and structures. It is here that ethics must make itself 
reflexive or, rather, meta-reflexive, in the sense that it must judge the moral-
ity of actions in light of how they configure relations, leaving aside agents’ 
intentions and existing structures.
This means that the ethical criteria that assess market functioning and its 
products must make reference to social relations rather than to impersonal 
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system mechanisms or individual preferences, possibly encouraged by 
incentives to carry out cooperative games. In any case, causal imputations 
can no longer be of a deductive and conditional type, of the type whereby, 
“if event X happens, judgment Y then applies.”
It is necessary that the ethical criteria for imputing moral responsibility 
concern agents not only as regards their individual subjectivity (internal con-
versation or personal reflexivity), but also as regards their social relations. 
Agents must reflect on the relations that condition them and on the relations 
that they generate. Relational good can transform itself into a relational evil 
if a suitable social (i.e. relational) reflexivity and a certain system reflexivity 
are not activated. Ethics must make itself relational. What does this mean?
It means seeing good and evil in social relations and not only in the individ-
uals as such or in the conditioning structure. To understand the significance 
of this statement, one should think about the following examples.
Traditional ethics considers poverty as a condition lacking resources 
that should be given by the collectivity to those who are most unfortunate. 
Relational ethics, instead, sees poverty as the product of relations that, even 
if enacted with good intentions, have objectively deprived some people of 
opportunities to which they had a right for reasons of reciprocity. Likewise, 
unemployment is seen as the product of policy that considers work as a 
commodity rather than as a social relation (Donati 2001). It is certainly true 
that, since last few years, the UNO has learned to conceive of poverty as a 
lack of capabilities, which leads to exclusion from the circuits of produc-
tivity. Amartya Sen, whose thinking has contributed to this new view, has 
proposed that the conception of poverty as a pure and simple lack of income 
be superseded. Nevertheless, concepts such as a “lack of capabilities” or a 
“lack of flexibility in the job market” usually make reference to individuals 
as such, that is they reflect an individualistic point of view, or they reflect a 
collective point of view, making reference to impersonal structures, rather 
than being expressed as forms of social relations. This is due to the fact that 
the common good is defined as a “total good” (a product of aggregation) 
rather than as a “relational good” (emergent multiplier effect).
In general, what I want to claim is that involuntary, but illegitimate, ine-
qualities must be seen as the product of a relationality among actors who 
lack reflexivity in the mechanisms that distribute life opportunities, even if 
those who participate in the exchanges are individually honest.
At this point, a clarification of the concept of ethical good (and, conversely, 
the ethical evil) that I am proposing is called for. The idea that ethical good 
consists in the flowering of the human person in happiness is widely shared, 
together with the assumption that happiness is due to the personal virtues of 
people. The opposite idea applies to ethical evil, seen as the result of personal 
vices. In this view, the normative components of social relations that lead to a 
happy or sad life are a consequence of persons’ virtues or vices.
What I add to this conceptualisation is a more complex view of the rela-
tionality inherent in social morality. The social dimension of the morality of 
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action does not only consist in the fact that the person must relate to others 
in a virtuous way with his/her own intentionality (necessary condition). It 
also includes the person’s responsibility for the consequences of the relation 
as such on other relevant persons (sufficient condition). Social morality is 
good if this second condition is met, that is if the effects of one’s own action 
on others are considered. In this consists the social nature of virtue, differ-
ently from personal virtue.
This is relational ethics, which joins together intentionality towards a 
good and responsibility for the relational value of the good as it is expressed 
in its consequences. The ethics of intentionality and the ethics of respon-
sibility cannot be separated, precisely due to the relational character of 
the good or evil. We go beyond modernity to the extent that we attribute 
a responsibility to subjects not only for what they think or do individually, 
but in as much as they generate social relations that have a sui generis real-
ity leading to certain consequences. This means conferring an ontological 
statute on the concept of relation when it is applied to the social realm. The 
morality of an action does not reside only in the conscience of the subject 
acting with an eye to a good in itself, but also to the fact that the subject does 
or does not respond to the relational nature of the sought after good.
The relational subject
The “discovery” of the reality of the social relation leads to a new ethical 
reflection when we consider that the relational good/evil is created in the 
interactive network (black box) in the interval between times T2-T3. Let us 
look at what happens inside the black box with the help of the morphoge-
netic framework (Figure 6.1).
Figure 6.1 The interplay between individual and relational ethics
Source: Author.
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Figure 6.1 is entitled “the interplay between individual and relational eth-
ics” to underscore that relationality changes moral responsibility over time. 
Morality is not given, once and for all, in the initial decision. It does not only 
concern single acts in time, but has to do with these acts in as much as they 
produce relational effects over the course of time.
At the initial time T1, individuals find themselves in a structure that con-
ditions them, and they make their choices. Traditional ethics considers the 
morality of the individual acting according to his/her inner reflexivity in 
response to the social context. At time T2, individuals’ choices interact with 
the choices of other agents. A network is constituted among “proximal” 
individuals (proximity network). In this phase T2-T3, moral responsibility 
concerns each agent due to the contribution that he/she makes to the net-
work. In order to see the connections with external others towards which 
there is the responsibility of positive/negative impacts, the constitution of a 
relational subject is required. If a relational subject can be actually gener-
ated through a morality that exercises its reflexivity on relationships (rela-
tional ethics), then a new social structure is generated consisting of a social 
network that seeks to avoid harm to distant others or at least to remedy it. 
Obviously, the problem is not solved once and for all. Here begins a new 
cycle in which agents will have to make their individual choices in response 
to the new structure.
Decisions in the proximity network affect the outside, even in an uninten-
tional way, because there exist structural (unintentional) connections. Only 
if agents pass from their individual morality to take the point of view of the 
relational effects of their actions, that is if they become relational subjects, 
is it possible to avoid damage to other distant people. Otherwise, relational 
evils are inevitable. As we will see in Chapter 8, the relational subject is one 
who acts taking into account the fact that relations can produce relational 
goods or evils.
For example, when white workers in the United States prevented Blacks 
from joining labour unions, they did not do this to prevent them from 
working – or even due to racism – but because they believed that Blacks 
would not be loyal to the union and, therefore, they thought that they were 
defending their legitimate interests. They had “good reasons” for their 
actions. Nevertheless, the emergent structural effect was to produce 
unemployment and poverty among Blacks, as Merton (1968: chapter 2) 
has shown.
From the standpoint of relational ethics, moral responsibility implies the 
duty to know the relational connections between the networks in which the 
agent is integrated (IN) and the relevant environment. Yet studies to this 
effect are quite rare because the issue of knowledge on how relationships 
operate is fairly new in social research. However, it is possible to make sev-
eral assertions that are validated by network relational analysis.
For example, we can say that moral responsibility is proportional to the 
degree of the Ego’s centrality in the network. Nevertheless, whoever occupies 
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the position of broker has a supplementary responsibility, because the bro-
ker’s responsibility is not only towards the network’s individual nodes (each 
Alter), but also towards the network overall in as much as what the network 
generates depends on the way in which a broker manages the structural 
holes of the network.
It should be noted that the relational interpretation of the principle of 
responsibility is quite different from the one formulated by Hans Jonas, 
not only because Jonas has addressed this principle mainly as it relates to 
phenomena of the natural environment (ecological and bioethical issues), 
but above all because he has applied it to individual action in the spirit 
of Kant (“Act in such a way that the effects of your action are compatible 
with the continuation of an authentically human life”). What distinguishes 
relational ethics is the fact that actors must act reflexively on the results of 
their actions combined (related) with others’ actions, and not only on the 
consequences of their own individual actions. In order for this to happen, 
it is necessary that a moral relational subject, to which moral criteria are 
applied, be constituted.
Undoubtedly, some connections are known and certain, while others are 
not known, or are uncertain. But ignorance is not an excuse for refusing to 
take responsibility. In many cases, the “remote” causality of the market’s 
economic phenomena is identifiable only if we presuppose the existence 
of a relational subject with respect to which agents are responsible. This 
is because it is with respect to this relational subject that an observer can 
assess the morality of their actions, whether ex ante or ex post, in producing 
those causal chains from which harm brought to bear on distant others is 
derived.
For example, a company that hires women with no concern for their rela-
tions with their babies is potentially responsible for the harm suffered by 
the latter due to the lack of maternal care. A company cannot ignore the 
network of relationships that its workers have in the company environment 
(of course this principle applies equally to men and women). Most probably 
many companies do not have bad intentions, but nevertheless they produce 
relational harms in the human environment of the territory in which they 
operate. Relational reflexivity on the process requires one to see the com-
pany, the employees, and their families as relational subjects. When one 
says that employers have a social responsibility towards their employees, 
this means that they should consider potential harms to employees’ families 
due to the type of work done. The solution is to make relational contracts 
that provide for family-work reconciliation measures. The contract is said 
to be relational precisely because it considers the relational effects of work 
on family life that lie outside the so-called contractual synallagm in which 
a simple equivalence is assumed between services rendered and remuner-
ation of the individual employee’s work. The relational contract is made 
not between two individuals (traditional ethics), but between two relational 
subjects (relational ethics)
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The relational perspective is not wishful thinking but has empirical cor-
roboration in a number of new ways of running the market that follow rela-
tional ethics. For example, many companies prevent harm to distant others 
by building networks in which for-profit and non-profit subjects cooperate, 
and for this are called socially responsible.
We are witnessing the birth of markets in which agents’ behaviours and 
rules are being redefined from the point of view of the relational subject 
constituted by a broad spectrum of stakeholders (business ownership and 
management + workers + consumers). New forms of relational economy are 
being born, integrating for-profit and non-profit sectors and holding as a 
value the social responsibility of business (CSR, shared responsibilities) and 
the production of commons. More recent than the concept of CSR is that of 
“shared value,” used by Michael Porter as well as Mark Esposito, Rosabeth 
Moss Kanter, and others, which has the advantage of using economic lan-
guage in the sense that it underscores that the goal of business is also value 
and not only profit. Social and positive ecological effects are included in 
value. Running through all of these innovations is the observation that the 
company that pursues only monetary profit is destined to fail.
These configurations are characterised by the fact that they introduce 
what I call “relational reflexivity” (Donati 2011b) into the black box and, in 
this way, civilise the market, while the typically capitalistic configuration – 
which is based on an acquisitive autonomous reflexivity – commodifies it.
Some examples
If market participants do not understand harm brought to bear on distant 
others as a product of their actions, it is because they do not see, or refuse 
to see, the relations that connect them. The prevailing political economy 
of today immunises them against these relations. How can one respond to 
someone who refuses to consider relations? How can we address someone 
who wants to have to do with us only for the things exchanged and not for 
the relations entailed by the exchange?
Let us look at some examples.
One: Social dumping
Social dumping is a practice considered in the economic world to be unfair. 
But in point of fact, in the United States, it is a normal praxis backed up by 
the laws on competition, and in the Europe Union, it is politics backed up 
by European Commission policy directives meant to foster market compe-
tition among member states. The lib/lab system imposes a market structure 
based on social dumping. And so one wonders: what responsibility does the 
individual business person, who practises social dumping, have in gener-
ating harm in those countries or areas where it causes unemployment and 
endangers workers’ social rights?
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From the perspective of relational sociology, conformity to starting struc-
tures does not absorb all of the entrepreneur’s moral responsibility because 
the latter has degrees of freedom in seeking alternative solutions if and 
when he/she wants to avoid unintentionally causing harm. Entrepreneurs 
can adopt cooperative strategies aimed at building social networks linking 
the countries or areas involved so to avoid harms to distant others. It is in 
this way that a civil economy arises that respects the ethical criterion of 
reciprocity as the moral rule of relations.
Two: Acquisition of merchandise produced 
in violation of human rights
What moral responsibility does the consumer have when he/she buys mer-
chandise produced with the exploitation of child labour or with the low paid 
work of women operating in “sweatshops” in developing countries?
The answer lies in the reflexive awareness of consumers. If they have no 
knowledge of the fact, we cannot impute moral responsibility to them. But 
if the network of corporate agents makes this reality public, and a consumer 
comes to know about it, he/she has the freedom to choose what to do. And so 
the knowledge of exploitation is an element in the imputation of responsibility 
because the consumer has the possibility of not buying sweatshop products.
Three: The rejection of risks that entails fostering 
the bankruptcy of countries in financial crisis
Let us take the case of a financial agent who withdraws his/her financial invest-
ments from a country in which there are risks of fiscal and financial instabil-
ity. By acting in this way, the agent contributes to causing unemployment and 
economic recession in that country. Such an agent is generally perfectly aware 
of what he/she causes, but imputes harm to the laws of the market. Moral 
responsibility lies above all in the refusal to alter the network of interactions, 
which can produce harm to distant others. The responsibility is thus propor-
tional to the degrees of freedom available for altering the network of financial 
actors in such a way as to avoid both one’s own losses as well as harm to 
others. Surely, we cannot criticise a person who tries to save his/her modest 
savings. On the other hand, from a moral standpoint, one must reserve a neg-
ative judgment for rating agencies which, with their evaluations, contribute 
to increasing the difficulties experienced by those countries that already have 
weak economies and, thus, instead of helping these countries to get back on 
their feet, they favour dynamics that lead these economies towards situations 
of even deeper crisis (they are examples of self-fulfilling prophecies).
Four: The involuntary creation of poverty
From the standpoint of sociological analysis, the condition of poverty is 
not a condition that is caused solely by certain individual characteristics, 
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but is above all the product of a relational system. Addressing poverty 
as an emergent effect of networks of relations completely changes the 
perspective as compared to an essentialist point of view that considers 
poverty as a condition caused by material (economic or physical) factors 
which have determined a certain outcome, that is the lack of means. The 
struggle against poverty in the market – without intervention by the politi-
cal system – consists in creating a new interactive network of a cooperative 
type.
“Social causality” is a relational causality. Life conditions and opportuni-
ties are the outcome of a relational context that not only conditions individ-
uals’ choices, but also has its own logic of interdependence that generates 
social problems. The category of interdependence is a moral category in 
which it can generate relational goods or evils. The moral responsibility for 
the creation of poverty does not have to do with the individual behaviour of 
single persons, but with the consequences of the relations that they activate. 
They are responsible for the outcomes because they are responsible for the 
relations that generate them, even if these are emergent effects that come 
about without their direct intentions.
The poverty of the homeless man on the street or of the illegal immigrant 
is the result of a long chain of actions that could have been individually legal 
and honest, but which did not take into account either aggregate or emer-
gent effects. When I see an old lady collect her pension at the post office, 
she does not know that this money comes from me and from those who are 
currently active in the work force (Ignatieff 1984). But I know it, and I am 
responsible for it. If I do not pay my taxes and other contributions to the 
collectivity, if I do not share in the We-relation and the relational subject 
that supports it, I am responsible for the failure of the collectivity to pay 
this lady’s pension.
Summary: can we civilise the market?
The idea that the market is a system of exchanges where the golden rule is 
pure competition, that is, with no premises beyond the mere capacities of 
individuals, is a myth. It is a pure illusion due to the simple fact that it erases 
the relations between market participants. Competition is a social virtue if 
it means cum-petere, that is, to strive together towards a good that entails the 
benefit of all those involved.
The modern political economy that originated in the 18th century, which 
in general terms theorises the market as “formally free” and, as much as 
possible, “deregulated,” is based on the removal of social relations because 
of its individualistic theological matrix. This model has historically tri-
umphed over the idea of a civil economy (Genovesi 2005 [1765–1767]; Bruni 
and Zamagni 2004) based on social relations. Although Adam Smith spoke 
of sympathy among market actors, it is quite true that all political economy 
from Ricardo onward is pervaded by ethics of “immunisation” of market 
agents against social relations.
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Since the economy is effectively relational, its ethics must also be rela-
tional. Redistributive economies (based on a central authority) and the 
so-called social market economies (which are a form of state regulation of 
the market) do not properly have a relational character and, for this reason, 
fail in combating the harm brought to bear by the market on distant others. 
At most, they can bring some relief.
In any case, in order to avoid harm caused by the market to distant oth-
ers, recourse to the state alone is inadequate. Rather, mechanisms of civil 
society are needed, if and in as much as they are relational. An economy is 
relational not because it entrusts itself to the regulations of some political 
system, but because it invests in solutions based on the social governance of 
civil society’s networks.
With this, we have reached the crux of the problem: the morality of actions 
in the market is essentially a problem of civilising the market, considered as 
a network of interdependences and interactions.
Ethics can operate as an independent variable or a function-objective of 
economic activity if it is conceived according to reflexive criteria, and no 
longer according to unidirectional criteria (i.e. the conditional criteria such 
that, if X happens, then the norm Y is applied).
In a society that is exploding agents’ subjectivity and creating always 
new relations via the channels of globalisation, it is no longer enough to say 
that the morality of action depends on the conscious intention to pursue 
something good in itself. Unfortunately, social evils do not derive only from 
behaviours that are dishonest, corrupt, and driven by greed for money or 
power – which are clearly visible, they derive from social networks that do 
not operate with adequate relational reflexivity.
Part III
Why and how can the 
new society be “good”?

7 What does the good life consist of?
What is a “good life”?
I am interested in shedding light on practices that are inspired by a real-
ist utopia that uses opportunities in order to realise a modus vivendi that 
allows people to enjoy relational goods in different social spheres. In short, 
I would like to highlight those social forms of the good life that are capable 
of including new life opportunities within the social relations that orient our 
conducts of life towards an “agonistic sociability.” This oxymoron alludes 
to the fact that, instead of encouraging citizens to bracket their moral and 
cultural disagreements, we have to cultivate oppositional yet respectful, 
that is relational, civic, and political practices. In the field of social services, 
this means developing relational social work. I argue that a flourishing civil 
society, on which a civil democracy is grounded, can be fostered by those 
social networks that are able to generate competing relational goods.
My argument is that in a society conceived as a field of opportuni-
ties, the discriminating factor of “living well” becomes the relational or 
non-relational nature of the good that is sought and realised by the acting 
subjects. It is a matter of clarifying the modalities with which the good is 
generated and which effects follow from it. The proof of this argument con-
sists in giving evidences that there exists a specific logic of opportunities 
that is capable of realising a “society of the human,” that is social forms in 
which, whatever the means used to realise social relations, the latter can be 
generated only by subjects who are actively oriented to each other according 
to a suprafunctional sense. This is a society in which, from the standpoint of 
relational realism, the good life coincides with the creation and enjoyment 
of relational goods.
Classical and modern conceptions of human happiness
There are two alternative views on what human happiness might be, which 
have prevailed over the centuries: a hedonic idea of happiness and a eude-
monic one.
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For the hedonic conception, happiness is the result of avoiding pain and 
seeking pleasure, the key concept of all utilitarian schools, in both its indi-
vidual and aggregated forms. Social relations are considered as “entities” 
that can bring pleasure or pain as other “objects” do.
On the other hand, we find the eudemonic view, which, apart from being 
more theoretical and holistic, takes a different view of human relationality. 
It considers happiness as a more complex concept, not strictly limited to 
attaining pleasure. Happiness is something like flourishing human living, a 
kind of living that is active, inclusive of all that has intrinsic value. It is the 
ultimate goal of human life and an indirect result of the practice of virtue.
I will focus on the latter conception, starting from Aristotle, who claims 
that pleasure is an enérgeia of the human body and mind, whereas happi-
ness is the enérgeia of a human “being a human” (Aristotle, Nicomachean 
Ethics, Book X, Chapters 1–5). Aristotle understood human happiness on 
two levels.
On the individual level, as the satisfaction of the human being’s natu-
ral needs (physical, psychological, and sociocultural), with the purpose of 
enhancing the more elevated human qualities, however one defines them 
(rationality, contemplation, otium, spiritual virtues).
On the social level, life consists in enjoying interpersonal friendship and 
in conducting a correlated active and peaceful life in the public sphere of 
the polis, with the intention of pursuing the common good. Aristotle does 
not examine in detail the relational nature of good life, limiting himself to 
making individual happiness dependent on the happiness of the political 
community, the latter having primacy over the former. Throughout history 
many other conceptions have been formulated on this basis, which certainly 
need not be summarised here. On the one hand, human needs have been 
discussed at great length, and, on the other, the relationship between indi-
vidual happiness and collective happiness has been variously described.
What I wish to recall is the fact that in classical thought and until the 
beginning of modernity, good life is related to two basic conditions: (i) it 
refers to a naturalness of human needs and thus presupposes a human nature, 
however this is defined, and (ii) it implies that the political community is 
capable of pursuing the common good by resolving social conflicts and giv-
ing citizens the security necessary to enable their human potentialities to 
flourish. These potentialities are generally understood as virtues.
Virtue (in Latin, virtus, and in Greek, α ῤετή-aretè) is understood as a 
disposition of the spirit towards the good; in other words, it is a person’s 
capacity to excel in something, to accomplish a certain act in an excellent 
way, to be virtuous as the perfect way of being.
In premodern thought, virtue has a stable disposition called habitus as 
its prerequisite. Habitus is a fundamental means for achieving the good life 
in that it regenerates a social order conceived as an ideal that is stable and 
immutable in its principles. From this comes the idea that a happy soci-
ety, and a good life for its citizens, is achieved by a strict correspondence 
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between personal virtues and social order, and that it is reproducible over 
time. The idea that individuals’ happiness (as the realisation of their virtues) 
projects itself onto the entire society prevails so that if individuals, as such, 
act for the good and are happy, the society will also be happy.
This vision lacks relationality. With modernity, this framework is pro-
gressively called into question. To the degree to which the individual is 
no longer incorporated (embedded) in a given community and becomes 
“casual” (formally free and available in the capitalist labour market), the 
distance between the individual and society grows increasingly greater. 
With the advance of the national state and the spread of capitalism, the two 
assumptions of premodern thought fall: the notion of human nature and 
that of the common good are radically changed, altered, overturned, and, 
with them, the meaning of good life as well.
With the progressive erosion of the metaphysical-religious roots of the 
past, the problem of how to sensibly conduct one’s life becomes an increas-
ingly fraught problem. In a society in which the values that guide life are no 
longer “founded” but simply chosen with subjective options, good life pre-
sents itself as an always problematic and somehow unreachable goal. The 
fact is that all of modern culture, from its beginnings to the present day, is 
marked by the drama of defining “what is human” and consequently what 
is, or can be, human happiness (Archer 2000).
With post-modernity, the process of change becomes ever faster and 
deeper. What is the conduct of life that leads to happiness and, even more 
to the point, what is the society that can foster it? These are questions that 
are increasingly debated along two main lines: on the one hand, there are 
those who hold that the good life consists in the emancipation and libera-
tion of individuals’ subjectivity from any system constraint (a new form of 
the hedonic ethos); on the other hand, there are those who believe that it 
consists in the possibility of building highly techno-functional impersonal 
social systems that can relieve individuals from their material needs, which 
is a technocratic reformulation of the eudemonic ethos. In reality, Western 
modernisation mixes both the aforementioned tendencies: individualism 
and system functionalism mix and intermingle with one another. They sup-
port and feed off each other.
Social structures, once the possibilities of basing moral values in an 
objective reality are lost, now function as if the problem of living in a good 
society can be reduced to a question of individual preferences and tastes 
that are allowed or not allowed by the system. The happiness of individu-
als is relegated to the private sphere, where it is subjectified and becomes 
narcissistic (Lasch 1979) while public happiness (the well-being of social 
systems) is entrusted to the chance of creating “reflexive systems” (Beck, 
Bonss, and Lau 2003). Everybody agrees that late modernity requires more 
and more reflexivity in order to pursue happiness. A system qua talis cannot 
be properly reflexive; it can only be reflective in a mechanical way like in 
a mirror. So, we have to distinguish between different modalities of being 
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reflexive, whereas Beck, Bonss, and Lau (2003) fail to make these distinc-
tions. As Beck, Bonss and Lau (2003: 3) put it, “reflexive does not mean 
that people today lead a more conscious life (…) reflexive does not signify 
an increase in mastery and consciousness, but a heightened awareness that 
mastery is impossible. Simple modernity becomes ‘reflexive modernisation’ 
to the extent that it disenchants and then dissolves its own taken-for-granted 
premises.” This leaves the referent, the purpose, and the point of reflexivity 
highly ambiguous.
Here it seems clear that the problem of human happiness is being posed in 
radically new terms, for at least two major orders of reasons.
1 Social and cultural systems no longer presuppose the existence of a 
human nature. On the contrary, they tend to alter existing reality to 
enter into the realm of the “post-human,” the “transhuman.” They cre-
ate the humanoid and the cyborg. All prior forms of humanism become 
obsolete. In short, human happiness no longer consists in the realisa-
tion of potentialities that are proper to human nature and only to it, 
but exists “elsewhere,” an “elsewhere” that cannot be defined because 
it does not have either an identity or stable boundaries. It is said that 
society becomes liquid, and people must live on the edge of chaos.
2 The processes of social differentiation erode the concept of the common 
good and, with it, the idea that good life can be guaranteed by a politi-
cal community. The common good is identified sometimes with public 
goods, sometimes with total goods, that is with impersonal entities or 
entities created by a simple aggregation of individual goods. The idea 
that public happiness can avail itself of private vices, indeed, that it is 
the product, even if an unintentional one, of private vices becomes a 
social norm. The logic of the production of the goods in which happi-
ness consists is left to the neo-liberalism of the market regulated by the 
state (lib/lab arrangement).
As a consequence of all of the above, happiness becomes a mysterious 
object, a dream, a passion, a conduct of life without a symbolic and norma-
tive centre. It is no longer a project. It is abandoned to the intrinsic ambiva-
lence of a Western morality that puts everything into doubt and is thought 
of as being purely “liquid,” while, in fact, it is not, due to the existence of 
tough structures of social inequality, in particular in accessing social ser-
vice and in organising alternatives to the lib/lab arrangements.
In reality, this society does not see that the liquid life and the risks that 
hinder the possibility of achieving the good life depend on precise social and 
cultural structures. We can ask, where can such a society, which appears 
to limit itself to being aware of its own inability to solve the problems that 
it generates, find happiness? Where is the “good society?” Certainly it is 
not only in material well-being. Various scholars have evidenced the “para-
dox of happiness,” which states that in the dynamic of advanced societies, 
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beyond a certain threshold of material well-being, increases in income and 
material goods do not, in fact, lead to increased happiness but generate its 
opposite, that is unhappiness and a whole set of connected individual and 
social pathologies.
Many economists and psychologists of the so-called economics of happi-
ness are still far from giving a convincing answer. In my opinion, the reason 
for this shortfall lies in the fact of not having really understood the role that 
social relations play in fostering human flourishing. The human being is a 
sui generis potentiality that can be actualised only through the relationality 
with other human beings. The central point becomes that of understanding 
how the logic of opportunities, which is supported by the morphogenetic 
society (Archer ed. 2013), puts social relations into a state of fluctuation and 
what consequences this has on the good life.
The opportunities offered by the morals prevailing in modernity
In the modern conceptions of the good life, goods are of an either individual 
or collective nature. In a nutshell, we can say that there exist two morali-
ties of the good life that drive social changes, and a third morality that is 
generally considered auxiliary, complementary, and, in any case, residual 
compared to the other two.
Said in short, the two driving moralities are those of the capitalist market 
and the state (or political system). The morality of the economic market 
extols the ideal virtues of honest and efficient competition in producing a 
never-ending supply of new goods that are supposed to improve the well- 
being of individuals and society. As a matter of fact, these virtues are not 
actually practiced. What is really at work is the idea that a good society 
should allow agents to engage in their free and private activities by means 
of which they are expected to enrich themselves and the social body (liberal 
morality). For this morality, opportunities are created by the capitalist mar-
ket. Of course, there are other kinds of markets, with different moralities, 
based on different norms of exchange. But it is well known that capitalism 
marginalises these different (civil) economies.
Collective morality, instead, extols the civic virtues of agents’ participation 
in and responsibility towards the public good, which is identified in the total 
good of the redistributive state that guarantees the rights of citizenship and 
equality of material starting conditions (socialist morality). For this moral-
ity, opportunities are created by the state or the political-administrative sys-
tems existing at the different territorial levels.
The third morality, the most marginal one, is that of the social spheres 
in which the virtues are neither those of the market nor of political citizen-
ship but make reference to relations of trust, cooperation, and reciprocity 
in lifeworlds. Opportunities are created in and by the primary and sec-
ondary social networks of civil society whose morality is based neither on 
profit exchange nor on redistributive norms, but on criteria of reciprocity 
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(peer-to-peer production, coproduction, open coordination, partnership, 
etc.). The marginality of this third morality is attested to by the fact that its 
guiding-value ( fraternité or solidarity) is not institutionalised in the cultural 
system (including the legal system) as, instead, the other two guiding-values 
are (liberté and égalité).
These three moralities refer to different logics of opportunity, which are 
opportunities in liberal, socialist, and “associational” terms. All three have 
their own specific conception of what we call life opportunity. The opportu-
nities offered by the market, those offered by the state, and those offered by 
the networks of lifeworlds respond to different relational logics intrinsic to 
the three aforementioned moralities, respectively, of economic exchanges, 
political safeguards of citizenship, and associative relations. Each logic of 
opportunities reflects a different morality of social relations.
It then becomes a matter of analysing who offers the opportunities, how 
the opportunities are selected and utilised, and what their effects on the 
good life are.
How globalisation redefines the logic of opportunity
I wonder, which logic of good life opportunities dominates the globalised 
world? It seems that this logic is driven by an “aesthetic energy” that makes 
individuals choose favourable opportunities on the basis of a type of utility 
that is instrumental to goals that are the “interests of the moment,” with no 
constraining finalities responding to a long-term project – and, thus, with-
out norms that potentially make the choices stable so that individuals end 
up aggregating and disaggregating with a growing variability that no longer 
responds to any social order except that of expressing a diffuse spontaneity. 
Family structures and “family moralities” offer numerous examples of the 
variety of ways in which individuals aggregate and disaggregate.
These new situational logics of opportunity seem to correspond to an 
underlying impulse that we could call “collective addiction,” favoured by the 
medium of an “anonymous communication matrix” (Teubner 2006a). It is 
a logic of the search for happiness through an unchecked availability of all 
possible innovations, which makes people addicted to continual change as 
if they were addicted to a drug. The process of societal morphogenesis takes 
the features of an “addictive society” (Teubner 2011).
Now the question becomes, to what extent is the good life pursued in a 
rational and reflexive manner, by whom and in which contexts? And where 
are new conceptions of the good life emerging in a non-normative way? 
What supports social integration? What produces social disintegration? In 
other words, is it possible that, passing through a phase of unbound and 
anormative morphogenesis (Archer 2016), new conceptions or effective 
social practices of the good life can be generated in which agents/actors find 
a stable consensus among themselves and build something in common?
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It seems to me that on this issue two main opposing arguments are 
advanced. One argument holds that the new prevalent moralities of the 
good life are the product of agents who are basically unconscious, driven 
by weak or fractured or impeded forms of reflexivity, that is modalities of 
action that characterise a passive attitude or a more laissez-faire outlook 
of “wait and see,” without any ability to anticipate the outcomes of their 
actions and life course. The other argument claims that, nonetheless, the 
new conceptions and practices of the good life are the product of conscious 
and free agents who make rational decisions.
From the standpoint of the relational theory of society, which is neither 
relationist nor formalist, we see acting subjects faced with the need to confer 
a normativity on social relations that is adequate to successfully achieving 
the promise of a good life. This need can only be met with a minimum of 
adequate reflexivity leading to an agonistic understanding of normativity 
(Maxwell 2012). In other words, so that interactions between social agents 
can produce social cohesion that respects the rights of human persons, it 
is necessary for acting subjects to acquire the characteristics of contesting 
relational subjects.
People create social cohesion to the extent that they act as subjects who 
reflect on social relations as emergents and, without necessarily sharing the 
same tastes and opinions, are nonetheless able to build a We-relation. This 
entails understanding the meaning and practical implications of how a rela-
tional subject is constituted, whether this is a single person or a set of people 
who act as a collective entity or as social network.
In search for a relational logic of happiness
The morality of the lib/lab configuration of society is based on an injunction: 
“you must be free” to seek opportunities that fulfil you. This injunction is 
configured as a “double bind” that consists in one’s being at the mercy of a 
paradoxical message: if you obey this injunction, you show that you are not 
free because you do it out of obligation; if you do not obey this injunction, 
then this means that you renounce being free. Apparently, there is no way to 
escape this paradox, which is notoriously at the origin of so many psychic 
and social pathologies and was elucidated as “the trap of postmodernity” 
by Michel Foucault (1966).
The relational paradigm argues that a way out exists. In order to see it, 
it is necessary to escape the paradoxes of modernity with a process of cul-
tural breakthrough. This process consists in semantisising the injunction, 
turning its meaning upside down, that is by resorting to a counter-paradox: 
“you must be free” comes to mean that you must choose whom to depend on 
because freedom consists in having the possibility of choosing the relation 
to which to belong, the bond that, through your choice, is the foundation of 
your identity.
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To solve the paradoxical message of late modernity, one needs to look 
at the enigma of the social relation and be able to manage it. The enigma 
is inscribed in the social and cultural structures that impose on individu-
als the norm of having to realise themselves by making themselves inde-
pendent of every social bond. From this system injunction derives a clear 
deception that consists in attributing to lone individuals the responsibility 
for everything that happens to them in life. Theirs is the fault, theirs the 
shame. From this comes the repressive sense of human and social relations 
in present-day society. This social norm is not saying, as some think, that 
the human person has the moral obligation to enhance his/her capacities: 
on the contrary, individuals are commanded to transcend themselves, to 
go beyond their capacities and potential to take on qualities and properties 
that the human does not have. This is the post-human, the hyper-human, the 
transhuman, and the cyborg.
In the private sphere, interpersonal bonds are replaced by technologies: 
for example, procreative relations are replaced by reproductive technologies; 
primary relations are replaced by virtual communication on the Internet; 
in the public sphere, collective bonds are replaced by system bureaucracies 
and mechanisms; in large organisations, the bonds between people are 
replaced by technological tools; in public debate, dialogue between face-
to-face participants is replaced by mass media and new apps. In all of these 
cases, social bonds become increasingly virtual. What was considered the 
“natural” quality of the bond between human beings loses its meaning, is 
rendered artificial, and, as a result, the bond can be constructed and altered 
at pleasure.
The fact is that, when talking about good life, we have to reconsider what 
we mean by “human nature” and, correspondingly, what the demands that 
social and cultural structures impose on people’s action are, especially with 
respect to the social bond. We have to understand the complexity of the 
morphogenesis of the human in order to grasp the novelty of the human 
wherever it is regenerating rather than destroying itself.
My thesis is that the regeneration of the human, wherever it is not being 
lost but is instead flourishing, emerges as the product of a qualified morpho-
genesis of the social bond. I would like to explain this statement by analys-
ing the causes that make the transition from lib/lab morality to a relational 
morality necessary.
This transition starts when interacting actors take a distance from the 
system of opportunistic logics supported by the lib/lab arrangement. The 
sequence is the following: (i) first of all, variability increases within the lib/lab 
framework; (ii) the opening of new, purely contingent opportunities creates a 
space-time in which the search for new rules for the selection of alternatives 
takes place; these rules refer to relations that must be generated; (iii) if choices 
are enacted that, in a targeted way, guide the creation and use of opportuni-
ties according to new relational logics, stabilised social innovations emerge in 
which the goal of humanising these same social relations prevails.
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We can delineate the discontinuity between lib/lab ethics and relational 
ethics with respect to their creation and use of opportunities as follows.
In the lib/lab paradigm, (i) the ethics of good life is a private choice and 
becomes public only as an external constraint on action; (ii) the social 
quality of objectives and products is independent of inter-human relations 
because it makes reference to the achievement of the maximum of individ-
ual opportunities. The “advantageous” new forms of “variety” are neces-
sarily appropriated by those who, even if they start from supposedly equal 
positions, have the capacities and means for appropriating them.
In the relational paradigm: (i) the ethics of good life pertains to the social 
relation in that it is a bond between humans, that is inter-human; (ii) the 
social quality is that which derives from the respect for and fostering of 
values and norms that give priority to caring for the relations between the 
acting subjects. In this case, the appropriation of “advantageous” new 
forms of “variety” by some to the detriment of others is hindered or very 
limited because here the moral norm of reciprocity, understood as symbolic 
exchange, is in force.
The aim of a symbolic exchange is to generate, maintain, or change a 
meaningful relationship with significant others. The easiest example of 
a symbolic exchange is doing someone a favour, giving a gift, or offering 
assistance. It can be a move to start a relationship of reciprocity, wherein 
reciprocity does not mean an exchange of utility (do ut des), or an act that 
regenerates an existing relationship. When the act is based on an already 
established relation, the favour, gift, or assistance maintains a circuit of 
reciprocal favours, gifts, or assistance. The circle can be restricted to two 
persons or enlarged to include many people. In any case, the exchange is not 
calculated in monetary terms but is part of a series of acts that maintain and 
keep up a relationship. The difference from monetary exchanges is marked 
by the rejection of any form of monetary payment for such favours, gifts, or 
assistance. In a way, the “payment” is intrinsic to the relation itself, that is 
the relational good enjoyed by those participating in the relation, and the 
“money” (not the “currency”) is the symbolic medium inherent in the action 
producing that good (i.e. the reference to the bond). It is in the spheres of 
society where reciprocity is the foundational norm that good life resides.
The original sin of the lib/lab arrangement lies in the fact that, by ignoring 
the value and intrinsic norms of social relations inspired by the symbolic 
exchange, it generates relational evils. The passage from a lib/lab arrange-
ment to a societal arrangement in which morphogenesis is “guided” (steered) 
requires positive norms (e.g. voluntary work on the part of the healthy, envi-
ronmental concern) and negative norms (e.g. discouraging prostitution and 
exploitative uses of labour) that follow a logic of opportunities in which the 
common good is redefined as a relational good. The reason for this asser-
tion is the fact that a common good without relationality between those who 
produce it and those who use it renders the ethics of the good life sterile and 
indifferent.
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The morality of social relations: empirical examples
The relational vision of society reveals that social problems arise from spe-
cific contexts that generate relational evils and that the morality for combat-
ing these must be inspired by relational work on these networks.
Let us take the case of social interventions that aim to make young people 
desist from committing crimes and to reintegrate them into a good society. 
Various studies demonstrate that friendship groups, intimate relationships, 
families of formation, employment, and religious communities play a cen-
tral role in changing the life course of young delinquents. As Weaver and 
McNeill (2015: 95) suggest, we have to explore “the ethical implications of 
these findings, suggesting that work to support desistance should extend far 
beyond the typically individualized concerns of correctional practice and 
into a deeper and inescapably moral engagement with the reconnection of 
the individual to social networks that are restorative and allow people to ful-
fill the reciprocal obligations on which networks and communities depend.”
Let us take the case of poverty. As very many studies demonstrate, pov-
erty is not only the product of individual characteristics, but above all of 
differences in access to opportunities. Social networks are the factor that 
conditions access to goods and services that can be obtained in markets 
(Marques 2012). Social inequalities have often been analysed from the point 
of view of characteristics of individuals or the workings of large opportu-
nity structures such as the job market or the offer of direct income trans-
ference policies. In reality, the best solutions to poverty are those inspired 
by the paradigm of relational work. It is necessary, however, to distinguish 
between how relational work has been adopted in the United States and how 
it arose and has been practiced in European countries.
In the United States, relational work is taken to be assistance towards 
pursuing a life plan in which material help is given to poor or indigent peo-
ple within a long-term relation that valorises the individual capacities of the 
poor and unemployed. This way of intervening has some value, but it does 
not alter the structures that generate social inequality because the goal of 
escaping poverty is pursued through a personal life plan within the frame-
work of unchanging social structures that correspond to the compromise 
between the capitalist market and the welfare state (lib/lab), even though 
welfare measures are performed by third sector agencies (Jindra and Jindra 
2015). Relational work, theorised and practiced as the modification of social, 
cultural, and economic structures, is very different (Folgheraiter 2004; 
Folgheraiter and Raineri 2012). It aims at helping people who experience 
life difficulties and vulnerabilities to remodel their relational contexts in a 
meta-reflexive manner (not directive) so to support their willingness to get a 
good life through a relational steering. An instructive example concerning 
relational social work in foster care has been provided by Calcaterra (2017), 
in which she demonstrates how the relational method provides significant 
operational guidance to social workers who, to understand how to support 
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people, are confronted with important questions regarding conceptual, 
methodological, and ethical issues, so as to achieve better results in recog-
nising and strengthening the motivation of the same people who are moving 
towards a desired improvement.
The question is: can we assess the morality of social networks, that is 
whether and how a network produces moral values such as justice, solidar-
ity, subsidiarity, etc. or, vice versa, injustice, oppression, marginalisation, 
exploitation, etc.?
The answer can be affirmative, but a relational framework is necessary to 
understanding this because it involves giving an assessment about relations 
and the networks of relations, and it is not enough to consider only indi-
viduals’ intentions (or their “altruism”), or only the morality of the social 
structures that condition individuals. This is the limitation of several socio-
logical views of the classical welfare state (from Richard Titmuss to Talcott 
Parsons).
In my view, the morality of a social relation (or network of relations) con-
sists in the fact that it can produce relational goods or relational evils for 
those who take part in it, independently of agents’ intentions.
For instance, (i) the freedom to dismiss an employee can be intentionally 
good in order to save a company or increase its competitiveness, but it can 
produce poverty or social inequities (not as a simple “fact,” but as a rela-
tional evil); (ii) redistributive state policies can have good intentions aimed 
at assisting the poor, but they can generate a “poverty trap” or other social 
traps (relational evils). When, how, and why can we say that a social relation 
is good or bad?
In order to produce relational goods, a dyadic social relation (or the rela-
tionality of a network of social relations) should meet the following req-
uisites: (i) a necessary requisite, but not a sufficient one, is that the social 
relation be good in itself, that is in its own structure or “molecule” and, 
therefore, in its own elements, which are its goal, means, guiding norm and 
value pattern), and not only in the feelings, aspirations, or intentions of the 
subjects/agents; (ii) the social relation should generate an emergent phenom-
enon that brings a good to each participant; and (iii) the good enjoyed by each 
participant could not be obtained “otherwise,” that is in a way that is lacking 
the We-relation.
For instance, a “mafia relation” does not meet the first requisite, since its 
structure is morally bad, although it can meet the other two requisites. On 
the contrary, a measure of redistribution pursued by public (state) policies 
can be morally good in itself, but generate relational evils because it does 
not meet the second and/or the third requisite.
The fact is that social networks are highly ambivalent. They offer oppor-
tunities and resources, but also constraints and obstacles to access to and 
use of opportunities. This can be seen in the research on structural holes 
and on the brokers that occupy positions of intermediation of information 
and exchanges between the nodes on networks. According to some authors, 
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brokers play a positive role in offering opportunities (Burt 1992). It is argued 
that the wealth of a society’s information depends on the informational 
potentialities of social circles (structural holes) that social entrepreneurs 
(bridges) are able to put into contact with one another. According to others, 
brokers play a decidedly ambivalent role; for instance, Ahuja (2000) claims 
that structural holes have both positive and negative influences on subse-
quent innovation. According to still others, they have different functions; 
for example, the results of the research done by Fleming, Mingo, and Chen 
(2007) illustrate how collaborative brokerage can aid in the generation of an 
idea but then hamper its diffusion and use by others.
Certainly, social networks are “assets” (Lazega 2007; Gulati 2007), but we 
must draw distinctions between the characteristics of each network because 
the fact of producing relational goods or evils is correlated with the morality 
of the good life that each network supports. It is important to reiterate that 
relational goods are goods that consist of relations: they are not material 
entities, they are not performances, they are not ideas – they are none of 
these things. They are relations. Let us take two examples, one negative and 
the other positive.
The negative example is when relational goods are lacking. A very com-
mon case, whether in families or in universities and work places, is the pres-
ence of structural holes in the networks of relations among people who are 
managed by brokers who hinder rather than foster communication among 
all the nodes in the network. The brokers are mediators who prevent people 
from being able to relate to one another and thus hinder the creation of a 
relational good. Empirical investigations demonstrate how important the 
attributes of nodes are in configuring the characteristics of social networks 
(Wang, Robins, Pattison and Lazega 2015).
The positive example is friendship. Friendship is a social relation that 
goes beyond individual dispositions. Certainly, friendship flows from peo-
ple, and only people can be friends and create friendship, which is a virtue 
for them as persons. But it cannot be an individual undertaking. Ego and 
Alter are not friends as individuals. Friendship is the acknowledgement of 
something that does not belong to either of the two, although it is of both 
of them. This is the relational good. It is the good that exists in common 
between people; only they can create it, but it does not belong to either 
of the two people, even if it is of both of them. Likewise, friendship can-
not be the product of a social structure; it cannot become an institution, a 
structure to which people must conform. To be friends, there have to be at 
least two people who must share and exchange something on an interper-
sonal level. As Lazega and Pattison (2001) have shown, friendship mitigates 
the competition in social networks and fosters the creation of social capital. 
It is the sharing, that is the reciprocal action that generates the We-relation, 
the relation as the reciprocal action of We, which gives sense and form and 
content to friendship. Sharing cannot be an explainable fact in individual 
terms, even if it is not a collective reality: it is not imposed by anyone, it 
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cannot be dictated by any authority, and no one can experience it as some-
thing constrictive or external. To understand this, it is necessary to move 
beyond both methodological individualism and methodological holism, 
which are the two great currents of thought that still dominate the social 
sciences today. They do not seem to have understood the new realities that 
are emerging in the worlds of the economy, as well as in those of the produc-
tion and consumption of goods and services, including the worlds of welfare 
and the Internet.
In these worlds, we see the spread of productive practices that operate 
on the basis of a “relational logic” so that the value of goods and services 
references the quality of the social relations, and not the quantity of the time 
of the work that was employed to produce them. Social capital is “good” 
if personal relations are good. In this way, the validity of all the classical 
economic theories is overturned, theories which, from Ricardo to Marx, 
computed the value of a good or service in terms of the time necessary to 
produce it, as lib/lab logic still does to a great extent. This “relational logic” 
is intrinsically a form of social morality because it involves the fact that a 
criterion of value is introduced (the quality of the relation) in place of ethi-
cally neutral quantitative parameters.
The economy in which the social relation is a value comes to define a 
new ethics of work and economic transactions. We need to look at things 
through the lens of relationships rather than just the lens of money. The rea-
son we do that is that behind every financial transaction there is a relation-
ship. It is the relationship that determines the long-term success and impact 
of what goes on in terms of finance and money. So if one really wants a 
successful economy, one has to see and give relevance to the social relations 
that are underneath the financial transactions.
Which eudemonic morality emerges through these phenomena?
Certainly, the idea of happiness, the good life of individuals as well as of 
society, depends on the creation of common goods. But, as I have already 
said, in a complex and globalised society, common goods must be inter-
preted as relational goods within particular networks that have positive 
externalities for the surrounding community.
In this regard, it is necessary to consider how the new media (ICTs) are 
revolutionising “real” (interpersonal and structural) social relations through 
virtual relations. Clearly, we must distinguish between the different types of 
media, the different ways of using them, and their specific outcomes. There 
are media that allow for the production of relational goods and others that 
generate relational evils. This is what the morphogenetic approach proposes 
to explain concerning the morphogenesis of the human person, agency, as 
well as social and cultural structures, in relation to a possible good life.
When people become aware of all of this, social change begins. New 
processes emerge that are aimed at reassessing relations with others. One 
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discovers that working as a team, cooperating with others rather than act-
ing individually, is more effective and satisfying, on condition, obviously, 
that the task has not been imposed and that teamwork is not a tool used by 
those in charge to make higher profits. Family bonds are rediscovered as 
relations that, while being constraints, give a meaning to one’s life that other 
relations cannot give. A growing number of people realise that they can 
achieve their goals only through new forms of association and new social 
movements. New demands for justice and social solidarity arise requiring 
a vision capable of putting the needs and rights of all of a community’s 
members into relation with one another. Indeed, many discover that we are 
all deeply connected to one another. Each person’s decisions, choices, and 
actions are not purely individual matters but are enacted in relation to oth-
ers. It is irrational to think of them as simple expressions of the autonomous 
Self. One comes to realise that, in reality, each person lives in dependence 
and interdependence on so many others, without whom one could not be 
the person one is, and could not become the person one desires to become.
It becomes apparent that each individual’s history resides in relations 
with significant others. The human person is not a self-sufficient entity: he/
she is an “individual-in-relation,” where the relation is constitutive of the per-
son. We are all in the same boat, in the sense that we depend on one another. 
And so the question becomes: what kind of boat is this? I think that we can 
call it: We-relation. But what kind of relation is this? In other words: how 
should the relationality between us be so that individuals fulfil their own 
humanity and do not become alienated from themselves to become another 
individual or something else?
Traditional collective movements – called mass movements – no longer 
offer adequate answers in that the identity they confer is of an aggregate 
type and is not relational. The identity acquired by the individual from the 
fact of belonging to a collective movement based on identification with a 
symbol (e.g. ecological, anti-global, civil rights movements) can become sig-
nificant only on two conditions: (i) if it is mediated by an adequate inner 
(personal) reflexivity and (ii) if the personal reflexivity is capable of realis-
ing a relational (social) reflexivity with others. Both of these conditions are 
hardly ever met by collective movements if they are purely aggregative. They 
can be present, instead, in collective movements in which people have real 
relations, and not only virtual ones, with one another, and these relations 
cause a social form (instituted form) to emerge that is capable of stability 
and its own action. The social networks on the web (run through informa-
tion and communication technologies) can do this on the condition – which 
is by no means a given – that the virtual relations are only a tool, and not a 
replacement, for intersubjective relations.
In the society of the human, well-being is constituted by the good of the 
social relation as the path towards obtaining individual goods. The rela-
tional good consists in all those relations that can be generated and enjoyed 
together with others and on which individuals must rely in order to obtain 
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everything that they could not have without such a relation. Examples are 
all of those immaterial, yet real, goods such as cooperation, friendship, rec-
ognition, cooperation, solidarity, mutual help, enjoying a positive climate 
in a firm, classroom, or social street, and so on, which meet most human 
needs.
The relational character of the moral good
We have to be clear about what we mean by the relational character of the 
(moral) good and the good society. Many authors speak of the relational 
character of the good, but, in reality, they are referring to individual agency. 
I offer two examples.
Christine Korsgaard observes that the (human) good is, above all, an 
affirmation that something is normative for me, for my condition, as an act 
of sympathy with myself.1 She claims the relational nature of the good, but 
she does it from an individualistic and, in the end, constructivist point of 
view.
In adhering to Kant’s philosophy, she maintains that the good has a rela-
tional character in as much as a certain entity becomes held in common, 
that is it is “constructed” as being shared by rational subjects who are capa-
ble of having sympathy with themselves and living this sympathy through 
empathy with others. The good is relational in that it is constructed with 
ends that are “shared among all of us” (“Good, then, is the schematic name 
for the solution to the problem of shared ends. This, then, is my answer to the 
question of why we operate with the concept of the good: because as rational 
creatures who are capable of seeing the world through the eyes of others, we are 
faced with the task of constructing a state of affairs that is, as far as possible, 
good-for us all,” Korsgaard 2013: 24–25, italics mine).
For Korsgaard, then, the good is relational, not because it consists of 
“good” relations, but because it is shared by individuals who use their 
relations to make something good held in common. She does not see the 
relational constitution of these common goods, because the goods do not 
consist of relations properly. In short, relations have no substantive real-
ity in themselves. The good life does not require a reality endowed with 
certain relational qualities and properties in itself, but is good in that it is 
constructed as being good for each of the participants.
Ana Marta González (2011), reflecting on these issues, identifies some 
paradoxes and internal contradictions in the thought of Kant that can be 
 1 “For to say that something is good-for me is to describe something’s relation to my condi-
tion as having normative implications, and that in turn is to endorse the view of myself that, 
simply as a conscious being – as a being who is in her own keeping – I necessarily take of 
my own condition. One might see the endorsement of that view as an act of sympathy with 
myself.” (Korsgaard 2013: 24, emphasis mine).
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traced to a lack of a relational vision. First, while Kant takes the educational 
process to be a radically moral enterprise all the way through – and hence, 
placed in a relational context – he also aspires to constitute education as a 
science, to be improved through experiments, thereby paving the way for 
a systemic approach to education; in spite of its moral inspiration, his sys-
temic approach not only could enter into conflict with the moral demand of 
taking each individual subject as an end, but is also marked by an intrinsic 
paradox, already involved in the ambiguity of the term “humanity,” which 
might mean (i) humanity as a moral disposition present in each individual 
human being, or (ii) humanity as a whole, as the “human species” (ibid: 
433). Secondly, González finds that the Kantian conception, “leaving aside 
the mechanism of education to focus on its relational dimension,” leads to 
the affirmation that “the attainment of a moral culture depends on teaching 
children to act upon principles, and hence autonomously,” with the para-
doxical consequence that “in order to educate autonomous human agents, 
we have to engage in a process marked by heteronomy” (ibid: 442).
González’ critique of Kant’s philosophical conception regarding educa-
tion, claiming a relational approach, is enlightening and correct. “While 
improving education may become the object of a systemic action, education 
is always the object of a moral relationship” (ibid: 437); “… moral education, 
as something directly linked to personality, is always beyond the reach of 
those techniques, and dependent on a relational approach to education” 
(ibid: 438). This relational approach, however, remains focused on the pro-
motion of the individual human being as the way to get better relations. The 
structure of education as a social relation is basically referred back to the 
moral quality of individual people: “autonomy is prepared in the context of 
personal relationships, interested not so much in the cold development of 
potentialities as in the real good of the person” (ibid: 452).
If, as González acknowledges, educating means performing a relational 
activity, then we have to understand education as a sui generis social rela-
tion, as a dynamic structure in itself, situated in a relational context, and act 
with it and on it, not only on individuals. Otherwise education remains only 
the object of individual agents’ morality, and not also a moral entity in itself, 
with its own qualities and causal properties. Interpersonal relations are 
considered as “conductors” of individual morality, not yet as moral goods 
(or evils) in themselves. To become truly relational, the moral good requires 
the adoption of the second person perspective on the part of the agents, i.e. 
a dialogue (a dialogical self), and not only a first-person perspective. The 
latter, of course, is absolutely necessary, but it is not sufficient in order to get 
“good relations,” which is what Kant believed.
Summary: the good life through social relations
Ethical neutrality in social theorisation is basically a myth. Certainly, soci-
ology distinguishes itself from social theory because, in analysing social 
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matters, it does not have to take sides on this or that value. It is inevitable, 
however, that it, too, always presupposes value choices (Lidz 1981), which 
obviously cannot be those of direct ethical or political engagement; oth-
erwise, sociology is transformed into an ethical or political doctrine. The 
moral burden of explicitly declaring the value choices in play is incumbent 
on the sociologist when entering the arena of social theory, where such 
choices can obviously be diverse and plural.
As for my relational sociology, it makes reference to a social theory that 
does not make a priori value choices, but points to the good or the bad in the 
effects produced by the societal dynamic. It juxtaposes the ways in which 
acting subjects generate different social consequences, which can contradict 
not only their situational expectations, but also the values of the collective 
morality that they support.
Relational analysis leads one to conclude that postmodern morality 
erodes the common good because, consciously or, more often, uncon-
sciously, it erodes social relations. There are obviously good reasons for 
assessing social relations negatively when they are used to exploit people 
(such as in human trafficking or prostitution), to organise social groups 
for the purposes of common criminality or corruption, or for other mor-
ally negative ends. On this basis, however, the postmodern morphogenetic 
society has elaborated a social morality according to which the good life 
consists in an indefinite increase in life opportunities, on the assumption 
that human identity can continuously change, endlessly altering its social 
relations. Today’s moral norm dictates the celebration of “relationism” as 
the path towards the individualisation of the individual. In the postmodern 
cultural system, it is assumed that happiness consists in this process.
Reality ends up debunking this morality. The idea that in order to achieve 
a good life the logic of opportunities must be untied from the value and 
norms of social relations leads to continual failures. The reason lies in a 
precise sociological reality. In fact, happiness is sought in the creation of 
ever new social relations; it becomes possible to enjoy all possible opportunities 
only on condition of immunising oneself from the relations themselves, that 
is, on condition of not rendering any particular relation (any opportunity) 
necessary: thus, on condition of not binding oneself to anything or anyone, 
if not for the opportunities of the moment (this is the “pure relation” theo-
rised by Giddens).
The moral norm celebrated by the unbound morphogenesis emerging 
from the crisis of the lib/lab system makes the maximum contingentism 
and relationism imperative. It celebrates relationality while negating it at 
the same time. But negating the identity of the relation means also negat-
ing the identity of the subject: hence, the impossibility for the individual of 
achieving authenticity in his/her identity. Such is the paradoxical outcome 
of this conception of the good life: living in relations without tying oneself 
to them. In this way, the individual can increase his/her life opportunities 
always on condition of not privileging any one social relation over others, 
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which – according to this collective narrative – would involve limitations 
and discriminations. It is a morality of nondistinction because the moral 
norm dictates that no distinction should be made, since every distinction is 
discrimination. But in this way, a “reverse discrimination” operates because 
one chooses to not choose (one decides not to distinguish). This is a moral 
norm that leads to cultural and moral regression because human civilisa-
tion requires the continuously renewed and creative use of distinctions.
Considering everything and every human action within the relation in 
which we find it and looking at it from this point of view is essential to giv-
ing meaning to things and actions. Human life in pursuit of happiness – in a 
couple, in a working relation, or in the search for a job that isn’t there – does 
not mean alienating people within the limits of the relational situation in 
which they find themselves, but the complete opposite. It means giving them 
a perspective for managing their human condition in a horizon of openness 
to meaning – openness to other relational worlds, that is.
We must acknowledge that still today we lack a proper reflexivity on the 
relational nature of the good life if we understand this expression in the 
sense that the good is constituted by certain social relations instead of oth-
ers. These are the relational goods that bring truly human happiness going 
well beyond material welfare.
8 The emergence of new social 
subjects generating relational goods
Identity and relationship: “distinguish to unite”
The topic of the relational constitution of identity pertains to every exist-
ing entity. It will be addressed herein only as regards the human person 
(as social agent and actor) and those social formations in which the person 
identifies herself as belonging to a collective (We-relation).
Identity and relation are two distinct concepts, but their distinction does 
not signify separation as they are ontologically and phenomenologically 
connected. The theoretical and practical problem is to understand how their 
connection is articulated. The two perspectives of identity and relationship 
cannot be separated empirically, but only analytically. The human person, 
as an “in-Self” being, does not find her identity by remaining in herself, but 
can find it only by relating to the Other-than-Self. At the same time, this 
relation cannot disregard the identity of the terms that constitute it. In syn-
thesis, identity is formed in the relation between the Self and the Other-than-
Self, without the Self’s and/or the Other’s nature (substantia) being entirely 
absorbed by their relation.
It is possible to understand this reality if we are able to see the enigma of 
the relation, which consists in the fact that the relation unites the terms that 
it connects (it creates commonality) while, at the same time, it respects and 
promotes their specific difference. This potentiality is due to the fact that the 
relationship that binds the subjects is not only a bond (a structural link, a 
religo), but is also a subjective reference (refero) that modifies the structural 
bond generating an emerging effect. Only in this way does one understand, 
for example how the identity of a couple, a family, a civil association, a 
sports team, or an orchestra is that of a We (We-relation) in which each 
member can and must find his/her own collective identity without negating 
or demeaning his/her own personal identity.
As human persons, we naturally ask ourselves what our most meaningful 
identity is, the one that substantiates the reasons for our life beyond the 
contingent identities that we assume over the course of our existence (the 
identity that we have in our family of origin, in school, at work, in civilian, 
political, and religious life). The response to this question (“Who am I and 
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why am I alive?”) cannot be given by the person only with reference to her-
self, but must be found by relating to something or someone that can give 
one the sought after identity, in which it is possible to find the ultimate and 
most satisfying meaning for one’s existence.
Obviously, we can give ourselves many different answers. When we suc-
ceed in putting aside all contingent historical identities, we find this deeper 
identity in the relation with an ultimate reality (the totally Other), in which-
ever way the latter is understood. This consideration, which is a statement 
of fact corroborated by empirical research, conveys how essential it is to 
understand identity as a relational reality. For those who have a religious 
belief, in particular, the deepest and ultimate identity is given by the relation 
of divine filiation, by feeling that one is a child of God.
Having already dealt extensively with the concept of relationship, I will 
first focus on the concept of identity and then I will try to understand the 
constitution of the human subject as an emergent effect of personal and rela-
tional reflexivity, and the challenges that this constitution must face in the 
process of social morphogenesis.
The concept of identity
The concept of identity is polyvalent and poses a series of problems. In the 
field of philosophy, the question of identity assumes a problematic form 
because we have two models of identity available: idem identity (the selfsame) 
and ipse identity (the self in its existence). I propose a relational reading of 
these models. Idem is the identity of something that endures over time while 
appearances or, as the Aristotelians say, “accidents” change. Since antiquity, 
its philosophical model has been substance. Substance is the substrate, the 
suppositum, the support, which is identical in the sense that it is constant, and 
in its sameness does not change: it does not depend on historical time even if 
it passes through the vicissitudes of time and can learn from them.
Ipse, instead, consists of the identity of a Self that rediscovers itself (it 
reidentifies with itself reflexively) when confronted by the observation of 
changes in itself due to the variability of feelings, inclinations, desires, and 
positions taken as situations and historical circumstances evolve. Ricoeur 
(2004) gives the example of the ipse identity of the individual who keeps a 
promise. Ego (idem) keeps his promise despite the changes to his internal 
state, for example, of mood (ipse). I am the same, and I conserve myself as 
the same person despite having changed over time in certain internal or 
external aspects (at 70 years of age, I am still Me, the same as when I was 10 
years old, even if I am obviously a bit changed). However, Ricoeur does not 
see the social contexts in which idem and ipse are relationally constituted.
In the field of the human and social sciences, the problem of the person’s 
identity exists in relation to two types of different questions. One refers to 
the perspective of the first person, the other to the perspective of the second 
person.
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1 When the question is “Who am I for myself? Who do I want to be for 
myself?,” the answer is produced by the internal conversation, that of 
the individual who reflects within him/herself on the social context. We 
are speaking about the individual identity that arises – as Archer (2003) 
maintains – as an answer to the regular exercise of the mental ability, 
shared by all (normal) people, to consider themselves in relation to the 
(social) context, and vice versa, considering that “each mode of reflexiv-
ity is a distinctive way of deliberating about oneself in relation to one’s 
society” (Archer 2003: 349).
On this level, the social relation is an attribute of the Self with reference to 
the social roles one plays in a contingent context (in the family, at work, in 
associations, etc.). Personal identity is individual because it refers to the ulti-
mate concerns of the person, which are selected, deliberated, and pursued 
in the intimate space of individual self-consciousness in response to the 
context. The tenet according to which the person “is what she cares about” 
should be interpreted in a phenomenological sense, that is in the sense that 
the person becomes what she loves by changing her ultimate concerns and 
what follows.
2 When the question is “Who am I for the (relevant) others? What do 
I want to be for them?,” the answer is social identity. The others can 
be family members, relatives, close friends, work colleagues, members 
of an association or community, and so on. Social identity can be a 
Me, We, You in the way that Archer (2003) has well clarified. It can be 
interpersonal, when it is referred to another person (e.g. I am the son of 
Mary), or collective, when it is referred to an impersonal social category 
or group (e.g. I am a teacher, an Italian, etc.). When the identity attrib-
uted to Ego by others is elaborated by Ego in his/her mind (personal 
reflexivity), the resulting personal identity is still of an individual type, 
because it is referred to Ego as an individual who can accept, negotiate, 
or reject it in different ways.
Identity based on relational reflexivity has a different nature from that which 
people elaborate within themselves and for themselves because relational 
identity answers to the ethic of the second person and not to that of the first 
person. The social identity becomes relational when Ego identifies him/
herself in that identity by exercising his/her own reflexivity on a relation 
that includes the point of view of the Other, and on this basis, it redefines 
its identity differently from how the Ego would have elaborated it in the 
first person. The term “Relational Self” here means the capacity to consider 
one’s actions in light of others’ needs and feelings (Gelfand et al. 2006: 431).
From interviews with young university students, Archer (2007) draws the 
conclusion that young people make their life choices by essentially resorting 
to their inner conversation. For her, resort to their internal conversations 
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alone can establish their own portfolio of engagements and finally lead to 
the endorsement of a course of action resulting in a (fallible) project for 
its realisation. At the same time, with great insight, she analyzes how 
young people, in making decisions, can be influenced by the dominant 
modality of reflexivity they have learned in the family of origin as well 
as by the choice of the working sector which traces the dominant modal-
ity of their reflexivity. I believe that, without denying the importance of 
people’s inner conversation, we need to take a more properly relational 
perspective. In other words, young people, like all human persons in the 
course of their existence, make decisions not only by reflecting on their 
own preferences, but rather by having to take into account the relation-
ships with the significant others that are present in the context in which 
the decision must be taken and assessing the consequences of their deci-
sions on these relationships. The decisions of young people, as well as 
of people of different ages, have to balance their own inner desires and 
projects (“I’m keeping my options open”) with the value attributed to 
primary relationships (Me) and secondary relations (We) in which they 
are embedded. These relationships have a decisive impact on the social 
role they have to play, regardless of the awareness of them that they have 
individually. I call relational reflexivity the need to respond to relations 
with a You and with significant Other. It is distinct from the individual 
reflexivity of the inner conversation. Take the case of a young person 
who prefers a certain professional occupation to another or quits a job 
because it gives priority to the relationship with the partner. This deci-
sion does not depend so much on the reflexive mode learned in the family 
of origin, but rather on how the person evaluates the possible outcomes 
of her decision on interpersonal relationship (I-You) with the partner, and 
what responsibility she chooses to assume for these results, redefining her 
concerns if necessary.
Archer denies that
a couple can succeed in forging a life together (‘our’ life as a couple after 
graduation) on the basis of hermeneutically entering into one anoth-
er’s aspirations for what kind of life that would be, given appropriate 
detachment on the part of both. Empirically – and assuming they are 
in love – it is quite likely that their external conversations together will 
cover this ground to the best of their abilities. But these discussions 
cannot be a necessary condition for the source of ‘We-ness.’ The best of 
their abilities is not good enough because as subjects they cannot avoid 
the double hermeneutic. However hard the two try, they produce Alter’s 
interpretations of Ego’s self-interpretations and vice versa, doing so 
seriatim with no way out of this trap.
(Archer 2019b: xii)
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I think that Archer’s thesis about the impossibility of escaping from the 
double hermeneutics is correct when it happens that Ego and Alter are not 
able to activate their relational reflexivity, but this is not always the case. In 
the couples who create relational goods, Ego and Alter are capable to grasp 
the meaning of their different aspirations and the possibilities to reconcile 
them through the cognitive ability inherent to empathy (understood as Stein 
1989 does, differently from Husserl), and thus find the way to create a shar-
ing of feelings and practical goals that lead to build a We-ness. The thesis 
of the impossibility of escaping from the double hermeneutics cannot be 
generalised.
In short, a first-person perspective is not enough to define the whole iden-
tity of the human person. Second- and third-person perspectives are also 
needed, as they are constitutive of people’s social identity which affects their 
personal identity. Without an ability to take a second-person perspective 
and also a third-person perspective, humans are not able to think morally.
In other words, relational identity is the result of an exercise of reflexiv-
ity carried out on the relationship as such, including in it the actions and 
expectations of the Other, in order to redefine one’s identity in that relation, 
by appreciating that relation as a good, renegotiating it or rejecting it as 
negative or indifferent for some reason.
An example can be the identity that a mother must elaborate, not as an 
individual who has her own concerns, thoughts, and feelings in respect to 
the son, but having worked out her identity as a mother, considering how 
her son sees her and desires her, what he expects of her, how he wants her to 
be for him (the same thing, of course, applies to the father). We know that 
it is the child who generates the identity of father and mother. That is why 
a mother and a father must take into account the fact that their parenting 
relationship has consequences on the child that do not necessarily corre-
spond to their individual concerns, thoughts, and desires, as well as con-
sidering the fact that any parental relationship depends on how the entire 
network of family relations operates.
In the ethic of the second person, the subject defines his/her identity 
reflexively starting from the question: “How do You consider me?,” “How do 
You want me?,” “How must I be for You?,” where the You is not the “I” that 
questions him/herself, but is an Alter who desires a certain relation with 
Ego. By accepting the relation with the Other as being significant for the 
Self-identity, Ego is called upon to accept the You and to acknowledge the 
Self-identity as an Other, which entails a new identity (Ricoeur 1954), that is 
it is a reidentification that explains the changes in the person.
To clarify the point, let us consider difference between the first- and sec-
ond-person perspectives. According to Lynne Rudder Baker, the first-person 
perspective is a complex mental property that enables one to conceive of 
one’s body and mental states as one’s own. She writes (Baker 2015: 79–80):
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A first-person perspective is a primary-kind property that members 
of the kind person have essentially. A first-person perspective is a dis-
positional property with two stages – rudimentary and robust (…) 
One acquires a robust first-person perspective as she acquires a nat-
ural language. To conceive of oneself as oneself in the first-person, 
one needs a self-concept – a nonqualitative way to think about one-
self. I take concepts to be inextricably linked to language. There’s no 
self-concept, and hence no robust first-person perspective, outside 
a language. Learning a language is learning concepts, and learning 
concepts is learning about reality. After a child acquires a battery of 
concepts like water, mommy, ball, want, toy, chair and so on, she is 
ready to understand a concept like mine, which she uses to apply to 
what belongs to her – conceived of as herself, from the first-person 
perspective. A robust first-person perspective – an ability, not just to 
recognize oneself as distinct from everything else, but to conceive of 
oneself as oneself in the first person – makes possible almost all our 
characteristic human activities.
So far, so good. The second-person perspective is quite different. It consists 
in the fact that Ego considers the Other as him/herself and reflects on the 
fact that his/her own identity, as well as that of the Other, depends on their 
relationship. It presupposes a reflexivity on the relationship that is not con-
ducted from the point of view of the “I,” but from the point of view of the 
Other with which Ego is in relation, and, as a consequence of this, by taking 
the point of view of the relationship itself.
The ethic of the second person is not the assumption of the Other in me, 
as some believe, but it is the ethics of my relationship to the Other consider-
ing the fact that the relationship is not the product of my own subjectivity, 
just as it is not the product of the subjectivity of the Other (i.e. the product of 
two perspectives in the first person), but it is ethics related to the good of the 
relationship itself as individual goods depend on it, that is to the relational 
good.
The difference between the perspective of the first and second person 
marks the difference in kind between the inner reflexivity that underlies 
the subject’s individual identity and the relational reflexivity that underlies 
the relational identity of the subject. To understand this difference, it can 
be instructive to make a parallel with individual and social responsibility. 
For example, some parents refuse the vaccination of children, claiming that 
they are harmful to them. In making the decision to vaccinate one’s child or 
not, the parent can reflect individually, based on his knowledge and opin-
ions in relation to his context, and then uses personal reflexivity. If instead 
he considers the fact that if he does not vaccinate his child he puts other chil-
dren with whom he plays at risk, then he uses relational reflexivity, because 
he takes the point of view of the relationships between his child and other 
children from which relational goods or evils can come.
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Without relational reflexivity there is not really a dialogue; there is no true 
“encounter” with the Other, because identity remains self-centred, if it relies 
only on individual reflexivity (Caetano 2015: 68). There is not even a deep 
knowledge of the world because knowledge is relational (Fiske and Haslam 
1996). And there is no adequate socialisation because a good socialisation 
is the outcome of relational processes in which the reference to the Other is 
fundamental in order to establish a shared identity (Van de Walle 2011). The 
well-being of the person is essentially relational (White 2017).
The notion of relational identity is delicate and complex because it high-
lights not only the reflexive cognitive components of the mind, but also the 
feelings and the cultural models of reference of the subject. On the capaci-
ties of cognitive reflexivity I will say later, here I limit myself to mentioning 
the affective-emotional and cultural dimensions.
There is something sensible in the argument by Jan Burkitt (2016) accord-
ing to which we need an understanding of agents as interactants, ones 
who are interdependent, vulnerable, intermittently reflexive, possessors of 
capacities that can only be practised in joint actions, and capable of sensi-
tive responses to others and the situations of interaction. But I would not 
fully agree with his view that “instead of agency resting on the reflexive 
monitoring of action or the reflexive deliberation on structurally defined 
choices, agency emerges from our emotional relatedness to others as social 
relations unfold across time and space” (ibid: 323). Emotions are certainly 
one component of social relations, as is affection in its various forms (Scheve 
(von) 2018). Ana Marta González (2017) has clearly highlighted the role of 
emotions as sites of social reflexivity. However, in contrast to Burkitt, while 
accepting that feelings are relational commentaries upon one’s concerns and 
ideals, I think that they are not sufficient to support one’s relational identity 
when the latter faces serious challenges. Since emotions are relationally con-
stituted within cultural worlds (Hong 2004), they need a structured social 
context to support personal and relational identity.
As regards the cultural dimensions of reflexivity, both kinds of questions 
on identity (who I am for myself, and who I am for others) have to do with 
those value patterns that orient the ideals and images (representations) of 
oneself. When a person asks these questions, she must find the answers in 
symbolic references, usually linguistic, to define herself in her own iden-
tity and for the others. In asking: “In what do I identify myself?,” “What 
is the model of life that I like?,” the answer is a cultural identity. The cul-
tural identity responds to the question about the symbolic world to which 
I feel a belonging or a reference, in terms of beliefs and values in a modus 
vivendi or in a lifestyle that willy-nilly associates me to others and is gener-
ative of meaning for my Self. This symbolic world is made up of people or 
things that have value for me. It is identity in the sense of configuring one’s 
image in relation to (by belonging to) other persons or certain sociocultural 
groups, or even things (e.g. in pantheistic religions). This relation includes 
cultural aspects – that is framing rules and feeling rules – based on which 
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individuals validate their own moral action and feelings and are, at the same 
time, evaluated by others (Stets and Carter 2012).
Personal identity becomes problematic when the answers to the afore-
mentioned questions are multiple (the Self perceives him/herself as a mul-
tiple self ), that is, in situations in which the “I” identifies or must relate 
to different identities and must try to keep them together while making 
choices, or risk fragmentation, alienation, and other pathologies (Gambino 
2017). One can agree with Harrison White when he claims that the problem 
of identity underlies a control problem. But White’s approach is strongly 
reductive and, in some respects, misleading.
White, who is considered by many scholars as the first theorist of rela-
tional sociology, defines identity as “any source of action not explicable 
from biophysical regularities, and to which observers can attribute mean-
ing” (White 1992: 6). So far nothing wrong. The sore point lies in the fact 
that the constitution of identity is attributed to the social network, putting 
the agency in the background, that is making it fully dependent on existing 
social links. In Identity and Control, White makes the claims that agency is 
“the dynamic face of networks,” that “stories describe the ties in networks” 
and that “a social network is a network of meanings” (White 2008: 65–67, 
245, 315). His argument is that identities emerge as a result of interaction in 
the social molecules (White 1992: 22) and “spring up out of efforts at control 
in turbulent contexts” (White 2008: 1).
Certainly, nobody can deny that identities try to control themselves in 
relation to the environment, which is made up mainly of other identities. 
But the existence and operation of identity cannot be reduced to a control 
problem. First, the need for control is only one of the components of iden-
tity (it is just one of the modes of the normative component of the relation). 
Second, by claiming that the starting point of sociological analysis should 
be identity rather than persons, given the assumption that persons can never 
be analysed separately from their environment, White (1992: 24) drasti-
cally reduces the complexity of the relationship between the human person 
and her identity. Third, he commits an ecological fallacy1 when he states 
that identities are tagged to individual human beings (White 2008: 10) by 
arguing that identity is a product of the network of social interactions; for 
him, persons come into “existence and are formed as the result of overlaps 
among identities from distinct network populations” (2008: 129). Fourth, 
he claims that identities are constituted by an essential relation – the tie – 
that is constitutive of identities (White 2008: 20–36), and therefore conceives 
the constitutive relationship of identity essentially as a bond (religo), which 
means to ignore the intentional and value reference dimension (refero). In 
 1 An ecological fallacy (or ecological inference fallacy) is a formal fallacy in the interpre-
tation of statistical data where information about the nature of individuals are deduced 
with operations of inference from the group to which those individuals belong.
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short, notions such as network and tie reflect a relational stance, but they 
are interpreted from a structuralist point of view. For these reasons, the 
so-called relational sociology proposed by White is strongly deficient. The 
same applies to the sociologies of those who follow Harrison White, such as 
Jan Fuhse and Reza Azarian.
How to connect identity and relationship?
The connection between identity and social relations is an inter-dependence 
and an inter-penetration between them. One term depends on the other 
in such a way that something of identity enters into the relation, and the 
relation goes to constitute a part of identity. Both personal and collective 
identities are formed within an environment constituted by a structural and 
cultural domain. The formation of identity requires a symbolic system of 
reference within which the generative mechanism of refero-religo-emergence 
of identity is carried out. It is possible to distinguish the contribution of the 
individual subjects and the autonomous contribution of their relationship 
(Tam 1989). Individual virtues (outcome of individual reflexivity) can gen-
erate social virtues (i.e. virtuous relations such as trust, friendship, cooper-
ation, loyalty, and forgiveness) at the condition that the subjects are able to 
exercise an adequate relational reflexivity on the network of their relations. 
Personal identity problems and relational evils are significantly correlated 
with the fact that the social networks in which people live are deficient in 
supporting the conditions and opportunities to exercise their relational 
reflexivity.
Saying that the identity of Ego is constituted in relation to an Alter means 
affirming that there exists a relation between Ego and Alter to which they 
give their personal contribution, but which takes on its own autonomy, 
unpredictability, and spontaneity to the point of becoming a resource or a 
challenge for Ego and Alter. To “ex-ist” (from the Latin ex-sistĕre) means 
“being outside” the terms of the relationship. For example, saying that Mark 
is a responsible professional in terms of his relational identity means indi-
cating that he cares for the relationships with his customers in such a way 
as to derive his professional identity by treating such relationships as an 
autonomous reality and not as an expression of his inner identity.
An issue sometimes raised has to do with the question of whether, from 
the ontological and epistemological point of view, identity precedes the rela-
tion or vice versa (who “comes first”?). Martin Buber’s affirmation accord-
ing to which “in the beginning is relation” (Buber 1970: 68) has a theological 
and metaphysical significance that gives the relation absolute primacy 
(Metcalfe and Game 2012) as “the living center” of community (Avnon 
1993). In a different vein, from the sociological point of view, the statement 
that is at the base of my relational sociology – “in the beginning is relation” 
(Donati 2011a: 17–25) – should be understood in the sense that the individ-
ual’s action is already always situated within a social context of pre-existing 
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relations and must be analysed and understood in that relational context, 
with its history and its dynamics. This should be done without dissolving 
identity in the relation or vice versa, because substance and relation are co- 
principles of reality. Identity is not entirely given by the relation, nor does 
the relation derive immediately from identity. If we reduce the identity to 
the relation, we fall into some sort of relationism, which dissolves identity in 
an indefinite referencing of relations to other relations (relativistic pragma-
tism); if we take the second position, we fall into a sort of fundamentalism, 
because identity comes to be somehow “reified” and quite often used as a 
“weapon” for opposing other identities.
Overcoming unrelated thought with relational thinking
Unrelated thought refers to those ways of thinking about identity that attrib-
ute qualities to entities exclusively on the basis of their substantial nature 
without making reference to the relational context (situation, circumstance, 
environment) in which they are situated and are subject to change. This way 
of thinking, which spans the history of Western culture, considers social 
relations as “accidents” which, although real, do not alter an entity’s iden-
tity. In contrast, “relational thinking” attributes qualities and causal prop-
erties to entities taking into account their own nature but at the same time 
considering their actual identity as a relational reality that emerges from the 
dynamics of a relational context.
To understand the movement from one way of thinking to the other, it is 
useful to distinguish between three types of semantics in defining identity 
(Table 8.1).
Table 8.1 Three ways of defining identity
Identity through 
self-reference
Identity through  
negation
Identity through  
relational differentiation
A’s identity is given by a 
simple relation of equality 
or equivalence with itself  
(according to a self-
referential symbolic code 
of identity)
A = A
(e.g. John is simply himself  )
A’s identity is given by a 
relation of negation of 
what A is not (it is a 
double negation, according 
to a binary code)
(it ends up evaporating)
A = not (not-A)
(e.g. John is not Mark or 
anyone else; but, 
radicalising the distinction, 
John is not John)
A’s identity is given by a 
relation (reciprocal action) 
with the Other (the not-A) 
that generates A’s identity 
as an emergent effect 
(according to a generative 
code)
A = Relation (A, not-A)
(e.g. John is himself  in 
relation to Mark and 
everyone else, even with 
respect to himself  in the 
reflexive process of 
distinguishing I, Me, You)
Source: Author.
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In the monistic conception, typical of ancient classical thought, identity 
is understood as substance, as something that does not need to put itself in 
relation to something other than itself. Identity is founded on the principle 
of self-reference [A = A], by which A’s identity is immediate and exists with-
out mediations. From a social historical point of view, talking about the 
general population, the individual’s identity coincides with that of the social 
group of belonging (tribe, social stratum, local culture) and is lived in an 
almost automatic way through the internalisation of habitus. The space of 
personal reflexivity is limited, and relational reflexivity, even where it can be 
practised, is not theorised.
This cultural semantics obviously does not negate the existence and 
importance of relations in defining social identities, but it considers them 
as something natural and taken for granted (e.g. the identities that come 
from family relations and those belonging to a tribe, gens, ethnicity). From 
the political point of view, all social subjects (and civil society itself) tend 
to be identified with the attribution given them by the community or the 
state (polis, civitas). This way of thinking about and experiencing identity is 
typical of societies characterised by segmentary differentiation (tribal and 
ancient societies) and vertical differentiation (i.e. stratified by class, such as 
medieval society).
The dualistic conception of identity, instead, is typically modern and is 
based on the principle of difference, by which [A = not (not-A)]. In other 
words, A’s identity is given by the negation of all that is not A. Identity is 
formed on the basis of difference understood and managed in a Hegelian 
dialectical way or as a total separation according to a binary code (0/1). 
For example, civil society is that which does not identify with the state, and 
thus its identity is constituted by the negation of the political society. In this 
semantics, relations certainly become important and, above all, in potential 
continuous change as compared to what happens in the monistic paradigm. 
But curiously enough, in its evolution, this semantics is radicalised to the 
point of leading to negation of the same operation of negation, that is it 
leads to making all the distinctions indistinct (as happens in Latour 1999). 
So it ends up evaporating (as succinctly indicated in Table 8.1).
The relational conception of identity defines difference not as opposition 
or separation, but as an emergent effect of reciprocal actions between A 
and non-A (i.e. as a relation). Identity is founded on the relational princi-
ple by which [A = R (A, not-A)]: that is, A’s identity is given by a relation 
(R) between A and not-A, where the relation becomes binary only in very 
special cases. In this semantics, identity is defined not by binary dialectic 
negation, but rather by relating to an otherness through exchanges, commu-
nications, and transactions. In short, to say that the identity of Ego is dif-
ferent from that of Alter means that they have a relation in which they share 
something at the same time that they differ in other aspects. For example, 
Mario’s Italian identity is different from John’s English in that they have 
two different citizenships, but they are both citizens of a state. If we con-
ceive the difference as a relation, we can see how that difference unites them 
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while respecting and promoting their difference (this is what the enigma of 
the relation consists of). The identity of civil society, for example, is defined 
in relation to the otherness of the state and on the basis of this relation, 
which entails a distance but does not entail negation of a dialectical type, 
rather it implies exchanges and interdependencies.
Table 8.1 gives a very concise example of the differences between the three 
ways of defining identity. While in monistic semantics John is simply him-
self, in binary dialectic semantics John is neither Mark nor any other person 
with whom he can be compared; but, when the negation is radicalised, John 
is no longer distinguishable from himself. In the third semantics, John’s 
identity consists in being in relation to Mark and all significant others, and 
also in relation to himself when he reflects on the distinction between I, Me, 
You as an acting subject.
Willis Overton (2014) offers us an example of relational differentiation 
when he writes,
[T]he prevailing Cartesian split narrative was that mother and infant con-
stituted two separate independent entities, and that the glue that came 
to bind them together was reinforcement via the feeding situation. The 
alternative narrative offered, especially by Bowlby and other’s known as 
‘object relations theorists’ such as Donald Winnicott, was relational in 
nature, arguing that mother and infant formed an initial psychological 
unity and the question was not how two separate entities become glued 
together, but how a single psychological unity differentiates into a relational 
two. Harlow’s work severely weakened the Cartesian narrative, and the 
work of Bowlby and his coworkers demonstrated the several phases or 
stages in the relational differentiation of the mother–infant matrix.
(Overtone 2014, 329–330, emphasis mine)
Relational semantics [A = R (A, not-A)] implies that Ego defines his/her 
identity by taking a certain distance from him/herself to make room for 
comparison with the Other, which means recognising that there is a certain 
contingency in the very unity of personal identity, which therefore comes to 
be constructed in a complex way, through Ego’s relational reflexivity urged 
and favoured by what is other than oneself.
Postmodern society should take into account the necessity of redefin-
ing identity by relating to others no longer in a functionalist manner, but 
rather in a suprafunctional one. The “I” is formed by relating with the Other 
and through the Other than the self. The “I” and the Other must no longer 
become specialised functionally (and thus be distinguished by the separa-
tion of tasks and identities), but, vice versa, must find their own identity 
in a certain way of being in relation to the Other, sharing some things and 
distinguishing themselves for other things.
In the dualistic (i.e. dialectic or binary) semantics, the distinction is a divi-
sion – a slash – for which one is on one side or the other; in the relational 
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semantics, the distinction is a relation that differentiate the terms starting 
from something they share. Both personal identity and social identity are 
relational, although in different ways.
The ontological reason that substantiates this statement lies in the fact 
that any difference arises from what is common rather than vice versa. 
In this regard, it may be useful to consider Heidegger’s thinking accord-
ing to which “human beings are always already social and dwell originar-
ily in a social world” (Aspers and Kohl 2013: 487). This statement should 
be read as Heidegger’s comment on Aristotle. Following this argument, 
Knudsen (2019: 337) claims that “in general, Heidegger’s ontology proposes 
to understand being through a unitary, relational structure between self, 
others, and world.” Personally, I appreciate these efforts to read Heidegger 
in a relational key. But I think that the tension between social relational-
ity and self-relationality central to Heidegger’s ontology of Dasein is not 
really resolved by him because he does not have a theory of the relation-
ship. He does not articulate the social relation in any way, and certainly 
not in the sense of Emirbayer’s pragmatism as suggested by Aspers and 
Kohl. However, I can recognise that there is an opening of Heidegger to 
relationality.
In my view, Heidegger’s ontology can have some interesting relational 
developments provided one gives it a certain interpretation. In his Letter on 
Humanism, Heidegger (1999: 287) writes, “In Sein und Zeit, it is with inten-
tion and due to prudence that it is said il y a l’être: being «gives itself». The 
expression il y a does not exactly translate as «it is given» (es gibt) because 
the «it» (es) that here «gives» (gibt) is being itself. It «gives itself» (gibt) indi-
cates the essence of being that gives, granting it its truth. The giving of itself 
to openness, together with the openness itself, is being itself.”
I believe that it is possible to give an interpretation of Heidegger’s thought 
that allows us to see both its limits and its possible developments in light 
of the relational approach. In fact, saying that “being gives itself” means 
that being is in itself “free giving,” that it has the qualities and properties of 
“givingness,” and, in this sense, being is not only open to the relation, but it 
is intrinsically relational. If being, as Heidegger says, is “the giving of itself to 
openness, together with the openness itself,” I wonder: maybe Heidegger is not 
speaking in this definition about being as relationality? But Heidegger does 
not speak of relationality. Being for him is that which simply “is,” as if being 
(its truth) could not become “other than that which is given.”
Instead, for my relational sociology, if being is an act, or better, if what 
exists has its own “act of being” (the “act of being” endowed with its ener-
geia that pertains to what exists), and this act is relation, precisely due to 
this, that is its intrinsic relationality, being is not static (it is not morphos-
tatic), but is dynamic and morphogenetic. This means that it can develop 
(it can “progress,” i.e. it can move forward or onward over time and space). 
Therefore, this is my argument, being permits its own transformation on 
the sole condition that its intrinsic relationality is respected. Against this 
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background, it is possible to speak of relational essentialism for human and 
non-human beings2 Human essence has its own historicity, which means 
that we cannot completely separate substance and accident once and for all, 
because there are real accidents (such as relationships) that constitute the 
substance so that it can develop over time.
It is in light of this ontological consideration that, in my opinion, we 
should interpret Heidegger’s perspective in Identity and Difference (1969), 
according to which identity is not equality or equivalence. He observes that, 
to make the difference, two terms are necessary, in order to have equality 
only one suffices.3 We can thus say that, while in the idem, difference disap-
pears, in the ipse, difference manifests itself. The relation of the human with 
its being is characterised by identity and not by equality. What is human and 
its being co-belong to each other because they remain different although 
they share an identity consisting precisely in this co-belonging. Without the 
one, therefore, the other is not given, even if the identity of one is not that of 
the other if not in the relationship of mutual belonging.
I call this founding relationship “vital relationship.” This relation to one-
self is a renewed belonging to oneself through a relational feedback with the 
Other. It is a belonging to oneself (Ego1) because, as a relationship, it implies 
the passage from a non-being to being someone different (Ego2) (someone, 
not something) in a reference system (refero) that keeps me bound to Other 
than myself (religo). The “non-being” is a possibility, usually undetermined, 
that should prove to be compatible with the transition from Ego1 to Ego2.
In other words, it is an emerging relationship (creative) that makes me 
exist unlike in the past on the basis of another reference system that I have 
chosen and to which I am bound, even if only temporarily. The I cannot say 
to him/herself “I am myself” except through the Other than self, which may 
be a physical entity or another person in the world, in all orders of reality 
(natural, practical, social, and transcendental).
It is in relating to the outside that Ego activates the life of the inner Self, 
which exists in itself. The inner life has its autonomy, but this autonomy can 
only be activated and managed in relation to the outside, that is to others 
and to the social context. For this reason, I call it “vital relationship.” It is in 
this relation that the person can transcend herself, that is tap into a reality 
that improves life, given that the person cannot transcend herself in a single 
act or in an external object (animal, plant, machine, or anything else). She 
does this by activating a reflexive relationality to what is other than herself. 
It is in this relation that the subject does verification of the uniqueness of 
 2 P. Donati (2021), ‘Relational Essentialism.’ In M.S. Archer and A. Maccarini (eds). What’s 
Essential to Being Human?. London: Routledge, chapter 4. 
 3 “Since in the equal (idem) difference disappears, [while] in the same (ipse) difference 
appears” (Heidegger 1969: 58).
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her identity as human person (as the singular existence of a link between her 
mind and body) that lives in an environment.
Obviously, the vital relation can generate goods or evils, but what is sure 
is that the absence or defect of the vital relationship is a problem for human 
development. The fact that, in a society, outweigh the social evils indicates 
that people fail to transcend themselves. Without this transcendence, peo-
ple have an impaired, weak, distorted, fractured identity, and society navi-
gates in the ocean of social evils, such as injustice, violence, corruption, and 
existential emptiness.
The relational semantics becomes particularly important in the era of 
information and communication technologies (ICT) because the use of 
these new technologies creates an inextricable intertwinement between 
online and offline experience in which the Self is configured as a complex 
informational system that shows it multiple faces in multiple social contexts 
through a recursive loop. Hence, the necessity of increasing the reflexive 
capacities of the relational subject who must find its permanence (the ubi 
consistam of the idem identity) by continually re-elaborating itself (the ipse 
identity) in the sea of contingencies. The great challenge of the future lies in 
the fact that identities change because of the hybridisation of social relations 
that derives from mixing the logic of the artificial (digital reality) with the 
natural human logic (analogical reality).
Recognising an identity means creating a relationship
How does the recognition of identity come about? It happens through rela-
tions (per relationem). Paul Ricoeur (2004) investigated the individual act of 
recognition and concluded that it consists in three moments: (i) the cognitive 
attribution of a specificity (e.g. if I hear a person speak a strange language 
that seems German to me, I wonder if she is a German or not), (ii) validation 
of the attribution (e.g. she is really a German and not a Dutch person who is 
speaking German), and (iii) gratitude as an appreciation of what exists (in 
my example, I appreciate that person and I feel sympathetic with her; more 
generally, this process concerns any existing entity, even non-human).
The relational perspective vindicates the relational character of these 
operations and affirms that all of this is possible, and, in fact, occurs only in 
a social network of relations that implement the circulation of mutual gifts. 
The recognition of identity implies a relationality that is not restricted to the 
simple one-to-one relationship between the one who acknowledges and the 
one who is acknowledged.
A practical example can clarify this perspective. Lucia is an Italian vol-
unteer working in a centre for welcoming human life (called CAV, Centro di 
accoglienza alla vita,) in a big hospital of Milan that specialises in women’s 
health and maternity care. Lucia offers pregnant women who are in trouble 
because they experience pregnancy as a drama the possibility of developing 
a free and conscious decision, whatever it is. Lucia observes that they do 
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not have a (meaningful) relation either with themselves or with the baby that 
is developing in their womb. What does Lucia do to help these women? She 
encourages them to talk, to tell her everything that they can, in a conversa-
tion that essentially aims at creating a meaningful relation with her. In this 
dialogue, the pregnant woman’s emotions become Lucia’s emotions, and, 
in their exchange of feelings, reciprocal empathy grows. At this point, their 
relationship becomes the subject that brings help to the woman (Lucia says 
that the relation becomes “the subject of care,” care being, in other words, 
taking on the burden of the pregnant woman’s suffering). Lucia allows that 
relation to act reflexively. Living in this relation, the pregnant woman dis-
covers her own identity. In fact, as Lucia says, she is reborn, or, really, “is 
born” “because she was never born as a person.” So, she becomes aware of 
the choice she wants to make.
In this practical example, we see the causal power of the relation in gener-
ating the identity of a human person because she discovers herself through 
a relational reflexivity. Generally speaking, we discover ourselves, what we 
are and what we want, (i.e. what most concerns us) from the experience of an 
“encounter” with an Other that allows us to redefine our identity while being 
ourselves (“who we are” to ourselves). The relation with the Other, when 
the Other is committed to creating a We-relation to which the encounter’s 
subjectivity is entrusted, illuminates the totality of the individual human 
person and gives “form” to her identity because it is capable of penetrating 
one’s deepest being. In brief, the flourishing of human identity is the fruit 
of the relational reflexivity exercised between people when they are oriented 
towards building a We-relation from which their individual identity flows.
What is “social” in the relational subject?
The term “relational subject,” as developed by Donati and Archer (2015), 
indicates individual and collective (social) subjects as “relationally consti-
tuted,” that is in as much as they acquire qualities and powers through their 
internal and external social relations. In this chapter, I am interested in see-
ing what this means for people’s identity, that is as regards the role that the 
relation with the Other plays in defining and redefining one’s own identity, 
whether personal (the identity that the “I” has of itself within itself) or social 
(the identity that the “I” has as it belongs to a social network with Others).
Obviously, this comes about in different ways depending on whether 
the subject is individual or collective (such as a family, a sports team, an 
orchestra, a civil association). In the individual subject, the relation to the 
Other enters into the individual consciousness and plays a role in the inter-
nal self-definition of the individual Self. In the collective subject, the rela-
tion to the Other alters the network of relations between the members of 
the collective subject and, therefore, also the processes that lead to discern-
ment, deliberation, and dedication on the part of the social subject when it 
acts as a collective.
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I start by asking myself the following question: is the “I” that situates 
itself in the existing relation with the Other the same “I” that converses 
internally with itself? The answer is certainly affirmative, because only the 
“I” reflects, but it is the way in which it “reflects” that is different. Why and 
how is it different? And what does this diversity engender?
The “I” that converses with itself inside its own mind (inner conversation) 
has, as an outcome, the fact of rethinking and reprogramming its own delib-
erations in response to the social context. But one could ask: what outcome 
is had by the “I” that reflects, not only on itself within itself, and not only on 
itself in relation to the world, but reflects in/on/with the relation as such with 
the Other and the world around?
Let us take the example of a musician in an orchestra when she reflects 
on the quality of her personal performance and when she thinks about and 
within the performance of the orchestra as a whole and, from this stand-
point, evaluates her own performance: are these two ways of reflecting the 
same thing? This is the problem of the “relational subject.” If the musician 
only thinks about herself, she will seek her personal model of perfection and 
nothing more (autonomous reflexivity). If she thinks about her contribution 
as a function of the orchestra, she will seek her best “adaptation” to the 
orchestra’s performance (communicative reflexivity). If, instead, she reflects 
on/in/with the orchestra’s performance and on how this performance can be 
improved in the event that the musicians relate to each other in a different 
way, she will seek to alter the performance of the orchestra as a whole, that is 
she will seek to produce a different emergent effect – which is to say, a more 
satisfying performance of the orchestra. In this latter case, we can speak of 
meta-reflexivity. However, it is necessary to distinguish between individual 
and collective (or relational) meta-reflexivity. The meta-reflexivity of sin-
gle musicians remains an individual fact that has certain repercussions on 
the orchestra. It becomes social – “relational,” that is related to a collec-
tive – when each musician looks (relates) to the orchestra conductor who 
represents and interprets the We-relation. Therefore, in the conducting of 
the orchestra, meta-reflexivity appears as the reflexivity of the “collective 
subject” that is thus because it behaves in a “fully” relational manner.
Sociologists are used to speaking of “collective (or social) subjects” to 
indicate groups of individuals which act “collectively” in the sense of a col-
lective entity that is supposed to evaluate objectives, deliberate on its own 
concerns, and strive to achieve them. Examples of collective subjects are a 
couple, a family, a voluntary association, a cooperative, a labour union, a 
political party, a foundation, a local community, and a social movement, 
although, of course, with different relational qualities and causal properties. 
Both in common parlance and in scientific studies, it is claimed that these 
collective entities evaluate, deliberate, and “act” as “subjects.”
The term “social subject” indicates a collective subject in that it is consti-
tuted by relations between individuals that form part of it, and by the exter-
nal relations that it has in as much as it is expressed in a “We.” However, this 
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We is not a “thing,” it is not an artificial entity, a symbol, an idea, an entity 
superimposed as a sort of “collective mind,” and not even a collective inten-
tionality. We have a “relational social subject” when this We is configured 
as a relation (We-relation).
What is “social” in the relational subject? The human individual is rela-
tional by nature, but relations are created in time and space, that is in a 
situated sociocultural context. The human person’s identity, as reflexive 
consciousness of the Self, is not a substance in and of itself lacking relations, 
but is constituted by relations with other human individuals.
In order to understand how the human person is a “relational subject” 
in a more profound way than the simple Aristotelian assertion that man is 
a political animal and exists only in society, which is a conclusion drawn 
from first level empirical observation, we need a sophisticated theory of 
social relations that is missing from classical ancient thought. Saying that 
the human individual exists only because he was conceived and raised by 
other human beings and, moreover, needs other people in order to live, 
etc., is banal. This says little or nothing about how the human individual 
is effectively structured (configured) in as much as he is a concrete and sit-
uated “relational being.” We need second-order observations, as well as 
second-order (relational) feedbacks.
The problem is to understand how social relationality structures the 
human individual’s personal and social identity as well as agency. When 
the personal “I” meets the social realm in the form of Me, We, and You, it is 
necessary to see how it considers these social identities, that is what relation 
the Self establishes with them. The relations that the Self establishes with 
Me, We, and You are very different from one another. An analysis of these 
dynamics is not within the scope of this chapter, however.
When I claim that a relational subject is a subject that exists only in rela-
tion and is constituted by the relations that she cares for, I do not mean to 
assert that the social relation is a subject in and for itself, but that the rela-
tion has its own (sui generis) reality in that it has causal powers and its own 
qualities. Sui generis (= of its own kind) here means that social relations 
are the effect or creation of human activities, but they are an emergent phe-
nomenon that corresponds to a different (autonomous and peculiar in its 
characteristics) order of reality in respect to human behaviour/agency. This 
relationality (the relation as a real entity) is activity-dependent, but has its 
own structure, which can be seen in the power that it exercises in retroacting 
on the terms (Ego and Alter) of the relation itself through relational gener-
ative mechanisms (Donati 2015b).
It is not usual that the terms of the relation (Ego and Alter) personally 
reflect on how the relation between them can be generated or altered by 
their action. Normally, the relation remains implicit and latent. No won-
der the fact that people do not “see” relationships. In the social world, 
something akin to the physical world happens. We do not see light, we see 
with light. In the same way, in the social world, we do not see relations, 
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but we see with relations, which themselves remain unseen. Most of the 
time, individual subjects treat the relation with the Other in an implicit 
and latent manner. They become reflexive subjects in the relational sense 
(“relationally reflexive”) when they succeed in thinking of the relation that 
they have with other agents/actors as an entity in and of itself and, thus, 
they consider it as a reality that, while depending on themselves, can in 
turn “determine” their identity and action. (Here the verb “determine” 
means that the Ego-Alter relation “circumscribes” the agent/actors with 
boundaries, “delimits” them, “identifies” them with a certain precision, 
and “specifies” them).
The underlying question that arises is that of understanding what “the 
social” is (what we mean by the word “social”) when we use it in the expres-
sion “social relation.” The term “social” is notorious for being extremely 
ambiguous and riddled with misunderstandings. In general, it is used as a 
synonym of “collective,” in the sense of an aggregation of many individ-
uals. But here, instead, I use it as a synonym of “relational”: saying that 
something or someone is social means saying that it is relational, in the 
sense that it exists and is relevant for the social fabric (not on other planes 
of reality) in that it is defined by its social relations. So, the seemingly tau-
tological expression “social relation” refers to the relationality inherent in 
the relation.
To clarify this point, it is worthwhile remembering that the term “social” 
is very often used in human and social sciences in the following two ways:
1 as resulting from individual actions, psychological projections or 
exchanges between individuals who orient themselves reciprocally; 
here the social is understood as an aggregate effect of a multitude of 
individuals who produce a collective result; in this case, the orchestra 
players would not need the orchestra conductor or a soccer team would 
not need a coach; for example, this is the way in which Uhlaner (2014) 
explained the onset of the Arab Spring as an aggregate effect of those 
who participated in the social networks of protest against the political 
regimes of their countries;
2 or as the structure that overshadows (impinges upon) individuals and 
makes them think and act in a certain way; in this case, the orchestra 
players would be no more than the orchestra conductor’s executors or 
the soccer players would be no more than their coach’s executors; the 
social movements of the Arab Spring would then have to be explained 
by one overarching supernational structure that has caused them, 
which is highly unlikely.
If one adopts these two meanings of “social,” it is not possible to see the 
relational subject. In the first case, the relational subject is reduced to an 
“event” or a consequence of individual choices (in a certain sense, a sort of 
upward conflation is performed); in the second case, the relational subject is 
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reduced to a structure lacking agency (in a certain sense, the outcome of a 
sort of downward conflation).
It is thus necessary to arrive at another meaning of “social,” the one that 
I am proposing here.
3 The social can be understood as “another” order of reality (I call it 
“the relational order,” not to be confused with Goffman’s “interaction 
order”), different from an aggregate reality and from that of a structure 
overshadowing the agents/actors and which determines them because it 
consists of relations. It is only in this way that we can explain the emer-
gence of relational goods.
On this point, however, it is necessary to draw some distinctions among 
those scholars who share the idea that the analytical unit is the social 
relation, and that it is neither the individual nor structures conceived as a 
“whole” that determine individuals.
For various reasons, I do not follow those authors who declare themselves 
to be “relational” but who, in reality, propose a “transactional” sociology 
because they conceive of the social as “transaction” between individuals (see 
Emirbayer 1997; Dépelteau and Powell 2013). They should be called trans-
actional sociologies.
The defects of such transactional sociologies are principally these two: 
in the first place, since they conceive of social relations as the fluid prod-
uct of situational interactions between individuals, they do not see the sui 
generis reality of the relations and, in particular, the reality of the social 
structures constituted by those relations that are not transactional (e.g. the 
fact of being born of two parents is a relationship that is not transactional); 
secondly, by reducing the relation to an interaction or multiple interactions, 
they run the risk of committing a central conflation between agency and 
structure. On the other hand, I would not call relational sociologies those 
structural approaches where the social is defined as an outcome of network 
structural mechanisms, because they ignore the relational feedbacks, which 
are the engine of the emergence process.
How the relational subject connects personal and 
collective identity in the morphogenetic process
Figure 8.1 summarises how structural, agential, and cultural factors affect 
the formation of the subject’s identity in the context of social morphogen-
esis through personal and relational reflexivity. It focuses on how personal 
identity and collective identity connect in the relational subject in the course 
of sociocultural dynamics. This figure is intended as an original elaboration 
of the SAC (structure-agency-culture) scheme suggested by Archer (2013). 
The originality of my elaboration lies in the fact that I emphasise the role 
of relational reflexivity and not only that of the agency’s personal reflexivity 
illustrated by Archer.
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The diagram of Figure 8.1 is composed of seven rectangles in a temporal 
sequence from time T1 to time T7, which describe the morphogenesis of the 
identity of the acting subject that must act within a given social and cultural 
structure. At time T1, the subject is positioned in a conditioning structure to 
which s/he responds with individual reflexivity which, at time T2, assumes an 
orientation in the reference cultural system. At time T3, the interactions with 
the other actors begin which prompt the activation of the relational reflexiv-
ity of the subject who is induced to change his/her relations in the network at 
time T4. By modifying the relations, at time T5, the subject changes his/her 
structural identity, that is his/her position in the social structure. This leads 
the subject to reactivate the relational reflexivity which, at the time T6, mod-
ifies the interactions with others and therefore leads the subject to redefine 
his/her cultural identity at time T7. The diagram outlines a cycle that repeats 
itself over time, continuing to change the relational identity of the subject.
The acting subject is always already included as an agent in a social struc-
ture (in a family, school, professional organisation, voluntary association, 
social movement, etc.) in which she must define and personalise her role 
(actor). Initially, therefore, the subject occupies a position/role in a social 
network on which she must reflect personally (personal reflexivity) having 
Figure 8.1  The morphogenesis of the subject’s relational identity (along the time 
steps T1–T7)
Source: Author.
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to give an answer to the social position that she occupies. In doing so, her 
inner conversation relates to the context and therefore participates in soci-
ocultural interactions.
In the interactions of the social structure (network) in which the subject 
is inserted, the social relationship appears as a bond (religo), that is as a link 
inherent to the roles. In sociocultural interactions, instead, the intentional 
orientation (the refero) of the subject prevails, made of values, feelings, and 
expectations that respond to cultural conditioning. The result of sociocul-
tural interactions leads to a redefinition of the Self as a new relational Self. 
This redefinition of the identity is then subjected to the relational reflexivity 
of the subject, which translates it into an emerging relationship with the 
social structure, to redefine her structural identity in the sense of the per-
sonalisation of her social role.
The process continues by subjecting again the identity of the structural 
role played in the social network to relational reflexivity, which is exerted 
precisely on the qualities and causal properties of the new relationship, 
which needs to be confirmed in the inner conversation. The symbol R in 
Figure 8.1 indicates precisely the connection between personal reflexivity 
(i.e. personal identity) and social reflexivity (i.e. collective identity), referring 
to the We-relation. It is this connection that transforms the identity of the 
relational subject which rests only upon individual interests (the personal 
concerns understood as what the individual cares about) into a sharing of 
relational interests (the collective concerns intended as taking care of social 
bonds and their outcomes) by the subject.
I argue against an integration of agency and structure as it was suggested 
by some scholars in the debate of past decades. I think it is necessary a shift 
of focus from solutions relying upon an interplay between agency and struc-
ture towards solutions that are based upon the role of social relations, which 
are a phenomenon on their own, with their own properties and dynam-
ics, which transcend agents and structures. It is the interactive networks 
between people and structures that are of greatest importance.
On this path, the great novelty of the last years and, in perspective, of our 
future is given by how ICTs and artificial intelligence (AIs) will influence the 
hybridisation of social relations in building a relational society according to 
Figure 8.1. In this regard, I believe that the relational approach is very use-
ful to avoid both the excessive voluntarism of the approaches that empha-
sise the agential self-reflexivity of the subjects and the positivistic approach 
of those who emphasise some form of structural determinism, while it is 
essential to resist to those attempts that support a radical hybridisation of 
relationships like the Actor-Network-Theory.
Perspectives: human identity vis-à-vis post-/trans-human
Within the so-called postmodern society, identity – any identity – is called 
into question to the point that it is proposed that we do without the very 
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concept of identity (Brubaker and Cooper 2000) to dissolve it in the pure 
dynamism of social relations, as if relations did not have their own structure 
with specific properties and their own causal dynamism.
This pervasive tendency began with so-called identity politics according 
to which we are “all different, all the same” (this is the slogan of the political 
ideology of multiculturalism), which has stoked cultural and ethical rela-
tivism, has fragmented society and created more conflict than solidarity. 
In their more general formulation, theories of ideological multiculturalism 
reject distinctions because they conceive of them as discrimination, and 
thus they promote a cultural indifferentism that constitutes a fertile ground 
in which the post-/trans-human can grow. In fact, if the human person does 
not have a substantial identity, but can be resolved in relations with no resi-
dues, then by replacing relations with the spread of new technologies (ICT, 
AI, robots, etc.), it is possible to create another world, one of androids, 
humanoids, “electronic persons,” developed to replace human persons in 
order to reach a new stage of evolution (the theory of singularity) beyond 
human identity.
To the tendencies operating in favour of the transition to the post-/
trans-human, one can and must object that the essence of the human is 
found in the relation, because from the anthropological point of view, the 
human originates in the relation, and it is in the relation that persons must 
learn how to accept their limits, at the same time that they desire to over-
come their finiteness, in response to the need for transcendence that char-
acterises the human person in her deepest identity. We will tackle this topic 
in the next chapter.
Identity is that which generates the relation and, at the same time, is gen-
erated by it. Conflations are always possible in every way, but it is up to the 
“relational rationality” (Donati 2009) to escape the vicious circles. The rela-
tional rationality connects the Weberian Zweckrationalität (instrumental 
rationality) and Wertrationalität (value rationality) in such a way as to give 
a moral character to social relations.
Persons activate relations based on their own personal identity, but over 
time, relations change and regenerate their identity. How this happens 
depends on how relational reflexivity intervenes, if it operates. It is pos-
sible to change the relation and, with this, to change identity, just as we 
can change identity and, as a consequence, change our relations. But it is 
necessary to see under which conditions this is feasible and with which con-
sequences, in terms of the relational goods and evils that are produced. To 
avoid falling into tautologies or vicious circles, we must see identity as a 
“relational subjectivity,” that of a substance or nature constituted relation-
ally and evolving relationally.
The major challenges today come from new digital technologies that 
mediate relationships of all kinds (natural, practical, and social – i.e. within 
and between individual and collective subjects). This topic will be addressed 
in the next chapter.

Part IV
The hybridisation of society: 
shall we forget about its 
human character?

9 The new scenario of a 
hybridised society
The topic and its rationale
In this chapter, I propose an analysis of how the processes of human 
enhancement brought about by the digital revolution (information and 
communication technologies [ICT], artificial intelligence [AI], robotics) 
are modifying social identities, relationships, and social organisations, and 
under what conditions this revolution can shape organisational forms that 
are able to promote, rather than alienate, humanity.
A recent debate in France about the use of robots in care for the elderly 
ended with the question: “can the human relationship be the product of our 
technological feats?.” We must look for a plausible answer.
Personal and social identities, relations, and organisations are forced to 
take shape in the environment of a Digital Technological Matrix (hence-
forth DTM) that is a symbolic code, which tends to replace all the onto-
logical, ideal, and moral symbolic matrices that have structured societies 
in the past. The concept of matrix used here refers to the meaning that this 
concept has in my book on the theological matrix of society (Donati 2010). 
It indicates a vision of the world that has a religious character, or function-
ally equivalent to that of religion, in that it expresses the “ultimate values” 
of that society. In the case of DTM, these values are those of an indefinite 
evolution of humanity and the cosmos that replaces the representations of 
the world as a reality created and supported by a supernatural reality.1
Obviously, I am talking about a trend, not only because in each society 
different cultural matrices coexist, in particular in the multicultural socie-
ties emerging today, but also because it is always possible that the conflicts 
between cultural matrices can intensify and diversify. What I argue is that 
DTM, like all cultural matrices that have a transcendental character, that is 
express a vision of the cosmos and humanity in their ultimate ends (éschata, 
the ends of everything), has an intrinsic propensity to become the dominant 
matrix, similarly to what happened with the cultural matrix of modernity 
 1 The values I am referring to are well illuminated by Harari (2017) and by various contri-
butions to the volume of Floridi (2015).
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that made traditional cultures marginal. As a form of Tech-Gnosis, the 
peculiarity of the DTM is that of making the boundaries between human 
and non-human labile and crossable in every way in order to foster hybrids. 
Hybridisation is defined here as entanglements and interchanges between 
digital machines, their ways of operating, and human elements in social 
practices.
Hybrids, however, are not random or purely contingent entities. They 
stem from complex interactional networks, in which social relations are 
mediated by the DTM. The processes of hybridisation of social identities 
and relations are selective and stratified according to the ways in which the 
human/non-human distinction is relationally thought of and practiced. We 
are witnessing a co-evolution between AI/robotisation and human relations.
Three scenarios of hybridisation are outlined along with three kinds 
of societal morphogenesis: adaptive, turbulent, and relationally steered. 
The chapter examines these scenarios of co-evolution and their possible 
consequences.
I am not so interested in discussing whether AI or robots can be more or 
less human in themselves – or not human at all – but rather how they can 
interact with humans and affect their social relationships so as to generate a 
different kind of society characterised by the hybridisation between human 
and non-human.
I will tackle two major themes: (i) the first concerns the problem of how 
we can distinguish inter-human relations from the relationships between 
human beings and machines, which implies the need to clarify what the pro-
cesses of hybridisation of identities and social relations consist of and how 
they happen; (ii) the second theme concerns the consequences of digitalised 
technological innovations on the hybridisation of social institutions and 
organisations and, ultimately, the possible scenarios of a hybridised society.
The hybridisation issue
The hybridisation of society emerges from a process of social morphogen-
esis in which social structure, culture, and agency intertwine so to produce 
social and cultural hybrids together with a hybridised agency. Figure 9.1 
schematises these processes, which consist in a series of subsequent mor-
phogenetic cycles.
In principle, each morphogenetic cycle can start from the side of the social 
structural domain or from the side of the cultural domain. Let us see what 
happens in either case.
1 If the morphogenetic cycle begins on the side of the structural domain, 
for example when a robot is introduced in a certain social context (a fac-
tory, a school class, etc.), what happens is a redefinition of the social net-
work and the social positions of the actors involved. As a consequence 
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of the presence of the newcomer, structural interactions change and 
produce structural hybrids. These hybrids affect human agency in the 
direction of influencing their impact on the cultural domain.
2 If the morphogenetic cycle starts from the side of the cultural domain, 
for example when new software (digital literacy, programs, algorithms) 
are invented and adopted by people, then new sociocultural interac-
tions produce cultural hybrids. These cultural elaborations modify 
human agency, which introduces changes into the structural domain.
3 The human agency changes through active (reflexive) responses to the 
above changes. The possibilities for developing this morphogenetic pro-
cess are certainly dependent on how the DTM operates in the cultural 
and structural domains, but we must consider the autonomous role of 
human agency.
One may wonder, which morphogenesis occurs in the human person 
(agency) and in his/her relational qualities and properties? What happens to 
social relations between humans and between humans and robots?
Figure 9.1 illustrates the relational structure and dynamics of co-evolution 
between digital machines, their ways of operating (according to their sym-
bolic code), and human agency illustrates this process in case it starts from 
the social structure. Co-evolution can obviously have positive or negative 
results in terms of compatibility among the different components, and 
therefore, it can generate both relational goods and relational evils.
The diagram in Figure 9.1 is composed of eight steps in a temporal 
sequence from time T1 to time T8 which describes the hybridisation of 
the acting subject and his/her relationships when operating with new dig-
ital technologies, for example when an AI or robot is introduced into the 
subject’s relational network. At time T1, the introduction of the new tech-
nology (hardware) modifies the structural network of the subject’s relation-
ships, and thus modifies his/her position or social role. In the T2–T3 time 
phase, interactions in the network activate hybridisation processes of the 
social structure, so that structural hybrids emerge at time T4. The struc-
tural hybrids lead to hybridise the action of the subject, who is depicted 
in a central rectangle. The next step, at time T5, indicates that, following 
changes in the social structure, the subject changes his/her cultural identity 
in reference to digital software. This step is followed by a phase of interac-
tions between time T6 and time T7 in which sociocultural interactions acti-
vate cultural hybridisation processes. Consequently, at the time T8, cultural 
hybrids emerge that condition the subject’s action. As in previous figures, it 
is a typical cycle that repeats itself over time.
Notice that the morphogenesis of human agency is both passive and 
active in both directions, towards the cultural as well as the structural 
domain. (i) It is passive because it is influenced alternatively by one of 
the two domains, and (ii) at the same time, it is active towards the other 
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domain. It is here that the body-mind relational unit has to confront the 
coherences or dissonances between the two domains. The symbol ® means 
that there is a connection of some sort between the cultural and structural 
processes of hybridisation of the human person in his/her social identity 
and social relationships. Such a connection can be of different kinds, from 
the maximum of synergy (complementarity), as when cultural identity is 
well adapted to the position occupied in the social structure, to a maximum 
of conflict (contradiction), as when cultural identity conflicts with the posi-
tion occupied in the social structure.
What is most relevant in Figure 9.1 is to observe the dematerialisation 
of the human agency due to AIs operating in and through the quantum 
network (the Internet) where information is transmitted with qubits. The 
process of hybridisation takes place in fact contaminating the relationships 
that operate on the basis of the principles of classical physics applied to the 
Figure 9.1  A scheme of the process of hybridisation (structural, agential, and 
cultural)
Source: Author.
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natural world with virtual relations that operate on the basis of the postu-
lates of quantum physics, where the latter dematerialises the natural world.2
The conceptual scheme summarised in Figure 9.1 is fundamental to 
understand the hybridisation processes of social identities, relationships, 
and organisations in the light of the idea that, to speak the language of 
Adams (2006: 517), “hybridity becomes a complex potential.” These pro-
cesses proceed according to a relation of contingent complementarity 
between changes in the cultural background that encourage the develop-
ment of certain forms of virtual thinking and utopian discourse, on the 
one hand, and changes in the material production of new technologies (AI/
robots) in the structural domain, on the other hand. Hybridisation occurs 
when culture (software) and structure (hardware) mutually influence and 
reinforce each other, as long as human agency adapts to these processes. 
Relations play the most crucial role because changes in identities and 
organisations depend on them. The hybridisation of society is based on the 
assumption that these processes operate in a functional way, making sure 
that the passivity of human agency translates into its active participation 
in such an evolution with minimal reflexivity or a reflexivity substantially 
dependent on the DTM. The kind and extent of hybridisation depend on 
how subjects reflect on their relationships, on which their internal conversa-
tion (personal reflexivity) depends.
The hybridisation of people’s identities and social organisations (families 
included) consists in the fact that these entities change their relational con-
stitution to the extent that the cultural and structural processes of change 
affect (in Figure 9.1 they “cross”) the human person and modify his/her ways 
of relating to himself/herself, to others, and to the world. Agency is obvi-
ously dependent on how the brain and the mind of the person work. Both 
the brain and the mind are seriously influenced by the way technologies 
operate (Greenfield 2014) because they absorb certain ways of communicat-
ing, using and combining information, and following performance logics 
that can ignore or alter analogical thinking. As Malabou (2009) claims, the 
human being has his essential difference in the plasticity of his mind that 
the robot will never have (synaptic plasticity is unique, there cannot be two 
identical brains).
Since hybridisation means some form of mutual adaptation between 
humans and AI bots, one can ask to what extent this mutual influence (up 
to mutual constitution) can arrive. Personally, I do not believe that human-
oid robots can be or become “relational subjects” in the sense of being able 
to relate to others and to the social context by forming a We-relation with 
 2 For a debate on this issue, see the theory by Alexander Wendt (2015) according to which 
consciousness is a macroscopic quantum mechanical phenomenon and the critical review 
by Porpora (2018b), in particular for what concerns the consequences of Wendt’s ideas on 
social life.
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adequate personal and relational reflexivity. They cannot for various rea-
sons, in particular because their mind and their body-mind complex are 
ontologically different from that of humans, so that human-human interac-
tion (HHI) and human-robot interactions (HRI) are ontologically different 
(of course, if we assume that human relations are constituted by recip-
rocal actions which are something more and different in respect to pure 
behaviour). Basically, AI bot’s mind (consciousness) has an inside-out and 
outside-in relationality that is structurally different from the human one 
(Lindhard 2019). There is much debate about whether robots can be friends 
of human beings. My position is that it is unlikely that humans will ever 
be able to be friends with robots. The capacity to enter into a friendship 
of one’s own volition is a core requirement for a relationship to be termed 
friendship. We also have a duty to act morally towards our friends, to treat 
them with due respect. To be able to do this, we need to have self-knowledge, 
a sense of ourselves as persons in our own right. We do not have robots who 
display these capacities today, nor is it a given that we ever will.
Bearing in mind the substantial differences between social relations and 
technological relations (Nørskov 2015), I believe however that it is possible 
to recognise that “social robots, unlike other technological artefacts, are 
capable of establishing with their human users quasi-social relationships as 
pseudo-persons” (Cappuccio et al. 2019: 129).
Hybridisation means that, through sustained interactions with technol-
ogies (the “fully networked life”), the previous modes of considering (con-
ceiving) oneself, relationships with others, and what form to give to a social 
organisation in keeping with the (analogic) principle of reality are mixed 
with the way digital technology works, that is the (fictitious) principle of 
digital virtuality. Hybridisation means blending the real and the fictitious, 
the analogical and the digital. This happens, for example when one wants to 
modify one’s own image through an app that presents it in an altered form 
in shapes and colours in a social network.
To clarify this point, I must say that I do not use the term “real” in oppo-
sition to digital. In my view, the polar opposites are “real” vs “fictitious” 
and “digital” vs “analogical.” If a hacker creates a profile on Facebook, 
or another social network, and transmits fake news, such news has its own 
reality, even if it is the reality of a fiction. While the story’s referent is not 
real, the story itself is causally efficacious and therefore real in that regard. 
So, instead of contrasting a digital message to a real message, it is better to 
contrast a digital message with an analogical, because the analogical code 
implies, in fact, an effective analogy relationship between what is written 
or transmitted and what is really existing. In short, hybridisation can take 
place by putting in interaction and then mixing what is real and what is ficti-
tious, what is digital, and what is analogical. Table 9.1 presents four types of 
relationships that generate hybrids when they are conflated with each other.
Qualitative and quantitative research provides some empirical evidence 
of these hybridisation processes:
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• About ICTs: in the chapter “Twenty-First Century Thinking,” 
Greenfield (2009) suggests that the decline of reading in favour of frag-
mentary interactions, such a computer games or short messages on the 
Internet, threatens the substance of both our neurological makeup and 
our social structures.
• human persons alter their pace, rhythm, and sense of Self; they change 
their personal reflexivity.
• About AI/robots: authentic human relationships are reduced to and sac-
rificed in favour of digital relationships (we expect more from technol-
ogy and less from each other); technology appeals to us most where we 
are most vulnerable (passions, feelings, interests, etc.).
• Digital relations erase precisely those aspects of randomness that also 
make human life, people, and relationships interesting, spontaneous, 
and metamorphic.
• By developing new technologies, we are inevitably changing the most 
fundamental of human principles: our conception of self, our relation-
ships to others, and our understanding and practice of love and death; 
nevertheless, we should not stop developing new technologies, but do it 
differently by adopting an approach of relational observation, diagno-
sis, and guidance.
In short, the processes of hybridisation of identities, human relations, and 
social organisations are closely connected and change together (in parallel 
with each other), varying from case to case due to the presence of interven-
ing variables in specific contexts.
The process of hybridisation of identities and relations
From the point of view of critical realism, hybridisation can and must 
instead be considered as a morphogenetic process that leads from entities 
structured in a certain way to entities structured in another way. The fact 
remains that we should understand how to define the proprium of the human 
in hybridisation processes.
Lynne Rudder Baker’s theory is often cited as a solution to this problem 
as it replaces a “constitutive” rather than a substantive (so-called identify-
ing) view of the human.
Table 9.1 Four types of relations generating hybrids when mixed together
Real Fictitious
Analogical Face-to-face relationships Plays on relationships





Baker (2000) argues that what distinguishes persons from all other beings 
is the mind’s intentionality detached from corporeity since we, as human 
beings, can be fully material beings without being identical to our bodies. 
In her view, personhood lies in the complex mental property of first-person 
perspective that enables one to conceive of one’s body and mental states as 
one’s own. The argument is that the human mind must have a bodily sup-
port since the body-mind relation is necessary, but the type of body – and, 
therefore, the type of body-mind relationship – can be quite contingent; 
according to her, we can change the body with artefacts, provided we do 
so from the perspective of the first person. The relation between one’s mind 
and one’s body is open to any possibility. Consequently, since the personal-
ity is equal to the self-thinking mind, we must then acknowledge the exist-
ence of a personality in any animal or machine that can be judged sentient 
and thinking, on the condition that it is aware that it is itself that thinks. In 
this way, the possibility of anthropomorphising robots, as well as robotising 
human bodies, becomes thinkable and legitimised.
Following this line of thought, some thinkers today are more and more 
inclined to acknowledge the existence of moral behaviours in certain species 
of higher primates like the chimpanzees. They are supposed to have a “moral 
intelligence,” that is in that they are compassionate, empathetic, altruistic, 
and fair (Bekoff and Pierce 2009), and, along the same lines, they recognise 
the possibility that special robots endowed with an artificial morality might 
exist (Pana 2006). It seems to me that this perspective is totally at odds with 
a realistic social ontology for which human relationality – between body and 
mind, as well as in social life with others (the two are closely related) – has 
qualities and properties that cannot be assimilated with the relationships 
that certain species of animals or ultra-sophisticated intelligent machines can 
have. On the whole, Baker’s theory is inadequate to the task of accounting 
for the possibilities and the limits of the processes of hybridisation because it 
does not account for the relational constitution of identities and social forms.
The hybridisation of human relations, paradoxically, is due to the logic 
inherent in such relationships, which, by definition, must be open to the 
world and cannot remain closed in self-referentiality, as artificial machines 
do. In interacting repeatedly with machines (AI/robots), agents can incorpo-
rate certain aspects of the communication logic of the machines in their way 
of relating to others and the world. However, we cannot equate the relations 
between humans with those between humans and robots. How can one not 
see that the qualitative difference between these relations, for example when 
someone says that the robot is “my best friend,” reduces the relationship to 
pure communication (i.e. to communication and only to communication, 
as Luhmann 1995 states)? This is an unjustified and unjustifiable reduction 
because communication always takes place within a concrete relationship 
and takes its meaning, qualities, and properties from the kind of relation-
ship in which it occurs, whereas the kind of relationship depends on the 
kind of subjects that are in communication.
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The problems caused by DTM (ICTs and robotics) arise when sociability 
is entrusted to algorithms. The introduction of the sentient robot changes 
the context and the relationships between human subjects as well as the 
form of a social organisation.
Let us take the example of a social structure of a sports type like that of 
a football team and a football match. How does the behaviour of a football 
team that is equipped with a goalkeeper-robot capable of parrying all rolls 
change and if two teams agree to play a game in which each of them has a 
robot as a goalkeeper, what will be the consequences on human behaviour?
There cannot be a “we believe” or a relational good between humans and 
robots for the simple fact that the supervenience human-robot relation is 
ontologically different from the supervenience relationship between human 
beings.3
The partial or total hybridisation cycle of relationships is selective and 
stratified on the basis of (i) how the personal and relational reflexivity of 
agents operates, given the fact that reflexivity on these processes is neces-
sary to get to know each other through one’s own “relational self-construal” 
(Cross and Morris 2003) and (ii) how the reflectivity of the network or organ-
isational system in which the agents are inserted operates.
We can see this by using the morphogenetic scheme, which describes how 
the hybridisation processes depend both on the reflexivity of the subjects 
and the reflectivity of their social network exert on the different forms of 
human enhancement.
At time T1, we observe an organisational context (or network) in which 
human persons must relate themselves to a DTM of sentient machines. In 
the temporal phase T2–T3, persons and sentient machines interact with 
each other. The hybridisation of social relationships and identities can hap-
pen in various ways, and with different intensity, depending on whether the 
human person adopts:
a A conformist reflexivity, that is a reflexivity that is purely dependent on 
the machine; in practice, the agent person relates to the machine by 
identifying herself with the digital code, which means that she “con-
nects” to the machine without establishing a real relationship (connec-
tion is not a social relationship); it happens, for instance, when people 
identify themselves with their Facebook profile.
 3 A set of properties A supervenes upon another set B just in case no two things can dif-
fer with respect to A-properties without also differing with respect to their B-properties. 
In slogan form, “there cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference” (Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2018). In our case, the human-robot relationship would be 
equivalent to the human-human relationship if the robot were human.
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b An independent reflexivity, that is a reflexivity that is autonomous with 
respect to the machine; the machine is used as a simple tool, and the 
human-robot relationship follows basically an analogic code.
c A critical reflexivity (meta-reflexivity) which means that the agent dis-
cerns the meaning of relations on the basis of the difference between the 
digital and the analogical code by re-entering4 the distinction digital/
analogical into what has emerged in previous actions and their out-
comes; if the agent uses the interaction s/he has with the machine in this 
way s/he can redefine the purpose of interaction, in order to establish a 
more satisfying relationship.
d An impaired reflexivity, that is an impeded reflexivity that is caused by 
an absorbing routine identification of the agent with the machine.
e A reflexivity that is fractured due to the fact that the agent combines the 
digital code and the analogical code in a casual and fuzzy way.
At time T4, a new social network emerges which exerts its reflectivity on 
agents and machines. At this point, a new morphogenetic cycle starts.
As Lally explains, “The development of the human subject (individual 
and collective) takes place through a progressive series of processes of exter-
nalisation (or self-alienation) and sublation (reabsorption or reincorpora-
tion). Human subjects and the (material and immaterial) objects of their 
sociocultural environment form a subject-object relation which is mutually 
evolving, and through which they form a recursively defined, irreducible 
entity” (Lally 2002: 32). These subject-object sociotechnical associations 
constitute the material culture of everyday life; they are bundled together 
with the affective flows of human relations and the emergence of a life-world 
in which images and emotions play a crucial role in the hybridisation of 
relationships, because it is through them that the subjects identify with the 
logic of virtual-digital relationships (LaGrandeur 2015).
The hybridisations of social relations and human identity through the 
DTM are connected to each other because the human being is a relational 
subject. The dynamics of mutual influence between identity and relations 
in the hybridisation processes are not linear, but proceed along very differ-
ent paths between the human person as a natural being (body, mind, and 
moral conscience), the human being a practical user of technologies (ICTs, 
AIs, robots), and the human being as a social subject within the networks 
of social relations. Let us see the hybridisation of human identity through 
these different paths of interactions.
 4 I am referring to the re-entry operation proposed by Spencer-Brown (1979) and subse-
quently used by Luhmann. I have taken it up by interpreting it in a relational key to define 
the human: see P. Donati. ‘A Critical Realist Perspective on Humanness as a Meaningful 
Re-Entry of Relational Distinctions.’ Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, first pub-
lished: 15 October 2020 https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12252.
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1 There are two-way interactions between the natural being and the use 
of technology (regardless of the social context). From a phenomenolog-
ical point of view, the relational context is always there, but in many 
cases, the human agents do not take this into account, as often happens 
in medical settings and biological laboratories.
Examples of this type of hybridisations are those widely used in medicine, 
where they involve checking whether the technology helps repair damaged 
organs or cure diseases. Baker (2013) generally refers to this type, obviously 
considering the individual as natural beings. But even when she speaks of 
human enhancement in the proper sense, that is as making someone or 
something “more than normal” by applying digital technological devices 
that are well beyond therapy, she does not consider the implications on the 
level of the social context. Since the relational order (context) is practically 
ignored in her theory, Baker’s vision remains restricted to a mentalised 
interpretation of the hybridisation of the individual.
2 There are two-way interactions between the use of technology and soci-
ality. In this case, the human agent is a virtual person who disregards 
his/her body-mind constitution. An example of this type of hybridisa-
tion is the phrase: “I do not use the blog; I am the blog.” Hybridisation 
happens through the formation of a relationship in which Ego’s identity 
is its blog. There is an identification of subject and object: no longer, “I 
make my blog in order to communicate,” but, “I am my communica-
tion” (Stichweh 2000). The logic of the blog becomes part of the logic 
of the Subject, who reflects according to the logic of what was once an 
instrumental object (a means) and now has become his/her way of relat-
ing (a norm), which reflects a value placed in the communication itself, 
in the presence of an undetermined goal.
The dialogue between the “I” (i.e. the Self that dialogues with itself), its 
“Me” (i.e. what the “I” has done in the past), and its “You” (i.e. what the 
“I” is willing to do in its future)5 takes place within an interactive time reg-
ister, in which time is evenemential, that is has no durée (it is composed 
of a sequence of events each without duration). It is neither relational (the 
time of relationships that have a beginning, a duration, and an end), nor 
symbolic (the time of symbols that have no time, those that do not depend 
on time), but is purely interactive (appears and disappears with every sin-
gle communication).6 The temporal history of the body-mind reflexivity, its 
stock of knowledge (Elster 2017), does not enter the process, except for the 
 5 This sequence is elucidated by Archer (2013, Figure 2, p. 4).
 6 On the three registers of time interactional, relational, and symbolic, see Donati (2011a: 
180–181).
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aspects in which it has been mentalised. The identification of the human 
person with the blog is the outcome of the process of mentalisation, which 
corresponds to the fact that an AI has become part of the Subject’s Mind, 
forging its conscience.
3 There are two-way interactions between the agent as natural being and 
sociality. In this case, the individual acts regardless of the technology, 
and, therefore, there is no hybridisation. This is the case, for example 
of families of elderly people who do not use digital technologies or of 
voluntary organisations that take care of the poor and fragile without 
resorting to any technological tool.
4 There are processes in which the agents are involved in all three orders 
of reality. Their body-mind complex and their sociality are mediated by 
technology, which is what happens “normally,” in fact, in any institu-
tion and organisation. The kind and degree of hybridisation depends on 
the network structure in which the agency is embedded.
It is important to emphasise that hybridisation of social identities and organ-
isations through the use of technology happens by involving the mind-body 
complex in the context of relationships, without the mind being separated from 
the body. The mind of agents/actors is modified through the perception and 
activation of those social relationships that are possible only through the body.
Victoria Pitts-Taylor offers an account of how the mind works on the 
basis of a brain that is “complex and multiple, rather than determined and 
determining” (Pitts-Taylor 2016: 8). Drawing on work by feminists, queer 
theorists, and disability theorists, she offers an understanding of bodies and 
cognition that can incorporate the cognitive differences that result from dif-
ferences in embodiment and that can recognise the social shaping of both 
bodies and cognition. She notes that scientists have discovered that some 
neurons seem to respond both to our performance of an action and to our 
observation of others performing that action. These mirror neurons have 
been theorised to underlie social relationships, especially “mind reading” 
and empathy. We need to do a better job of recognising the complexity and 
variety of social relationships. In particular, the assumption that the exist-
ence of mirror neurons shows that we are naturally in tune with others and 
empathetic to them leaves social neuroscientists unable to account for why 
our empathy for others is so often selective and so often fails. This is an 
example of how social neuroscience can take the embodiment of brain and 
social relationship seriously, differently from those attempts to create digital 
identities as avatars that simulate the human without being human (e.g. the 
Soul Machines company), thus producing a morphic sociability devoid of 
real humanity (Pitts-Taylor 2016).
Let us now move from the micro to the meso and macro levels of the 
social fabric, to consider the institutional and organisational hybridisation 
processes.
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The emergence of hybridised institutions and organisations
I call hybridised organisations and institutions those that pursue a social 
configuration in which advanced digital technologies are conferred a cer-
tain degree (min/max) of decisional and operational autonomy. Technology 
(AI/robotics) takes on an autonomous and decisive role in managing the 
organisation of roles and relations between the members of the organisa-
tion. The digital logic with which hybrid organisations operate is that of 
increasing opportunities, conceived, however, not within the framework of 
their relational implications, but according to the maximum useful variabil-
ity in terms of system efficiency.
The relational approach to social organisations can show why and how 
AI and robots cannot replace humans because of the specific generative 
character of inter-human relations. In fact, the utilitarianism of efficiency 
refers to the relationships between an actor/agent and “things,” while the 
search for relational goods – or the avoidance of relational evils – implies 
relationships between human beings, which, unlike algorithms, are genera-
tive of meta-reflexive solutions for problems of human relationships.7
Let me give an example of how an algorithm can generate relational 
evils. On November 21, 2017, the algorithm of the multinational company 
Ikea fires a worker of its megastore in a small town near Milan. Marica, a 
39-year-old mother separated from her husband with two young children, 
one of whom is disabled, is fired because she does not observe the new work 
shift assigned to her by the algorithm. The algorithm has ordered her to 
show up at 7 a.m., and, instead, she arrives at 9 o’clock according to the 
old work shift because she has to look after the children, and, in particular, 
she has to take the disabled child to therapy. Previously, the woman had 
explained to the manager that she could not work that shift, and the man-
ager said that he would consider her situation, but the algorithm worked on 
its own and fired her. The company did not review its decision, and, instead, 
continued to dismiss other workers on the grounds that they did not comply 
with the indications of the algorithm.
Undoubtedly, it cannot be said that the algorithm has not been proven 
to have its own “personal” decision-making ability (some call it “electronic 
person”), but it was certainly not a relational subject. Clearly, the algorithm 
 7 By relying on the notion of auctor proposed by Donati, Scott Eacott (2018: 85) observes 
that “Auctor provides the intellectual resource to overcome the structure/agency analyti-
cal dualism through recognition of relations and the generative rather than deterministic 
nature of activity without defaulting to a naïve form of autonomy. […] Auctors generate 
organising activity. They are not separate from spatio-temporal conditions but simultane-
ously constitutive of and emergent from them. The substantialist basis of organisational 
theory in educational administration and leadership is broken down through relations. 
This is why, despite my (somewhat artificial) partitioning of organising activity, auctor, 
and spatio-temporal conditions here, they work together, in relation, to generate an elabo-
rated communication of activity.”
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simply followed its procedural rules, neglecting the needs of people and 
their relational context, which were unpredictable for him. If so, we can 
say that the algorithm is not a person, given the fact that a person is an 
“individual-in-relation” (relationality being constitutive of the individual), 
although it is presented as such by management. The algorithm’s personal-
ity is a convenient managerial fiction.
In the perspective of the future, in my opinion, in principle, it will be 
possible to build more sophisticated AI/robots that can take into account 
people’s needs and their relationships. However, in addition to modifying 
the instructions provided to the algorithm accordingly, it will be always 
necessary to supervise its operations by a management that, by adopting a 
relational steering approach, must be able to deal with the individual prob-
lematic cases and the complexity and diversity of contingencies that the algo-
rithm cannot handle. Without such relational steering, the hybridisation of 
organisational relationships due to increasing automation will only mean 
exploiting people and dismissing them by blaming the algorithm for making 
inhuman decisions and apologising for not being able to do otherwise.
From a more general view, as Teubner writes, “Today, with the mas-
sive emergence of virtual enterprises, strategic networks, organisational 
hybrids, outsourcing and other forms of vertical disaggregation, franchis-
ing and just-in-time arrangements, intranets and extranets, the distinction 
of hierarchies and markets is apparently breaking down. The boundaries 
of formal organisations are blurring. This holds true for the boundaries of 
administration (hierarchies), of finance (assets and self-financing), of inte-
gration (organisational goals and shared norms and values) and of social 
relations (members and outside partners). In formal organisations, mem-
bership becomes ambiguous, geographical boundaries do not matter much 
anymore, hierarchies are flattened, functional differentiation and product 
lines are dissolved” (Teubner 2002: 311).
Hybrids raise problems of conflict between divergent normative arrange-
ments. As a strategy to deal with these changes, Teubner recommends a 
“polycontexturality which combines heterarchy with an overarching unity” 
(Teubner 2002: 331) assuming that this organisational solution would rep-
resent the new institutional logic capable of avoiding collisions between 
spheres ruled by incompatible norms.
I take Teubner’s proposal as an example of an attempt to preserve the 
human (with its regulatory requirements) alongside the acceptance of the 
entry of new hybrids, through general rules that allow different norms to 
coexist in different domains (Teubner 2006b). Unitas multiplex is his key 
word for preserving the integration of society, supposing that human beings 
and actants, human relations and artificial relations, could coexist within 
a neo-functional differentiation architecture under the aegis of the DTM.
I have serious doubts about the tenability of this perspective (although 
it worked in the 17th century as the Hobbesian solution to the problem of 
social order). I think that it is an impracticable solution in a networked 
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society governed by the DTM. In any case, it does not work for a “society 
of the human.” As Hobbesian (Leibnizian) rationalism, Teubner’s idea of 
a constitutionalisation of the private hybridised spheres does not address 
the issues of the relations between human and non-human, and the rela-
tions between divergent normative spheres. Teubner’s perspective simply 
avoids the relational issue. In short, it has all the limitations of a multi-
cultural doctrine that ignores the reality of what lies in between opposite 
spheres that have incompatible normative orders. It is silent about the 
issue of how far the hybridisation processes can go and to what extent they 
can affect the human.
The same difficulty is present in the Luhmannian theory that seems to do 
a good job of interpreting the hybridisation processes insofar as it places all 
cultures under the aegis of a conception of society as an “operating system” 
(Clam 2000). According to Luhmann (1995), all systems, organisations, and 
interactions are forced to use a binary functional code that is precisely the 
one through which the DTM proceeds. Hybridisation follows a functional 
code. For this reason, he believes that the humanism of the old Europe is 
unsustainable and, therefore, sees no other way than that of considering the 
human (especially the human of the Western tradition) as a residual entity 
fluctuating in the environment of the DTM. Are there no alternatives? I 
think that there are. We must examine the possible scenarios.
Three scenarios dealing with the processes of hybridisation
The digital transformation of society is destined to produce different types 
of hybrids through different types of social morphogenesis. I would like 
to summarise them in three scenarios: adaptive morphogenesis, turbulent 
morphogenesis, and relationally steered morphogenesis.
1 Adaptive MG producing hybrids by trial and error: this is the scenario of 
a society that adapts itself to the hybridisation processes produced by 
DTM in an opportunistic way; it is configured as an afinalistic infos-
phere – without pre-established goals, as in Floridi (2015) – that tries 
to use the technologies knowing that they have an ambivalent charac-
ter: they allow new opportunities but also involve new constraints and 
possible pathologies; therefore, it is essentially engaged in developing 
self-control tools to limit emerging harms (theories of harm reduction).
2 Turbulent MG favouring mutations: this is the scenario of a society that 
operates for the development of any form of hybridisation; it becomes 
“normal” to anthropomorphise the robots, as well as to robotise the 
human body: in principal, it is run by anormativity and anomie (lack 
of presupposed moral norms) and openness to mutations, understood 
as positive factors of “progress” (theory of singularity); it operates 
through ceaseless, unrepeatable, intermingling processes of relational 
flows with “confluence of relating” (Shotter 2012).
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3 Relationally steered MG aiming to configure technologies in order to favour 
relational goods: this is the scenario of a society that tries to guide the 
interactions between human subjects and technologies by distinguishing 
between humanising and non-humanising forms of hybridisation. The 
aim is to produce social forms in which the technologies are used reflex-
ively in order to serve the creation of relational goods. This requires that 
producers and consumers of technologies work together interactively, 
that is that they are co-producers and partners in the design and use 
of technologies, careful to ensure that technologies do not completely 
absorb or replace human social relations, but enrich them. This alterna-
tive is certainly much harder to pursue than harm reduction, but it is not 
impossible, and it is the one that leads to good life.8
Hybridisation cancels every dualism. In particular, it erases the dualism 
between the system and the lifeworld (theorised by Habermas 1987) and 
replaces it with a complex relational system in which each action/communi-
cation must choose between different causal mechanisms (Elder-Vass 2018).
To be human, technological enhancement must be able not only to dis-
tinguish between the different causal mechanisms, but also to choose the 
most productive social relationships that can generate relational goods. 
New technologies generate not only unemployment, as many claim. They 
also release energy for the development of many jobs in the field of virtual 
reality and make it possible to put human work into those activities that 
have a high content of care, such as education, social assistance and health, 
or a high content of cultural creativity.
Laaser and Bolton (2017) have shown that the introduction of new tech-
nologies associated with the advance of performance management prac-
tices has eroded the ethics of the care approach in banking organisations. 
Under electronic performance management monitoring in bank branches, 
in particular, co-worker relationships have become increasingly objecti-
fied, resulting in disconnected and conflict-ridden forms of engagement. 
This research reveals the multilayered and necessarily complex nature of 
co-worker relationships in a changing, technologically driven work environ-
ment and highlights the necessity for people to defend the capacity to care 
for others from the erosive tendencies of individualised processes. Within 
the relational approach, this entails assessing the way in which an organ-
isation uses AI/robots to enhance human relations from the viewpoint of 
what I call “ODG systems” (already illustrated in Chapter 2) aimed at the 
relational steering of digitised organisations.
ODG systems, based on the sequence: relational observation (O) → rela-
tional diagnosis (D) → relational guide (G), can make use of AI/robots 
 8 Practical examples can be found in the journal “Relational Social Work” (free access).
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as means for communication, information sharing, and decision-making. 
The cooperative norm is obviously inserted as a basic standard in the AI/
robot that supports the agents of the social network. The sequence works 
like that. (O) Relational observation aims to define the problem to which 
AI must respond in terms of a problem that depends on a certain rela-
tional context. Therefore, it favours the meso level (in which relational 
goods can be produced). (D) Relational diagnosis aims to define the sat-
isfactory (or not satisfactory) conditions with respect to the effects pro-
duced by the way the AI works on the relational context (i.e. whether the 
AI contributes to produce relational goods instead of relational evils). (G) 
Relational guidance aims to modify the AI and its way of working to sup-
port a relational context that can be mastered by people in order to gener-
ate relational goods.
An example of product innovation can be that of systems that try to 
regulate the AIs of self-driving cars. The AI must be constructed in such 
a way as to take into account the main parameters of the relational con-
text in which it operates. The AI must see objects and people around, and 
assess their relationships with respect to those who sit in the driver’s seat 
to put him in a position to intervene on situations that present a high 
contingency. Relational observation implies the ability of AI to calcu-
late the relationships given in a context and those possible in its short- 
medium-range evolution. Relational diagnosis concerns the ability to per-
ceive possible clashes in case the relationships with objects and people 
can become dangerous while the car is on the street. Relational guidance 
means the ability to regulate these relationships in order to make driving 
safer.
At the organisation level, we can consider any company that uses AI/
robots in order to produce satisfactory goods for customers. The AI/robots 
that are used must have similar characteristics to those just mentioned for 
the self-driving car. It is up to those who organise the production, distribu-
tion, and sale of business products to configure the AI/robots so that they 
have the ability to contextually relate and evaluate the progress of relation-
ships in various sectors within the company and in the context of sales and 
of consumption. It is not enough to improve the cognitive intelligence of the 
single AI/robot. It is necessary to build AI/robots that are able to regulate 
the progress of the network of relations between producers, distributors, 
and consumers of company products. Is this possible?
I do not know practical examples already in place, but the idea of “dis-
tributed responsibility” among all the actors in the network that produces, 
distributes, and uses the goods produced goes in this line. It requires that 
the AI/robots be constructed and monitored within a project of (i) observa-
tion of their relational work, (ii) with the ability to diagnose deviations from 
satisfactory procedures and results, and (iii) the orientation of the manage-
ment to operate according to a relational guidance program.
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Summary
With the fourth technological revolution, social identities, relations, and 
organisations are forced to take shape in the environment of a Digital 
Matrix that works through a symbolic code that tends to replace the onto-
logical, ideal, moral, and theological matrices that have structured societies 
in the past. As a form of Technological-Gnosis, its peculiarity is that of mak-
ing the boundaries between human and non-human labile and crossable 
in every way in order to foster hybrids. Hybrids, however, are not random 
and purely contingent entities. They stem from complex interactional net-
works in which social relations are mediated by the DTM. The processes 
of hybridisation are selective and stratified according to the ways in which 
the human/non-human distinction is thought and practised. Three possible 
scenarios of hybridisation can be outlined: adaptive, turbulent, and rela-
tionally steered.
As a criterion for evaluating hybridisation processes, I have proposed 
assessing how digital technologies mediate the transformations of people’s 
mind-body identities with their sociality so as to assess when such media-
tions produce those relational goods that lead to a virtuous human fulfil-
ment or, instead, relational evils.
The justification of this perspective is based on the fact that human 
beings are at the same time the creators of society and its product. They 
are the parents and the children of society. As a consequence, it is not the 
physical world (Anthropocene) and/or the artificial world (AI/robots) that 
can produce the human being as a human being, but society, which, from 
the point of view of my relational sociology, consists of relationships, that is 
“is” (and not “has”) relationships. Therefore, the quality and causal prop-
erty of what is properly human comes into existence, emerges and develops 
only in social life, that is only in and through people’s sociability, which 
is however embedded in the practical order and has roots in the natural 
order. In fact, only in sociality does nature exist for the human being as a 
bond with the other human being. The vital element of human reality lies 
in the relationality, good or bad, that connects Ego to Other and Other to 
Ego. The proper humanisation of the person is achieved only through the 
sociality that can be enjoyed by generating those relational goods in which 
the naturalism of the human being and his technological enhancement com-
plement each other.
The hybridisation of society
10 Prospects
Should we abandon the dream 
of a human(e) society?
“What madness not to know how to love men as they are! Fool who 
cannot bear to be a man” (Augustine of Hippo, Confessions, 4, 7)
Can society retain its human qualities and properties?
The fact that the boundaries between the human and non-human (both nat-
ural and artificial) entities evaporate in many social and cultural contexts 
reveals that the ground is ready for a kind of society (read: networks of 
social relationships) that abandons its human characters to take on others, 
still unknown. What features will the future society have?
Many fear the advent of algocracy (the rule of algorithms) as that particu-
lar form of governance of relationships where the process is managed by the 
operating algorithms of digital platforms. According to Aneesh (2002), who 
invented this term, algocracy tends to flatten all bureaucratic structures 
because it does not require any intermediate or centralised level of manage-
ment. Thus, the indestructibility of bureaucratic structures prophesied by 
Weber seems no longer a stable truth despite (or because of) the continued 
advance of formal rationality.
In this way, social relations become even more indifferent to differences 
(“neutral”) than they already were in modernity (Aneesh 2015). A real “neu-
tralized society” is born – neutral even in the face of human/non-human 
difference. People become disconnected from the local interactions and per-
sonal relationships that make their lives anything but neutral.
By subjecting social relations to virtual games, and by neutralising rela-
tional goods, the possibility of finalising social life towards the emancipa-
tion of the human person is brought into play.
Advanced societies seem to be more and more dissatisfied with the lim-
itations that are inherent in the so-called human nature. The premise of 
this dissatisfaction was clearly expressed by Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche 
in his famous writ “Human, all too human” (1878), in which he launched 
the theme of transcending the human for the next centuries. Since then, it 
is a matter of fact that the old Western humanism has declined for many 
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reasons that cannot be enumerated here. In principle, this evolutionary 
trend has to do with a culture that does not accept the limits of the human, 
which is considered too weak, fragile, and perishable, and therefore should 
be transcended. As Simmel (1970: 8) has claimed, “man is the limited being 
without a limit.”
Looking at the future horizon, we ask ourselves: is it still possible, if it 
ever makes sense, to speak of some sort of (neo) humanism or should we 
abandon humanism and proceed towards the transcendence of the human?
What does it mean to transcend the human? As it is well known, today, this 
means getting into the post-human, the trans-human, and the cyborg. Well, 
if we transcend the human, in what society will the next generations live?
Transcending the human entails denying certain characteristics that are 
uniquely human (including those of weakness and physical limitations) and 
those that constitute human nature, just as we can still observe them today 
(Haslam 2006). It implies operations that take something away from the 
human to replace it with something else.
Giving the human beings special skills through particular technologies 
can strengthen or threaten human nature, depending on how technologies 
affect the constitution of the human person and her internal as well as exter-
nal relationality, and therefore the qualities and properties of society under-
stood as a web of relational social forms.
The two currently prevailing scenarios of societal evolution
To my view, we have to face two grand scenarios of the societal evolution, 
underlying the present cultural dynamics in the globalised world, that 
implicitly contain the two prevailing models of understanding human tran-
scendence. On one side, the Western scenario based upon the expansion of 
science combined with technology, positivistically geared to generating a 
new being with superhuman abilities. On the other side, the Eastern idea 
that the world evolution consists in a continuous bringing into existence 
what does not exist, that is a process in which human transcendence means 
the construction of a machine of Nothing.
Western scenario is fundamentally linear or multilinear in the way it con-
siders evolution, while Eastern scenario is basically circular, although in 
both scenarios, there may be spiral visions.
1 The first scenario assumes that human nature is equal to a bios equipped 
with psychism, what is human in the future will consist of these dimen-
sions enhanced by technology. The distinctions between human beings 
and other living beings (animals and plants) will be gradually fall-
ing. Human sociability will be transformed accordingly. In this per-
spective, the human being is considered as a nature’s beautiful glitch, 
that is a beautiful error of the natural evolution that has succeeded 
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in surviving and now is evolving into an infosphere which becomes 
anthropo-eccentric rather than anthropocentric (Floridi 2015). The 
basic tenet is that “more tech makes us more human.” The great vehi-
cle of this epochal transformation is seen especially in the ICTs, most 
of the times in combination with genetic engineering, nanotechnology, 
biotechnology, and cognitive sciences. The latter cease to be instru-
mental means mastered by people and become autonomous forces that 
modify (i) our self-conception (who we are), (ii) our mutual interactions 
(how we socialise), (iii) our conception of reality (our metaphysics), and 
(iv) our interactions with reality (our agency). In each case, ICTs have 
a huge ethical, legal, and political significance, yet one with which we 
have begun to come to terms only recently.
The supporters of these views are convinced that the aforementioned impact 
exercised by ICTs is due to at least four major transformations: (i) the blur-
ring of the distinction between reality and virtuality; (ii) the blurring of 
the distinction between human, machine, and nature; (iii) the reversal from 
information scarcity to information abundance; and (iv) the shift from the 
primacy of stand-alone things, properties, and binary relations, to the pri-
macy of interactions, processes, and networks.
The impact summarised in (1)–(4) and the transformations behind such 
an impact listed in (i)–(iv) are used as a test to verify the foundations of the 
Onlife Manifesto philosophy, in the following sense. It is assumed that peo-
ple’s perceptions and understandings of the realities surrounding them are 
necessarily mediated by concepts. The latter work like interfaces through 
which people experience, interact with, and semanticise (in the sense of mak-
ing sense of, and giving meaning to), the world. In conclusion, we humans 
grasp reality through concepts, so, when reality changes too quickly and 
dramatically, as it is happening nowadays because of ICTs, we are concep-
tually wrong-footed (Floridi 2015: 2–3).
My criticism to the technological versions of this Western scenario con-
cerns the fact that there is a lot of determinism in it. In particular, one 
could observe that, contrary to what this vision maintains, perceptions 
precede their conceptualisation, so there is a gap in between them (the 
enigma of the relation) and not an overlapping as this scenario supposes. 
It is true that perceptions appeal immediately to the need for attributing a 
cultural meaning to what is perceived, but this happens through a reflexive 
processing of sensory experience. While for relationists, perception is nec-
essarily mediated by concepts, as if they were the unavoidable interfaces 
through which reality can be experienced, relational sociology argues that 
cultural mediation is necessary for the full recognition of reality, but it is 
the product of a process of personal and relational reflexivity, which of 
course may be very weak or even distorted, and indeed can be of many 
different kinds.
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It seems to me that opposing this view on the basis of an individualist 
first-person perspective is not enough, because this view of personhood does 
not recognise the consistency needs and uniqueness of the relation between 
mind and body in each person. Baker (2007) and Archer (2020), for example, 
claim that the first-person perspective is necessary and sufficient to preserve 
the sense of the human. Their perspectives are perfectly compatible with this 
evolutionary scenario, once we admit that technology can change the human 
body without affecting the way one thinks of oneself as oneself. I disagree with 
these scholars because I believe that denying the essentiality of the mind-body 
relationship, as well as the importance of social relations, in the constitution 
of human identity, means abandoning the human to enter another order of 
reality. Despite an apparent support for the enhancement of the human, they 
actually hide a reductive understanding of the human and its depreciation in 
favour of an increase in the importance of technology and the Digital Matrix.
We have to pay attention to the influence exerted by social relations on the 
first-person perspective. That is why, while I too maintain a first-person per-
spective (together with the second-person and third-person perspectives), I 
do not agree with Baker when she thinks that we can split what is human 
(the animal) and what is a person (in her definition: “self-reflectivity on one 
self”), as – in her view – they do not form an identity. On the contrary, I 
argue that the notion of “human person” indicates the more overarching 
concept that captures the fully social, interconnected, and bonded human 
being in her entirety. However, much, as Luhmann states, the body seems 
to disappear from modernity, and, however, much the split between the 
psychic system (consciousness), the social system and the biological system 
increases, thus making the unity between these elements more and more dif-
ficult, however, as Francis Halsall (2012: 4) writes, “the body has the ability 
to migrate between different systems and, thus, has a transcendent status in 
social systems. That is, the body can migrate between social systems and, in 
Luhmann’s terms, irritate them in significant ways.”
Human body, mind, and agency cannot be completely separated. Either 
they are integrated, or the human is no longer such and the action is no longer 
human. The unity of this difference is a relation. Splitting body and mind is 
an abstract operation that can serve to give absolute priority to a first-person 
perspective, defined as “our inwardness—our abilities not just to think, but 
to think about our thoughts; to see ourselves and each other as subjects; to 
have rich inner lives” (Baker 2002: 370). This is a naïve perspective. It does 
not see how the relationships between people influence their inner life and 
does not provide any meaningful account of the real experiences of “nor-
mal” people (not humanoids or robots) in connecting their body and mind 
in a hyper-technological society. The “inner” abilities Baker is referring to 
are strictly dependent on the new communicative environment as well as the 
possibility of keeping a sense of identity in the connections between body 
and mind. Baker’s first-person perspective seems to be a strategy that is pro-
posed to leave the body to the technologies and preserve (indeed enrich) the 
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“reflective mind” (Baker 2013, 2016), as if the same technologies did not have 
a powerful influence on the personhood through body modifications. In the 
end, what she calls “constitution view” of the human person is a-relational, 
in a double way: because she splits what is human and what is person (Baker 
2002: 370), and because she ignores the role of social relations in constituting 
the way in which the first-person perspective can actually operate.
2 The second scenario can be illustrated by quoting an evocative paper 
by Bilimoria (2012), in which he comments on the Veda books, where 
it is written: “In the beginning, there was neither Non-Being (asat) 
nor Being (sat)” (RgVeda X.129.1; it is called “hymn to the creation”). 
Bilimoria asks, “what was there, bottomless deep?” Eventually, he 
responds positively. The bottomless deep is called “Nothingness” (the 
absence of existence). The argument is that “Radical Nothingness 
ought not to be feared: it may have therapeutic value in the hallowed 
Wittgenstenian-Yogacārin sense (an antidote for excessive linguistic 
conceptualism); it may prove to be the timely yet fairest watchdog on 
the excesses of the Technoscience culture (to which Heidegger similarly 
drew attention), as well on fundamentalisms of all varieties, the return 
of religion to the public sphere (despite the Enlightenment’s decree), 
secularism re-seeking the sacred enchantments, and on other attach-
ments to Absolutes, perhaps also to being/Being, and an acute part-
ner in inter-faith, intradeist and inter-faithless conversation of the Four 
Horsemankind” (Bilimoria 2012: 528). “Therefore – so he concludes – 
let there always be non-being so we may see their subtlety, and let there 
always be being so we may see their outcome. The two are the same. But 
after they are produced, they have different names. They both may be 
called deep and profound (…) Deeper and more profound…” (quotation 
from Tao-te Ching by Lao-tzu) (Bilimoria 2012: 528).
Unlike the progressive vision of the former, this scenario leads to see the 
evolution of the whole creation, and the human evolution within it, as a 
“machine that creates Nothingness” (ibid) in the sense of bringing into 
existence what does not exist originally. It can mean to give real existence 
to certain fictional beings. In this scenario, there is no reason to distinguish 
between human and non-human, or to think of transcending the human, 
simply because, to put it bluntly, the religious matrix of these Oriental cul-
tures is a sort of naturalistic pantheism.
The general notion of “matrix” here refers to a cultural code (symbols 
and norms for their use) that orients or steers the way in which agents/actors 
intersect their intents, the situational context in which they find themselves, 
the meanings they use and the generated effects (Donati 2021). While the 
term matrix is generally used in the sense of “(symbolic) matrix of society,” 
here I would like to underline its transcendent dimensions (I will focus on 
the concept of transcendence in the next pages).
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In short, I have chosen to mention these two visions because, although distant 
and even contradictory in some respects, they seem to merge in the globalising 
society. What emerges from their mix is a culture that views human transcend-
ence as an endless evolution that is supposed to supersede human deficiencies 
by mixing natural and artificial elements of all kinds. Western rationalism is 
mixed with Oriental naturalism within a complex “nature + technology” in 
which transcendence is a matter of an immanence that surpasses itself. The 
result is a vision of human transcendence as a process of incessant creation of 
new singularities (see the theory of technological singularity). From my point 
of view, however opposite, these two scenarios seem to be connected by a sub-
tle and hidden thread, that of a kind of vitalism mixed with some kind of (a 
Nietzschean?) nihilism. What now is called “post-truth politics,” is, in fact, a 
form of cultural nihilism, since on the digital media “anything goes,” which 
means that communications do not discriminate between truth and non-truth, 
and communicative rationality is substituted by emotionality.
Bruno Latour’s thought, which refuses the concept of “out there” vs “in 
there” and renders the distinction between subject and object simply unusa-
ble by arguing that there are only “events,”1 provides an example of such an 
approach. It blends the Western culture with many typical elements belong-
ing to the Oriental culture. According to Latour, there is no reality out there, 
everything goes, science has no conceptual content, the more ignorant one is 
the better, everything is political anyway, subjectivity should be mingled with 
objectivity, and “action is simply not a property of humans but of an associ-
ation of actants” (Latour 1999: 182). Following Vandenberghe, we might ask: 
should we expect to become “humants,” that is humans dehumanised by the 
actant? “When science enters in action, meaningful action disappears and 
all we are left with is a pasteurized and desymbolized world of strategically 
acting dehumanized humans, or humants” (Vandenberghe 2002: 55).
A third scenario
The two scenarios just mentioned place human transcendence, respectively, 
in the total immanence of the technological evolution and in an imma-
nent process of creation that makes exist what is not. It is noteworthy that 
the adoption of both these perspectives is part of the strategy adopted by 
Luhmann to build his sociological theory overtly anti-humanistic.
I would like to present here a third scenario that introduces another idea 
of human transcendence. It conceives transcendence as an emerging rela-
tion between what exists (immanent reality) and what can be (transcenden-
tal reality).
 1 “There is no object, no subject, no contradiction, no Aufhebung, no mastery, no reca-
pitulation, no spirit, no alienation. But there are events. I never act; I am always slightly 
surprised by what I do” (Latour 1999: 281).
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I start by offering my own interpretation of the following sentence from 
the Vedas books: “sages who searched with their heart’s thought discovered 
the existent’s kinship in the non-existent.”2 What does it mean that there is 
a “kinship” between the existent and the non-existent when referred to the 
human being?
In my view, kinship can be interpreted as a particular relation between the 
existent and non-existent forms, not necessarily – as the original text seems 
to suggest – the reversibility of being and non-being within a cosmic vision 
of the emptiness of all things. Instead, if we adopt a relational perspective, 
the kinship between Being and Non-Being appears as an enigmatic rela-
tion, so that the existence and possible evolution of the human being (and 
its constitution) could be seen as a particular kind of relationality between 
immanence and transcendence.
In other words, we can say that, at the beginning (of any creation, not 
only of the original creation), there is not a bottomless depth, but a Being 
ever able to transcend itself by relating himself to the Non-Being (what does 
not exist yet). It is in this process of transcendence (emergence) that being 
and non-being are related, while no one of them can exist per se in absolute 
isolation. The very nature of creation would then consist in a relation that 
brings into existence what does not exist through a process of emergence. 
Is it possible to think that what is human can transcend itself in this “rela-
tional nature” of the creation? The possibility of arguing in favour of a pos-
itive answer to this question lies in the social ontology of what we mean by 
“relation” and “relationality.”
The relations between a human being and other living beings (animals 
and plants) or machines do not possess the same qualities and causal 
properties of the inter-human relations. If the interpersonal relations are 
replaced by technological devices, for instance the ICTs or robots, they 
become digital or mechanical, that is they change completely their qual-
ities and properties. They take on qualities and properties other than 
human ones. These are, for example, the social relations of the actant the-
orised by Bruno Latour.
In short, I want to support the thesis that the human does not transcend 
itself neither in the technological enhancement of the individual nor in the 
personal unit act, nor in creating more sensitive, smart, and human-like 
machines, but in the human relationship and only in it. As Anders (2016: 45) 
claims, “what makes ‘thing’ the person is not the scientific treatment, but 
the actual treatment of man by man.”
Since I realise that the reader may wonder “what is the mystery of this 
‘magical’ relationship,” in the following I will tackle the riddle of the social 
relation. The issue concerns the relationships between what is human and 
 2 RgVeda X.129.4 (italics mine). Another translation from Sanskrit is “The sages who have 
searched their hearts with wisdom know that which is kin to that which is not.”
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all its environments (in the sense of systems theory), that is both the physical 
and the transcendental realities.
The distinction human/non-human is a 
transcendental relation containing an enigma
To speak of transcendence implies a social ontology of reality that, in turn, 
refers to a transcendental reality, and therefore it calls for the existence of a 
transcendental cultural matrix to which the ontology is closely connected. 
When I claim that this matrix is “theological,” I do not refer to the dogmatic 
beliefs of a specific religious faith, but I mean the symbolic code underlying 
every great culture or civilisation concerned with ultimate realities. Every sci-
entific theory depends on a cultural matrix through which it “sees” the world, 
and this matrix has meta-reality presuppositions of any kind. The founding 
fathers of sociology, like Comte, Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, provide differ-
ent examples, and also today we can find such an underlying matrix in every 
sociological theory, although it is often unspoken, hidden, and removed.
The service of the transcendental matrix is to mould our needs, experi-
ences, and ways of thinking. It does this through an operation with which it 
treats the existent (the Dasein) in the light of what it supposes to transcend 
it. What is this operation of transcending what is simply observed at a cer-
tain moment?
Transcendence here can mean:
1 a metalevel of reality that we must and can reach, in order to explain 
what happens in reality, by relating to a further “layer” beyond what 
already exists in an open horizon (matrix) of up-grading orders of 
realities;
2 the necessity of this meta-relation, as distinct from its contingencies;
3 whereas “necessity” is a matter of recognition of what is latent (hidden, 
invisible, unmeasurable) as an “ultimate reality” bordering on religion 
(i.e. what is sacred, and, as such, conferring a dignity to every being, in 
the sense of recognising that every existing being deserves the respect 
that is due to it according to its own nature).
The recognition of the dignity of every entity (in Latin the word dignus 
means “a thing or a person deserving respect for its qualities”) marks the 
boundary between what I call “immanent transcendence” (as a product of 
society) and “transcendent transcendence” (as a reality which is not the prod-
uct of society, because it is pre- and meta-social).
The problem with which we are confronted is: what are the relationships 
between the human and the transcendental realities?
The possibility of linking human relations and transcendental relations 
depends on the fact of being able to see and manage the enigma of the rela-
tion as such, the enigma that lies in relationality as such (Donati 2015c).
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The enigma can be simply expressed with this question: why in order to 
achieve what people love and desire, transcending their constraints and limi-
tations, must they go through the relations with other people especially when 
new technologies are available that make human relationships unnecessary?
Take the example of Sweden. As Erik Gandini’s docu-essay The Swedish 
Theory of Love (movie 2015) has shown, Swedes’ obsession with independ-
ence and self-sufficiency, coupled with a welfare state that provides for every 
physical need, has produced a lonely and alienated society (it’s called “stat-
ist individualism”). Women can have a baby alone without a sexual rela-
tionship with a male partner, sperm-bank donors abound, many people die 
alone, and state investigators try to find the next of kin of old people who 
died alone and a suicide who were not found for years because all their stand-
ing orders were paid automatically. It is no coincidence that many young 
people refuse to live in the world of high technologies and organise camping 
in the woods to make alternative life experiences in common, take care of 
each other, relate and be in physical contact between people and with nature.
Why human beings should transcend their limitations and constraints 
by avoiding dealing with other people, especially when technologies can 
replace the presence of other human beings? If we know that a particular 
gene produces aggressive and deviant behaviours, why not avoid having to 
deal with these relationships by genetic engineering on DNA? Today, many 
jobs and services can be performed by machines: should we look for smart 
AI robots or humanoids who can work better than humans, by this way 
avoiding any sort of those interpersonal relations that we know in advance 
will be deficient and vexatious?
I am thinking of ordinary life, where people rely on technologies that once 
required human relations. The final horizon is that of a society, as Marx and 
Engels (Engels 1959: 386–387) advocated, in which takes place “the admin-
istration of things by things.” Of course, they could not speak of robots and 
cyborgs. We have done a lot of progresses ever since. Today, a-normative 
regulations justified by an adiaphoric ethics are amongst those procedural 
devices that allow present and future social systems to go in that direction.
The modern West has exalted the Subject (the I) at the expense of its 
relations. It thought it could provide social relations at its pleasure. It also 
thought and thinks in system terms, with the “system” being understood as 
instruments of liberation of individuals. It refused to answer that which I call 
the enigma of the relation (Donati 2015c), which consists in the fact that Ego 
needs an Other who is the source at the same time of support and conflict.
Ego must find something in common with the Other and at the same time 
assert the differences with him. When modernity sought to give an answer to 
this riddle, it created new problems, either because the answer was that of con-
flict, of division, of confrontation, or stipulated and then betrayed contracts, 
or because it pursued strategic games that have ended badly. The post-human 
exacerbates these problems because, while providing more advanced technol-
ogies to Ego, it further removes or dehumanise social relations.
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The point is that Western culture does not have devices (indeed a cultural 
matrix) capable of treating the riddle of the relationship, in the sense of 
knowing how to connect with other people so to have something in com-
mon while accepting the inevitable distress arising from differences. From 
Schelling and Hegel forward, there have been many attempts to think about 
this issue. Aside from countless authors from the 20th century (especially 
Foucault and Deleuze), it is sufficient to cite Derrida (1982), who sees the 
difference as ambiguity, and Lyotard (1984), who proposes analysing les dif-
férends qui nous opposent through a radical relationism. The point is that, 
in all philosophy and culture that starts from the idealism of the 18th and 
19th centuries and into the present day, the possibilities of conceiving of a 
relational matrix of society are still missing.
In the end, Western modernity has removed the reality – that is the proper 
space-time – of social relations, in order to create an indefinite number of 
relations, all virtual, all otherwise possible, in order to be able to play with 
them. Are these, as Jean Baudrillard says, “fatal strategies”? Or, are they 
functional strategies, as Luhmann says?
Luhmann’s explanation, not surprisingly, goes back to Greek mythol-
ogy. The solution of the enigma of the relation comes to be represented by 
Perseus, who managed to survive because he adopted a precise relationist 
strategy, consisting in avoiding the deadly gaze of the Gorgons (the enigma 
of the relation) through a continuous change in his position, in such a way 
as to never directly cross the gaze of the Gorgon. Luhmann (1990) calls this 
strategy “eurialistics,” according to which the insoluble problems of society 
(its paradoxes, like its enigmas) should be treated in such a way as to avoid 
directly confronting them, which means constantly changing one’s point of 
view by rendering everything “relative,” that is, adopting a radical relativism, 
or rather radical relationism. It is not surprising that the prevalent culture of 
today recommends precisely this way of life as the solution to the enigma of 
the relation: it is that way of relating to others that consists in believing that 
one cannot and should not have any certainty in the face of problems.
Consequently, our ways of life are in conflict with an increasingly radical 
crisis, made of existential and solipsistic voids, because we are not able to 
confront and to respond to the enigmas of human relationships that ask to 
go beyond appearances. It is precisely here that lies the need to transcend 
the human in its present limitations.
Any humanism requires a certain social 
ontology of relationality
Affirming the transcendence of social relationships does not mean denying 
their immanence. This affirmation must be clarified through a confronta-
tion between substantialist, relationist, and relational sociologies.
Both the relational and relationist approaches share the need to overcome 
the substantialist approaches of various types (spiritualist, naive realist, 
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positivist, rationalist) – which have dominated scientific thought in the past. 
This lesson comes to us from quantum theory which has questioned the 
existence of “the thing itself” (Rovelli 2020).
I would like to clarify my point of view by saying that the relationist point 
of view goes too far: it thinks the macro level of reality as if it could be 
understood in the same way as the micro level in which the indeterminacy 
principle applies. It conflates the micro and macro levels because it does not 
see the meso level. In this way, it does not understand the making of real-
ity. Table 10.1 outlines a comparison between substantialist, relationist, and 
relational approaches with regard to social reality.
I refrain from commenting on it in detail because it seems clear enough to 
me. I just want to point out the most fundamental differences. Social ontol-
ogy, paradigmatic assumptions, and epistemologies are basically different. 
Therefore, radical differences follow in the way of understanding the levels 
of reality, social structures, and social agents, what distinguishes the human 
and its capacity for transcendence.
The substantialist approach remains tied to the idea that an entity is 
real because it exists “in itself,” regardless of the relational context, and 
exerts effects which are consequences of its own substance. The relation-
ist approach completely overturns the previous way of observing reality. It 
assumes that an entity is real because it is observed and thought of as such 
by actors who are situated in highly contingent contexts. In short, something 
is real because it is observed by an observer who according to his tools of 
knowledge, believes it to be real. Contrary to both the first and the second, 
the relational approach thinks instead that an entity is real because it has 
specific causal powers in itself due to its own structure which is, however, 
formed by the dynamics of the past and present relational social context.
For relationists, social relations are nothing but transactions that occur in 
different social situations. They treat relations like a continuous and unde-
termined reference to infinity (an eschaton). Rorty (1999: 54) clarifies it very 
well, when he affirms, “Everything that can serve as a term of relation can 
be dissolved into another set of relations, and so on forever. There are, so 
to speak, relations all the way down, all the way up, and all the way out in 
every direction; you never reach something which is not just one more nexus 
of relations.”
Is that precisely how things are? I think not. Relationality does not cancel 
out substances, but forges them in social time, so that we must always read 
reality as consisting of substance and relation as co-principles of what exists 
or that there may exist (the “being”).
For my relational approach, the terms of the relation cannot be dissolved 
in other sets of relations by reason of the reality of their concrete relation, 
which is a structure with its own emergent properties and causal powers.
Open is the question of what social ontology we need in order to support 
a relational (not relationist) interpretation of reality, and what kind of tran-
scendental matrix it needs. We find here two opposite positions.
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Table 10.1  A comparison between substantialist, relationist, and relational 
approaches
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On one side, there are those who argue that relationality is constituted and 
intelligible without any need for a transcendental matrix. Along these lines is 
Niklas Luhmann, who uses an autopoietic and self-referential cultural matrix 
for which relationships serve to operationally close each system, and simul-
taneously as a cognitive opening of each system. What unites him with the 
relationists is the use of a holistic formula of total immanence of social pro-
cesses, according to which relational emergence excludes the reference to a 
transcendental reality. According to this theory, we must consider that, for 
example, a social cooperative, a family, a voluntary association, or a social 
movement – as a specific relational structure – is formed from itself without 
the need for an explanation that refers to some transcendental principle.
That is why, I disagree with Jean-Sébastien Guy (2018) when he tries to 
credit the thesis that Luhmann can be considered as a sort of forerunner of 
relational sociology. Guy writes, “system operations for Luhmann are rela-
tional operations. Indeed, with each operation of communication, a unity 
is projected over different elements scattered in time and space. These ele-
ments are as many micro-events that are connected together so as to create 
the macro-event that communication is (or meta-event: an event made out of 
other events). Since communication means coordination, this is accomplished 
when individuals take their cues from each other so that what one individual 
did at time t can be selected retroactively by another individual as the reason 
or justification for his own action at time t+1.These different elements are con-
nected together so as to create a unity out of them that the communication 
process (that is, the social system) can then adopt as its own unity” (Guy 2018: 
867). Since for Luhmann “relational operations” are defined by a system of 
cybernetic operations, they have nothing to do with social relationships as 
we observe them in real life. The above definition given by Guy resembles 
Weber’s definition of the social relation, which I have already commented 
upon as a reductive definition limited to a communication reference (refero). 
As a matter of fact, Luhmann explicitly denied that the concept of social rela-
tion could be considered the basic unit of sociological analysis (this statement 
was made by conversing with me and is explained in a footnote of one of his 
last books commenting upon my Teoria relazionale della società).3
 3 “Es gibt nach wie vor gute Gründe für die Beibehaltung dieser Begriffe [Struktur, ndr], 
wenn es darum geht, Systemmodellezu beschreiben. Aber über Modellbildung kommt 
man damit nicht hinaus. In ihrer operativen Wirklichkeit und in der Fluidität vor allem 
auch: im Reichtum ihrerübergangenen Möglichkeiten sind Systeme sehr viel komplexer, 
als es in einem Modell gezeigt werdenkann. Deshalb vermag ich auch dem Vorschlag 
von Pierpaolo Donati, Teoria relazionale della società, Milano 1991, nicht zu folgen, die 
Systemtheorie durch eine Relationentheorie zu ersetzen…” [translation: “there are still 
good reasons to keep these terms [like structure] when describing system models. But 
you can’t go beyond modeling. Above all, in their operational reality and fluidity: in the 
richness of their past possibilities, the systems are much more complex than those that 
can be shown in a model. Therefore, I cannot follow the proposal of Pierpaolo Donati, 
Relational theory of society, Milan 1991, to replace the theory of systems with a theory of 
relations…”] (N. Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, Suhrkamp. Frankfurt a.M., 
1997, vol. 2, p. 34, footnote 95).
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A different view is that of relational sociology, for which relation – as 
ontological entity (insofar as it is) – has its reason for being in a transcen-
dental reality (as defined earlier). This means that nothing comes into exist-
ence if not through/for/with the relation that possesses in itself a principle of 
transcendence. For example, the reality of a social cooperative, a family, a 
charity, a social movement, a company, a state, as a relational phenomenon 
sui generis – regardless of different contingent historical forms that these 
realities can take on – is fully comprehensible in its “being” only in the light 
of a transcendental symbolic code.
In these two seemingly opposed perspectives, Luhmannian and relational, 
there is the enigma of the relation that has come down to us through history. 
The riddle to be solved is this: is social relation in the world self-generated, 
as orthodox Luhmannians say, or does it depend on a “formula of tran-
scendence”4 as relational sociology maintains?
The answer is not simple. In a certain way, it is tempting to say that both 
perspectives contain something true, but obviously not on the same level. If 
we place ourselves before the comparison of these two positions (claiming that 
social relation is formed even if transcendence does not exist and claiming, 
instead, that, if transcendence is not given, relation – ontologically speaking – 
does not come to exist), and we ask ourselves who is right, we could respond 
by saying that they are both right, but from totally different points of view.
The former (the “Luhmannians”) are right in the sense that it is true that 
relations form “spontaneously” (due to interactions and inherent operations 
in the same contingent relations), and nonetheless, from a critical point of 
view, it is by no means assured that they are positive and humanising rela-
tions, but rather the opposite is quite likely. For Luhmann, in fact, the rela-
tion is certainly an emergent phenomenon, but completely contingent and 
devoid of structured distinctions rooted in moral values inherent to relations 
themselves. That is why, Luhmann formulates an anti-humanist sociology.
The others (those who refer to a transcendental symbolic matrix) are right 
in observing that an emergent dynamic rooted in a transcendent reality leads 
more easily to the creation of relational goods that a purely immanent way 
does not manage to create. This statement can be confirmed by empirical 
evidence, when, for instance, sociological surveys (Mahoney 2010) point out 
that families who are inspired by religious values produce more relational 
goods than those more secularised, although obviously any determinism 
is always excluded, since no family, even the most religiously inspired, is 
exempt from producing relational evils.
I propose adopting an approach that links the two perspectives as one 
sociological thesis to be verified. In short, the thesis to prove becomes that 
the social relation has its dynamic autonomy on the level of the “second” 
causes in the sociological sense (“be the second” here means that refer to 
 4 I take the expression “formula of transcendence” from Teubner (2009).
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the contingent empirical causes that unfold in space-time, i.e. in each his-
torically situated context), but does not have an absolute dynamic on the 
level of “first” causes in the sociological sense (“being first” here means that 
inhere in the ontological potentiality of an entity in coming to emergence as 
a reality sui generis). This is why, a transcendental matrix is needed in order 
to recognise human rights beyond contingencies. Human rights, differently 
from the civil, political, and social rights, are recognised to the individual 
person in so far as they involve specific relations (for instance every child 
has the human right to be raised in a family setting instead of an institu-
tion), which means that specific social relations should have a transcenden-
tal sense to the individual.
What brings together the first and second causes is the “vital relation,” 
which is both human and social because it relates the human and the social 
to each other. It “stands outside” of terms that it gathers, with its own qual-
ities and causal powers.
The vital relation is the relationship that a human person needs to find 
outside herself in order to be reflexive in herself on herself, so that she can 
tell herself to be herself, on the basis of distinctions with what she is not, 
because this relationship allows her to find her deepest identity. It is the 
relationship that makes us say: “Now I become myself.”
This new relation to oneself is a new (or renewed) belonging to oneself, 
but beware: this belonging is not an end in itself, otherwise, one falls into 
solipsism and narcissism. It is a belonging to oneself because, as a relation-
ship, it implies the passage from a non-being (a possibility X, usually unde-
termined) to being someone (not something) in a reference system (refero) 
that keeps me bound to other than me (religo). Therefore, it is an emerging 
relationship (creative) that makes me live unlike in the past on the basis of 
another reference system that I have chosen and to which I am bound, even 
if only temporarily.
It is in relating to the outside of her interior life that the person activates 
the inner self, which exists in itself. Personhood matures through social 
relations. Personal identity is constituted in, and sustained through, our 
relations with others, such that were we to erase our relations with our sig-
nificant others we would also erase the conditions of our self-identity.
The inner life has its autonomy, but this autonomy can only be activated 
and managed in relation to the outside, that is to significant others and to 
the social context. For this reason, I call it “vital relationship” (already illus-
trated in Chapter 8).
This relationality is not only that of symbolic references but includes 
structural bonds, and for this reason it is a concrete reality and not 
purely communicative. If the relationality between agents/actors consists 
of pure contingent communicative events, then it is equivalent to simple 
interactivity.
The solution to the enigma of the relation rests in the fact that the con-
stitution of a relation according to a certain structure is necessary to ensure 
226 
that each term (agent/actor) of the relation may obtain from it what it could 
not obtain in any other way. There are no functional equivalents for rela-
tions when they have a reality (relationality) sui generis. This is very clear for 
many traditional pre-modern cultures, like the Chinese culture of Guanxi 
(which means “relation”), in which any deal or exchange must take place 
within an established relationship and should lead to a renewed structured 
relation. It may become a practice also in trans-modern societies, although 
in different modes.
The non-fungibility of social relations unfolds when people realise that 
to live in a world of relations thought as “always possible otherwise” turns 
out to be a dream devoid of reality that generates frustrations, disillusions, 
addiction, estrangement, dissatisfaction, unhappiness, and a lot of social 
and psychological pathologies.
People know that certain social goods cannot be achieved through rela-
tionships that are standardised or interchangeable at will. Certainly, most 
people think that certain social relations do not make any difference. Take 
the case of the belief that all kinds of love relations with human beings or 
animals or things are equivalent or make no difference, on the basis of the 
idea that to make a difference between them is an intolerable discrimination. 
Most times, practical life undertakes to reveal to them the inconsistency of 
their belief. Then, and only then, they realise that one type of relationship is 
not fungible with a seemingly similar relationship. They start to think how 
to solve the enigma by looking for a unique (human) relationship that has 
no equivalent.
When a social form can be called human?
Human life can achieve as much as it can of happiness provided it passes 
through appropriate social forms, that is relationally valid to generate and 
express the humus of the human flourish. A social formation can be called 
human to the extent that the nature of its internal as well as external rela-
tionality is qualified by the recognition and satisfaction of basic human 
needs and nourishes people’s reflexivity in order to help them to realise their 
ethical ultimate concerns as a way of transcending human limitations.
In my relational language, a social form is human insofar as the social 
relationships of which it consists are produced by subjects who are oriented 
to each other according to a suprafunctional sense. This is precisely what is 
lacking in the relationships triggered by a robot or an actant.
When I speak of the nature of the relation, I mean its internal principle of 
operation. It is this operative principle that justifies the assertion according 
to which “at the beginning [of each reality] there is the relation.” This affirma-
tion coincides with the ontological principle that is at the base of relational 
sociology. It is in this principle, on it, with or without it, which is played 
the fate of Western reason, and therefore of the “Western society” itself, as 
regards a possible new humanism.
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Relational sociology consists in the observation that society, or rather, 
whatever phenomenon or social formation (a trading company, a civil asso-
ciation, the state), including the global society, is neither an idea (or a rep-
resentation or a mental reality) nor a material thing (biological, physical, 
technical, economical, or other types), but a complex network of social 
relations.
It is neither a “system,” more or less preordained or impinging upon 
individual agents, nor a product of individual actions aggregated or added 
together, but it is another order of reality: the society is relation, and every 
social formation – think also of the Internet – is made of social relations. 
Every society or social form is distinguished by the mode sui generis of com-
bining elements that make up what I call its constitutive “social molecule,” 
whereas such elements interact according to certain relational dynamics 
making a new structure emerge which can simply reproduce (morphostasis) 
or modify itself in a meaningful way in time (morphogenesis).
At the base of this interpretation of the social stands the fact (not the idea 
or the mere figuration or fiction) that the social relation must be conceived 
not as a reality that is accidental, secondary, or derived from other entities 
(individuals or systems), but rather as a reality of its own kind. Such a reality 
is endowed with an autonomy that consists in the peculiar way in which the 
affective, cognitive, and symbolic elements proper to human beings come 
to be combined. To claim that society, indeed the whole of human reality, is 
relational can seem almost obvious, but it is not at all where the affirmation 
is understood as an ontological and epistemological presupposition, and 
therefore one is conscious of the enormous implications that derive from it.
In the end: confronting the dissolution of 
humanity with relational thinking
Post-humans and trans-humans are dreams populated by phantoms, and 
very peculiar phantoms that appear to be real, or better seem to be real 
because they produce some realities. As Günther Anders (2016: Section 24) 
claimed many years ago, “Phantoms are not only matrices of the experience of 
the world, but the world itself. The real as reproduction of its reproductions.” 
The kind of evolution that they feed is far from human, call it dis-human, 
inhuman, or a-human. To avoid all the deceits that they bring with them, we 
need to overcome the dissolution of humanity with relational thinking.
Is that neo-humanism? I do not know. What I am suggesting is that we 
are forced to abandon the old humanism of the West taking into account the 
deep changes of our times that are trying to transform the human in some-
thing else through technological progresses. This fact obliges us to overcome 
the “personalistic views” of the past that have put what is human inside the 
individual as such rather than in its intrinsic relational constitution.
Traditional personalism distinguished humans from other living beings 
for their ability to exercise an inner reflexivity and make individual choices 
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in the assumption that the goodness of these features would bring sponta-
neously the common good. A relational humanism must acknowledge that 
this old concept of person is no longer sufficient to identify the human per-
son. In the new scenario, a person is human, and becomes more human (i.e. 
transcends itself), if and to the extent that she generates social relationships 
that support the flourishing of relational goods from which she feeds herself 
in order to be more humane.
When we do not know what to do with others and with the situations of 
life, or what relation to have with the contingent world around us, then we 
feel confused, weak, fragile, sad, and in crisis. Every existential situation in 
which we find ourselves, each encounter with something or someone that 
puts us in trouble, is a relation that challenges us. Usually, we do not think 
of these situations in terms of relations, because we only see individuals 
and things. We must confront something (a situation) or someone (people 
around) and ask ourselves what to do. The fastest way to go is to find a tech-
nological device that can solve this problem. In reality, however, behind the 
challenge of situations, there is a challenge that we do not see, and it is the 
most important challenge. It is the challenge of the relation in play, which 
asks us to transcend ourselves.
We need to see the Vital Relation that, by linking the unity of body and 
mind to the context of existence, makes it possible for us to transcend our-
selves. We must learn to deal with this Vital Relation. The enigma to be 
solved lies in this relation, not in technological devices. Human life is in the 
enigma of the relation. The enigma of the relation contains the meaning of 
human life.
My answer to the question whether or not we can be humanist, and prac-
tise a humanist sociology, is therefore the following. The crisis of human 
relations brought about by the modernising and globalising processes is 
what fuels the search for a posthumanism that can remedy this crisis. The 
concomitant crisis of a collective faith in something that transcends our-
selves, so to become demotivated to pursue a common endeavour, and of 
interpersonal relations at the micro level finds an explanation in the fact 
that in both of these relations, the texture of relationality is made evanes-
cent. The loss of the inherent sense of the relation is the “intervening factor” 
which explains the crisis of social solidarity in its manifold forms. If the 
sense of the human relation diminishes, then so does the transcendental 
relation, and vice versa. The same holds true for the relation between the 
human and non-human realms. For a deeper understanding of this point, it 
is necessary to recall that the source of the meaning of the relation lies in its 
transcendental cultural matrix, although the social relation is generated (or 
is not generated) due to autonomous causes.
In summary, to grasp the why, where, and how the human can transcend 
itself, it is necessary to “see” the peculiarities of interpersonal relations 
and their enigmas. One could observe that even the relations with robots 
are enigmatic, but these enigmas are games, not the stakes of serious life 
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(the Durkheimian “vie serieuse”). Thinking that the human person is dis-
tinguished from animals, plants, and machines because it is able to think 
in first person (i.e. to think of oneself as oneself) is not enough. Nobody 
can exclude the possibility that, in the future, very smart robots or cyborgs 
could become able to behave in such a way.
To my mind, what distinguishes the human person is her “structural rela-
tional constitution,” in inner as well as exterior life. This dynamic constitu-
tion is the relational substance that enables the human person to transcend 
herself in the relationship with others and with the world, acting reflex-
ively, not only in herself (personal reflexivity), but on the social relations as 
such (relational reflexivity), which she assesses as good or evil, taking into 
account the behaviour of significant others and the reference to the situa-
tional context.
The technologies that lead humanity towards the post-/trans-human must 
be analysed and evaluated based on the criteria of what human relations 
they assume, and of those they produce.
Early modernity modified natural relationships by creating an acquisitive 
capitalist society in which relationships are thought of as the fruit of indi-
vidual choices. Homo faber is held to be master of his destiny. Modernity 
thus created a historical process in which relationships became a game, an 
expression of one’s emotions and concerns, a play of fictitious distinctions 
to be used at will. The latest modernity has taken on the task of completely 
opening Pandora’s box of relations, and consequently has met its own failure 
signalled by increasingly fierce system crises that leave society completely 
disoriented and uncertain, prey to the most unthinkable risks.
At this point, modernity can continue to play with Pandora’s box of vir-
tual relationships that do not respond to human needs, creating processes of 
neo- and hyper-modernisation, or it can take another path. The latter is the 
way of a society which, without rejecting the best acquisitions of the past, 
redefines its own cultural and social structures grounding on a relational 
social ontology and a relational anthropology. The latter presuppose a way 
of thinking that knows how to properly see and manage social and human 
relationships, which means revising the assumptions that the individual 
is a self-determining being and that social institutions must serve his/her 
self-determination.
Here is the point where relational society encounters a decisive fracture, 
in some ways unbridgeable, with all modernity. The fracture lies in the fact 
of having to take note that, pushing on the self-determination of the individ-
ual, we lose the human subject. Who is no longer master of herself, nor of the 
relational games she can play. The human subject cannot live without mean-
ingful relationships, although their meaning is all to be discovered. Just the 
loss of significant relationships reveals that the human being is realised not 
in self-determination or in the technology of doing, but in the encounter 
with the Other, when the encounter produces a relational good. The being 
of the person, like that of society, is in the relationship. This is the social 
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ontology needed by a new society. This is why, we cannot think of a society 
that completely expels the human from the social. The human person can be 
happy only when she knows how to emerge from relationships to the Other 
and at the same time knows how to “surrender” to these relationships.
However, we are all aware that this transition from modernity to an after-
modernity is not at all obvious. It is open to a sea of alternative possibili-
ties, as I have tried to clarify by talking about the different morphogenetic 
scenarios.
Wondering whether aftermodern society will be better or worse than 
modern society makes no sense, because comparison is not possible. The 
society I speak of tries to transcend the modern one with a relational think-
ing that remains open to many and different possibilities. The relational 
society that lies in our horizon is not necessarily good or bad in itself. It can 
be both. In this, it reveals that it is still “human.”
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